THE STRUGGLE FOR POPULATION


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
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THE STRUGGLE FOR POPULATION

BY

D. V. GLASS

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS

OXFORD

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1936

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
AMEN HOUSE, E.C. 4
London Edinburgh Glasgow New York
Toronto Melbourne Capetown Bombay
Calcutta Madras
HUMPHREY MILFORD
PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, OXFORD
BY JOHN JOHNSON, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

PREFACE

IN recent years the population problem has assumed a new importance. The threat of declining numbers has already influenced the policies of many Governments and is likely to affect still more Governments in the near future. Since the problem is one which will soon intimately concern the 'plain man', it appeared desirable to cast this book in a form which would suit the general public interested in the social problems of our time. To this end, therefore, the text has been made as simple and self-contained as is consistent with accuracy. The notes and appendices contain more academic material which can be used for reference, as well as some bibliographic notes to which the reader can turn if he wishes to make a closer examination of the mechanism of population growth.

That I have enjoyed writing this book is due to the kindness shown to me by so many experts on whose time and temper I trespassed. Miss M. E. Green, of the Family Endowment Society, Dr. F. Burgdörfer, Director of the German Statistical Office, Professor R. A. Fisher, and Dr. R. R. Kuczynski have all been extremely generous in their suggestions and criticism, while I take great pleasure in publicly acknowledging my indebtedness to Professor A. M. Carr-Saunders for his unflagging interest in, and patience with, my work.

D. V. G.

LONDON. *May* 1936.

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INTRODUCTION

By A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS

'I MUST say that I look upon the continued diminution of the birth-rate in this country with considerable apprehension. At the present time it may seem that we have here a larger population than we are able to support in England. At the same time we know the difficulty which the Dominions find in accommodating a larger population when they themselves are troubled with unemployment. But I have a feeling that the time will not be far distant when that position will be reversed, when the countries of the British Empire will be crying out for more citizens of the right breed and when we in this country will not be able to supply the demand. I think that if to-day we can give even a little help to those who are carrying on the race, the money will not be wasted.' This passage is taken from the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer when introducing the Budget last year. He accompanied these remarks with the announcement that he proposed to modify both the personal allowance of a married tax-payer and the children's allowances. The former then stood at £150; he proposed to raise it to £170. The latter stood at £50 for the first child and £40 for each subsequent child; he proposed to raise the allowance for second and all subsequent children to £50.

It is evident that the Chancellor regards these measures not as a remedy for, but rather as a recognition of, a grave problem, towards finding a solution for which they are intended to be merely a very modest beginning. It is probable that in the future the taking of these steps will be regarded as marking a very important turning-point in our social policy, for they represent the first deliberate attempt to begin the construction of a population policy for this country. It has recently become apparent that such a policy is necessary. The population of this country has now almost reached its peak; decline will shortly set in, and even if fertility remains at its present level, that decline will soon become rapid. There may be good reasons to welcome the cessation of growth, but there are no grounds for desiring a swift

decrease of population. Such a decline is not likely to be arrested, however, unless, as the result of careful investigations into all aspects of the matter, measures are taken to modify the social and economic situation in so far as it affects married people when they decide upon the size of their families. Hence the need for a considered policy, for the construction of which much more information and experience are needed than are available at present.

Great Britain is not, however, the first country to begin to devise a population policy. During the last decade certain European countries have taken measures which were intended to stimulate their birth-rates. It would therefore seem desirable at this point in our history to investigate the nature of these measures and, so far as possible, to assess their results. For we may hope to learn something from the experience of other countries. It is true that, owing to variations in social conditions, it does not follow that a policy which produces a given result in another country will be followed by a similar result here. Nevertheless, foreign experience cannot be without interest and lessons for us.

With these considerations in mind the Council of the Eugenics Society decided early last year to promote an inquiry. A Committee was set up consisting of Professor A. M. Carr-Saunders (chairman), Mrs. E. Hubback, Miss M. E. Green, Mr. Julian Huxley, Professor R. A. Fisher, F.R.S., and Dr. C. P. Blacker (secretary). A sum of money was provided by the Council to pay the expenses of such investigations as the Committee might find it desirable to conduct. The Committee drew up a scheme of inquiry and obtained the services of Mr. D. V. Glass to carry it out. During the spring and summer of last year Mr. Glass paid visits to France, Belgium, and Germany. He was thus able to collect information that is not otherwise available in this country, and also to interview some of those officials who, in one way or another, are closely concerned with the operation of the various foreign schemes. His book should be of interest, not only to those who are anxious to know what foreign countries are doing in this important field, but also to those who share the anxiety of the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to the future course of population in this country.

I

THE POPULATION POSITION IN ENGLAND AND WALES

FROM the point of view of public interest in population questions in this country, we can divide the last hundred years into about three periods. First, a short space of time when, under the influence of Malthus, the threat of future over-population was regarded by many people as an urgent one. Secondly, a very long period during which the over-population scare had died down, but in which there was a growing interest in the trend of mortality and a strong desire to reduce this mortality by public and private means. Thirdly, a period which we have only just entered, when people are beginning to realize that the fertility aspect of population trends is not less important than that of mortality. This does not mean that we are returning to the old fears of over-population; on the contrary we are now concerned with the raising of the birth-rate and not with its reduction. Recent investigations by statisticians whose work will be surveyed later show that in almost every country in the Western World the birth-rate has now fallen to such a point that, if it continues at the present level, populations will soon begin to decline, and that once decline has begun, its downward progress will be rapid. Moreover, among these countries, our own is a striking example of the probability of future decline.

But although these facts are known to a number of statisticians and sociologists, the general public is largely ignorant of them. The reason for this is that the actual situation is hidden in the official figures of births and deaths that are published from year to year. To see, therefore, what is really taking place, we must analyse the mechanism of population growth in order to understand the indices which enable us to calculate it.

For us, as for all other industrial nations, the nineteenth century brought an unprecedented increase in the population. Estimates of the population of this country before 1801 are inexact, but it was probably about seven millions in 1770. In

1801 the first census gave the total for England and Wales at nearly nine millions, and within fifty years that number had doubled itself. Roughly speaking—the details are given in the tables below—between 1801 and 1931 the population of England and Wales increased by 350 per cent. And, in fact, the full growth of the population was even greater than is shown by these figures, for they take no account of migration movements.

Population of England and Wales at each Census, 1801 to 1931[1]

In millions

		Percentage intercensal increase			*Percentage intercensal increase*
1801	8·893	..	1871	22·712	13·2
1811	10·164	14·0	1881	25·974	14·6
1821	12·000	18·1	1891	29·003	11·7
1831	13·897	15·8	1901	32·528	12·2
1841	15·914	14·3	1911	36·070	10·9
1851	17·928	12·7	1921	37·887	4·9
1861	20·066	11·9	1931	39·952	5·5

If we deduct the total number of deaths occurring in England and Wales each year from the number of births, we arrive at the 'natural increase' for each year. Such data are not available right back to 1801; but for the period 1851 to 1930 each ten-year interval shows a greater natural increase than is actually visible in the various census returns.

England and Wales: Percentage Natural Increase by Ten-Year Periods, 1841 to 1930[2]

1841–50	14·2	1871–80	15·09	1901–10	12·43
1851–60	15·1	1881–90	13·97	1911–20	8·38
1861–70	13·58	1891–1900	12·39	1921–30	5·91

This difference is due to the emigration which formed so marked a feature of nineteenth-century development. As far back as we can trace the figures, we have always sustained a net annual loss on this account, the exodus from the British Isles as a whole ranging from a maximum of 315,409 in 1881 to a minimum of 37,721 in 1894. The movement was strongest in the decade 1881 to 1891, when 601,000

persons left England and Wales alone, as compared with only 164,000 in the preceding decade.[3] Since 1930, however, the position has changed completely. The post-war period has seen the introduction of quotas and prohibitions, while at the same time depression abroad, particularly in the United States, Canada, and Australia, has brought many emigrants home again. Thus, instead of a loss on account of emigration, there was, in England and Wales, a net inward balance of 26,419 in 1931, 32,877 in 1932, and 23,801 in

Returning to the question of the growth of our population in the nineteenth century, we see that two factors are responsible—the fall in the death-rate and the increase in the birth-rate. The fall in the death-rate since the early part of the nineteenth century has been of very great importance, for it has meant that an ever larger proportion of the children who are born live through infancy and to the period when they can marry and have children. Thus a lower death-rate should not only swell the population by increasing the expectation of life, and so the number of adults in any given year, but also by providing more mothers to bear children for the next generation. In this country the death-rate fell partly because of an increase in the standard of life and partly through improvements in medicine and sanitation and in the general provision of public health services. The importance of the latter is great, but since these services were only instituted in the fifties, the fall did not become marked until the third quarter of the century. The death-rate is still falling, but when we consider its probable trend in the future we must remember that it is influenced not only by mortality from different causes, but also by the age composition of the population. No matter how low the specific mortality rates fall, there will still be a high death-rate if the population contains a large proportion of old people. So we should not place too much faith in the declining death-rate as a means of maintaining our numbers. It obviously cannot fall to zero, while on the other hand there is no logical reason why the birth-rate should not do so.

The birth-rate, although it rose between 1851 and 1871,[4] has been falling steadily since the latter date, the decline

being particularly marked in the last fifteen years. It is this fact which, as Dr. Kuczynski has pointed out, marks the great change between the present time and the days before the Industrial Revolution.[5] Up to the end of the eighteenth century births probably remained fairly constant, and the major factor in determining the size of the actual and future population was the death-rate. But now mortality is at a

ENGLAND AND WALES: BIRTH AND DEATH RATES



England and Wales	*Birth-rate per 1,000 total population*	*England and Wales*	*Birth-rate per 1,000 total population*
1851–5	33·9	1901–5	28·2
1861–5	35·1	1911–15	23·6
1871–5	35·5	1921–5	19·9
1881–5	33·5	1926–30	16·7
1891–5	30·5		

relatively low level, tending to decrease very slightly each year, and the main factor moulding the population situation and prospects at the present time is the fall in the number of births. The real causes of such a change must be dealt with separately; they are difficult to estimate, but it is relatively easy to see how those causes were making themselves felt, and that is the next step in our analysis.

When we look at the figures in the table above we do not learn very much about the trend since 1871. We are merely told that the number of births per 1,000 total population has

fallen in the last sixty years. But birth-rates are not only inadequate in this sense. They are also crude and may give an entirely wrong impression of the situation in any year. The only section of the population which can give birth to children is that consisting of the women from 15 to 50 years of age, but the birth-rate relates the annual number of births to the total population, the bulk of which is incapable of bearing children. The result is that the rate may give no indication of the extent to which the potentially fertile section of the population is being fertile in fact. Dr. Kuczynski has shown that 'if, for example, in the State of Colorado in the year 1860, every second female between 15 and 50 years had borne a child (which would have implied a fertility such as has never been observed in the world) the birth-rate of that year would still have been only 16 per 1,000, because the females between 15 and 50 years constituted only 3·2 per cent. of the total population'.[6] Also, since the age and sex composition of the population varies, the birth-rates of two separate years are not really comparable.[7] For these reasons it is better to use fertility-rates, since they relate to women in the child-bearing age groups, and the trend of fertility is shown in the graph and table on p. 6. We see that whereas in 1871 a thousand married women between the ages of 15 and 45 gave birth to about 303 children, in 1931 only 123 children were born to a similar number of potential mothers. But even these rates are not wholly satisfactory, for obviously the number of births is affected by the age composition of the potential child-bearing population—other things being equal a larger proportion of women between the ages of 20 and 35 will mean a higher fertility—and by the amount of marriage which takes place. In France, for example, the fertility of a potentially fertile woman is lower than in this country, but a larger proportion of marriageable women do marry, and the result is that the population is reproducing itself more fully than our own. The best method is to add the specific fertility rates—that is, the fertility rates for women in each year aged 15 and under 50 years of age. From this calculation we learn the number of children who would be born to a woman passing through the complete child-bearing period at any given time, without

having to worry about age composition or the amount of marriage. The inadequacy of our vital statistics prevents us from making such a computation for England and Wales,



Fertility in England and Wales

	Live Births per 1,000 Women aged 15 to 45 years	*Legitimate Live Births per 1,000 Married Women aged 15 to 45 years*
1851	147·8	253·0
1861	153·5	293·4
1871	158·7	302·7
1881	149·1	288·8
1891	129·8	263·8
1901	114·3	235·4
1911	98·3	197·4
1921	91·4	179·1
1931	64·3	122·7

but conditions in Sweden in the last sixty years have probably been very similar, and we can use the indices for that country to show what has also taken place here. The rates given below are thus very instructive.

Sweden: Fertility Rates

Confinements per 1,000 Women passing through the Child-bearing Period[8]

1851–5	4,272	1891–5	4,094
1861–5	4,581	1901–5	3,907
1871–5	4,488	1911–15	3,311
1881–5	4,340	1921–2	2,793

Whereas, with the conditions of the period 1861–5, woman passing through the child-bearing period would have 4·581 confinements, in 1921–2 this had dropped to 2·793. In other words, fertility had fallen by about 39 per cent. in sixty years. What we now want to know is how far this fall is going to affect the size of the population in the future.

When we look at the table giving the intercensal increase of our population, the most we can say is that since 1881 each successive census has shown a smaller rate of growth. But we cannot assert, as a result of analysing the series of percentages, that the rate of increase will be larger or smaller in the future, which is, of course, just what we want to know. Nor can we learn this from the tables of 'natural increase' which the Registrar-General publishes every year. Of course if, during any one year, there have been 690,000 births and 470,000 deaths, then we know that by the end of the year our numbers will have gone up by 220,000. What, however, the rate of natural increase—obtained by deducting the death-rate from the birth-rate—cannot tell us is how much longer and to what extent that excess of births over deaths will continue. There may, in a particular year, be a deficit instead of an excess, and so a net decrease in the population, but, nevertheless, conditions may be such that if fertility and mortality continue unchanged, the total population will increase in the future. The reason may be that in the year in question, the population contains a very small proportion of women in the child-bearing age groups, or a very large proportion of old men and women. In the former case the situation is similar to that in Colorado in 1860, mentioned above, and the high fertility is swamped by the large numbers of people who cannot bear children. In the second case the prevalence of older people sends up the death-rate, but when these people have died the death-rate will fall and the population increase again. On the other hand, a country in

which there has always been an excess of births over deaths may, nevertheless, soon experience a decline in the numbers of its inhabitants. It may, in other words, be living on the high fertility of past generations. As a consequence it will have a large proportion of potentially fertile women, and since the proportion of people over 50 years of age is small, a low death-rate. But if it is not reproducing itself adequately, the people who are to-day aged between 15 and 45 will, when they have passed through that period of life, swell the ranks of the old people and cause them to form a larger section of the total population than they do to-day. So that, if fertility and mortality remain unchanged, there will soon come a period when deaths are more numerous than births and the population will begin to decline.

Intercensal rates would not show this at all, and their inadequacy is shown by applying some of the rates calculated by Sir G. H. Knibbs.[9] In the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century our rate of increase was about 1 per cent. per annum (compound interest). If we had made a forecast on the basis of that rate, we should have concluded that our population would double itself in about 70 years. Our rate in the last 20 years has been about 0·5 per cent. per annum (compound interest), which would mean, if it continued, a doubled population in about 140 years. In fact, however, even if there were no further drop in fertility, our population would shortly begin to decline.

It has taken some 45 years for the public to become at all conscious of this fact. As long ago as 1895 Professor Cannan[10] published a paper in the *Economic Journal*, in which he predicted such a fall. He pointed out that, whereas between 1853 and 1876 the number of births was 'uniformly about 12 per cent.' of the number of persons between 20 and 40 years of age, by 1886 this had dropped to 11 per cent., and by 1894 to 9·8 per cent. Assuming that this rate continued and that mortality rates remained unchanged, 'it will be seen that increase of population, large at first, becomes less and less, till it is trifling in 1941–51. It would continue, but always growing less and less, till about 1995, when the last survivor of the period before 1891 would disappear, and the population would then stand at its maximum of 37,376,000.'

In fact, of course, Professor Cannan's calculations were incorrect. In 1931, over sixty years before the date of his predicted maximum, the population of England and Wales was 39,952,000, and it is still growing. But in essence his analysis was penetrating and remarkably in advance of his time, for only five years before, at a meeting of the Royal Statistical Society, Dr. Ogle[11] had given an entirely opposed analysis. He had said, 'The population of England and Wales is, as we all know, growing in a most formidable manner; and though persons may differ in their estimates of the time when that growth will have reached its permissible limits, no one can doubt that, if the present rate of increase be maintained, the date of that event cannot possibly be very remote.' And he was supported by another statistical expert, Dr. G. B. Longstaff. Even now the amount of Malthusian literature published shows that the realization of the present position is by no means complete.

The simplest way of analysing the situation and judging whether or not the population will increase in the future is to examine the 'population pyramid'. This pyramid shows the numbers of males and females at each year of age who constitute the total population of the country at any time. Now in 1911 there were about 9·5 million males and females between the ages of 15 and under 30. In fifteen years' time these would all have passed through that particular age group, but since there were about 11·1 million children of less than 15 years of age, their full replacement was assured. At the same time the 9·5 millions would be able to replace the 7·6 millions who had passed through the 30 to 45 years age group. But in 1931 the situation was very different. There were 10·3 millions aged 15 and under 30 years who might be able to replace the 8·5 millions then aged between 30 and 45 years, but even if no deaths occurred, it would be impossible for the 9·5 millions aged 0 to 15 years to replace the 10·3 millions who would have passed through and beyond the 15 to 30 years age group. It is evident, therefore, that in 1931 there were strong signs of a decline in our total population in the near future, unless the deficit could be made up by a considerable increase in the annual number of births.

This crude way of gauging the position is given precise

form in the net reproduction rate elaborated by Dr. Kuczynski and explained at length in his book, *The Balance of Births and Deaths*.[12] The method of calculating the index is quite straightforward, the only requirement being adequate vital statistics. In many countries the published figures are perfectly satisfactory, but unfortunately in this country we are rather behind, and are only just about to include the age of the mother in birth-registration forms. Nevertheless, we can make a reasonably accurate estimate of the position here. There were in England and Wales in 1921, 10,795,000 women of over 15 and under 50 years of age,[13] this section being responsible for replenishing the population from generation to generation. In thirty years all these women will have passed beyond the potentially fertile age groups and what, briefly, we want to know is by how many women in the fertile age groups they will be replaced. The first fact we must have is, therefore, the number of female children born to each woman now passing through the child-bearing period. Secondly, since many of these children will die, we must also know what proportion of female children born to-day will themselves survive long enough to pass through the child-bearing period, and we obtain this information from life tables. Life tables are constructed from the mortality rates of the particular period in order to show what proportion of newly born children survives at each year of age, and as the mortality rates for males and females are different, we must use the table embodying the female mortality data. Obviously, of each thousand female children born to-day, considerably fewer than a thousand will reach the age of forty-nine years, and what the life table shows is how many fewer will reach this age.

By combining the two facts of fertility and survival, we obtain the net reproduction rate, and when that rate is 1·0 it means that, given the existing conditions of fertility and mortality, each woman is just replacing herself in the next generation. In 1921 the rate for England and Wales was 1·07, indicating that if fertility and mortality remained constant the population would continue to grow. But by 1931 the position had worsened considerably and the net reproduction rate for that year shows the changed circum-

stances. Even allowing for the fall in mortality which took place during the intervening period, the rate was only 0·81, so that fertility in 1931 was not high enough to replace the child-bearing section of the population.[14]

What the figure really means is that if 1931 conditions of fertility and mortality persist, the total population will soon begin to fall. Eventually it will reach a stable age composition, and after that stage there will be a decrease of almost 20 per cent. in each successive generation. But the net reproduction rate cannot tell us how long it will take before a stable age composition is reached, or the exact length of a generation.[15] If we want to know when our population will begin to decline, and by how much it will have fallen in the next fifty or a hundred years, we must use another technique. We must begin with a particular year and examine the interaction of fertility and mortality in succeeding years.[16]

The process is actually quite simple, though rather long. It means dividing the population into groups by age and sex, subtracting for each year the deaths that occur in each age and sex division, and adding the year's births. The result will give the population for the following year, and by continuing the process of addition and subtraction, we can estimate the population for any year in the future. But we must, of course, make certain assumptions about fertility and mortality rates. We can, if we choose, assume that they will continue unchanged, and in that case we shall be working out the details of which the general indication is given in the net reproduction rate. On the other hand, we can make a more realistic estimate by continuing the trends which have been most marked in the last ten or fifteen years, that is, a further drop in fertility and mortality. There are, naturally, certain limits to be borne in mind when doing this, for the death-rate cannot fall to zero, and it is highly unlikely that the birth-rate will do so either.

Within the last few years, three estimates of the future population of this country have been made on the lines suggested above. The first was by Professor Bowley, who calculated that if the annual number of births remained the same as it had been for the period 1921 to 1923, and the

death-rates were those of 1910 to 1912, the population of Great Britain would reach a maximum of 48,859,000 in 1971. But since 1923 the annual supply of births has fallen considerably, so that Professor Bowley's estimate rather exaggerates the probable growth of population. A more likely rate of decline was shown in the estimates computed by Dr. Leybourne in 1934. Beginning with the Registrar-General's mid-year estimate of the population of England and Wales in 1931, she assumed that mortality rates would remain fairly constant at the 1924 to 1932 level, and that the 'fertility of child-bearing women as a whole would decline until 1944 and then stabilize', the rate of decline being approximately that indicated by the fall which occurred between 1924 and 1931. On these assumptions, the population of England and Wales would show the following numbers in the future:[17]

Population of England and Wales in millions

Ages	*1931*	*1936*	*1941*	*1946*	*1951*	*1956*	*1966*	*1976*
0–15	9·538	8·816	7·646	6·548	5·636	4·990	4·201	3·362
15–45	18·842	19·057	19·239	18·820	17·850	16·415	13·235	10·220
45–65	8·752	9·079	9·269	9·494	9·942	10·488	10·671	9·815
65+	2·856	3·262	3·717	4·072	4·321	4·437	4·772	5·260
Total	39·988	40·214	39·871	38·934	37·749	36·330	32·879	28·657

The most recent estimates of the future population of England and Wales are those worked out by Dr. Enid Charles.[18] She gives calculations based upon three different assumptions, taking the population on January 1st, 1935, as her starting-point. The first estimate assumes that fertility and mortality rates after 1935 will be the same as they were in 1933; the second that fertility would continue to fall up to 1985 and mortality up to 1965; and the third that while mortality continues to fall, fertility rises to the level of 1931. Judging by the experience of the last twenty years, the second estimate seems to approximate most closely to what may really happen, and in this case we see that our population will begin to decline in 1941, and will have fallen by about 11·7 per cent. by 1965, and by 56 per cent. by the year 2000. At the same time there will be a considerable change

in the age composition of the population. Whereas in 1935 some 64 per cent. of the population is 'able-bodied'—that is, between 15 and 60 years of age—by 2000 this percentage will have fallen to 49·6 per cent., while on the other hand

ESTIMATES OF THE FUTURE POPULATION OF ENGLAND AND WALES (DR. E. CHARLES)



the proportion of people aged over 60 will have risen from 12·5 per cent. to 46·5 per cent. So marked an ageing of the population would constitute a very serious problem. We must, of course, remember that this is an estimate, not a prophecy. It is obviously impossible to prophesy the future population, because fertility and mortality rates may change completely during the intervening period. But on the basis of the three sets of assumptions which are made, the

figures below show the course which our population would follow:

The Future Population of England and Wales

In millions

Year	*First hypothesis*	*Second hypothesis*	*Third hypothesis*
1935	40·563	40·563	40·563
1945	40·876	40·392	42·338
1955	40·207	38·777	43·651
1965	38·504	35·799	43·774
1975	36·038	31·452	43·021
1985	33·106	26·087	41·612
1995	30·019	20·440	39·871
2005	27·090	15·058	38·177
2015	24·467	10·456	36·646
2025	22·121	6·940	35·104
2035	19·969	4·426	33·585

On any of these assumptions—even, therefore, if fertility and mortality remained at the 1931 level—our numbers would be bound to fall in the future.

Without going fully into the economic and social implications of a considerable fall in population, it is obvious that such an event may create serious problems. If, for example, the people aged 60 years and over form about 45 per cent. of the population, a possibility suggested by Dr. Charles's estimates, the following difficulties may arise. The population will suffer from a much higher degree of invalidity and the burden of state health insurance will be greater. So, too, will be the relative cost of old age benefit. On the other hand, this large section of aged and therefore unemployed people will have to be supported by a relatively much smaller proportion of able-bodied persons. That is, proportionately, the amount of taxation per head will rise, while the ability to bear it will fall. Moreover, the position of industry is likely to be more difficult. In the last century the industrial system recovered fairly easily from the depressions through which it passed, and one of the major factors in this ease of recovery was, undoubtedly, the growth of population. An increase in the numbers of people meant an increase in the demand for the products of industry, and with it the slump period of the trade cycle was shortened. The much reduced

rate of increase of the population of the world since the War has no doubt helped to intensify and prolong the economic crisis, and if population actually falls in the future, the effect of the trade cycle upon economic prosperity is likely to be much more severe. In particular, it seems probable that the constructional industries will be badly hit.

Not only will industry be likely to suffer, but we, too, as consumers, may find our standard of life lowered remarkably. The commodities we buy to-day are cheap, largely because they are made by mass-production methods, and such methods are profitable to producers only because large numbers of people demand the goods they make. If our numbers fall, and with them, the extent of the market, the whole costs structure of industry may be changed radically because it may no longer pay to manufacture goods in such quantities. This in turn may lead to the abandonment of the more efficient large-scale methods of production, with the result that the prices of most goods will rise.

These, then, are some of the reasons which would make a considerable fall in numbers rather unwelcome. There are, as we shall see, other and less justifiable reasons which have influenced a number of European countries and caused them to make attempts to check the present trend of population decline. But, in balance, a rate of decline such as that depicted by Dr. Charles in her second estimate of the future population of England and Wales would produce an extremely dangerous situation. It is to avert this kind of danger that four European countries—France, Belgium, Germany, and Italy—have for some time been attempting to check the fall in their birth-rates, and the rest of this book is concerned with an analysis of their attempts and, as far as is possible, with an objective judgement of the measure of their success.

II

POPULATION AND POLICY IN GERMANY

IN the last chapter we said that four European countries are making attempts to encourage marriage and the bearing of children. But in only two countries—Germany and Italy—have these attempts been consolidated into a direct population policy, forming a fundamental part of the principles of government. Italian efforts, as we shall see later, show few signs of success, but in Germany there has been an appreciable increase in the numbers of marriages and births in the last two years. The impression made by this increase and the statements which have been uttered as to its significance and causes, point to an urgent need for an analysis of the position. Unfortunately it is impossible to say with complete accuracy how far any particular measures have or have not been successful. There are no control groups in the field of social action by which experiments can be tested. What we can do, however, is to outline the trend which was to be seen before the measures were applied, point to the factors most likely to have caused the change, and attempt to gauge how far that change has really altered the previous trend.

Like most other western European nations, Germany has experienced a fairly continuous fall in her birth-rate since the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Whereas in the period 1881 to 1890 each woman passing through the child-bearing period gave birth to about 5·2 children, by 1901 to 1910 this number had dropped to 4·5, and by 1924 to 1926 it was only 2·3.[1] At the same time mortality rates and the general death-rate were also falling, thus helping to some extent to compensate the fall in births. The table on p. 17 shows the general fall in birth- and death-rates in the last sixty years.

At first this decline in the number of births only meant that the rate of growth was slowing down. The German population was still more than able to replace itself. But in the post-war period the situation worsened, and when in 1929 Dr. Burgdörfer, the Director of the German Statistical

Office, published his book, *Der Geburtenrückgang und seine Bekämpfung*, it was to point out that fertility had dropped to so great an extent that the German nation was no longer able to maintain its numbers. Expressing the position in Dr. Burgdörfer's terms, after 1925 the annual excess of births over deaths hid what was really a shortage of births.

Germany[2]

	No. of live births per 1,000 total population	*No. of deaths per 1,000 total population*	*Natural increase per 1,000 total population*	
1876–80	39·2	26·1	13·1	Pre-war territory.
1886–90	36·5	24·4	12·1	
1896–1900	36·0	21·2	14·8	
1906–10	31·6	17·5	14·1	
1920	25·8	15·1	10·7	Post-war territory, excluding the Saar Basin and Alsace-Lorraine.
1925	20·7	11·9	8·8	
1926	19·5	11·7	7·8	
1927	18·4	12·0	6·4	
1928	18·6	11·6	7·0	
1929	17·9	12·6	5·3	
1930	17·5	11·1	6·4	
1931	16·0	11·2	4·8	
1932	15·1	10·8	4·3	

Compared with the annual birth-rate necessary to keep the population at the level of the particular year, there was in fact a deficit of 0·4 births per 1,000 total population in 1926, 1·6 in 1928, 2·9 in 1930, and 5·1 per thousand in 1932. Or, using Dr. Kuczynski's method, the net reproduction rate was 0·924 in 1924 to 1926, 0·818 in 1929, and 0·748 in 1931.[3] A new rate has been introduced here, and so, to avoid confusion and misunderstandings, it is advisable to explain the construction of this rate and discuss its implications. Dr. Kuczynski's rate shows a greater deficit, but his figures are not strictly comparable with those of Dr. Burgdörfer.

Dr. Kuczynski's rate gives the replacement coefficient of a newly born female child, or a woman passing through the child-bearing period under given conditions of fertility and mortality. It does not, therefore, concern the replacement of a particular population, though if the rate were constantly 1·0, the population would eventually become stationary and have an age and sex composition showing the

same stratification as the life table for the country. Dr. Burgdörfer, on the other hand, begins with mortality instead of fertility, and his index may be used for two main purposes. It may relate to the annual number of live births required to replace a particular number of potentially fertile women (a minor complication arises here as the 'potentially fertile' group is taken by Dr. Kuczynski to be the 15–49 years age group, while Dr. Burgdörfer adopts the 15–44 years section), given the existing mortality conditions, or to the number necessary for maintaining a given *total population*. It is, in fact, generally used in the latter sense in his book, *Volk ohne Jugend*. The distinction between these two main uses is very important, *for unless the population is already stationary*, an index calculated upon the number of potentially fertile women envisages a total population which is not by any means the same as that total population upon which a total-replacement index is based, and the numbers of births required in each case are quite different. To give an example, there were 16·4 million women aged 15 to 44 years in Germany in mid-1927, and a total population of 63·252 millions. Now to replace the 16·4 million women and maintain a stationary population containing that number, envisages a total population of about 78 millions, given the mortality rates prevailing in the period 1924 to 1926. But to replace a total population of 63·252 millions, given the same mortality rates, only means maintaining a potentially fertile female stratum of 13·3 millions, since that is all the 1924–6 life table population of 63·252 millions would contain. The first case would require 1·366 million live births per year, while the second would only need 1·1 million. If Dr. Kuczynski's method is applied to total replacement, it refers to the maintenance of a stationary population containing the number of potentially fertile women present in the particular year, and thus is approximately comparable only to the first use of Dr. Burgdörfer's index.

Dr. Kuczynski's method was explained in the first chapter, where it was worked out in some detail, but we may say in addition that it is slightly more complicated than Dr. Burgdörfer's, since the latter only demands the knowledge of the number of potentially fertile women in the country in the

particular year, and the true death-rate for the period. The true death-rate, which is derived from the life table, is computed from the average expectation of life: for example, the expectation of life at birth in the period 1924–6 was 57·4 years, and the true death-rate was $\frac{1{,}000 \times 1}{57{\cdot}4}$ or 17·4 per 1,000 total population. To maintain a given stationary population requires a birth-rate of the same size, and the annual number of births necessary is thus estimated directly. The advantage of Dr. Burgdörfer's index, although it is rather cruder than the net reproduction rate, is that it is easily adapted to give the coefficient of replacement either of a total population or of a given number of potentially fertile women, whereas Dr. Kuczynski's net reproduction rate is not so simply adjusted to the first case. Also, and this is the main reason for using it, Dr. Burgdörfer's index can be applied for countries in which the inadequacy of the vital statistics would not permit the calculation of the net reproduction rate.

In spite of the differences in construction, however, the fundamental significance of the two sets of figures quoted is the same. They both mean that while each year still saw a positive increase in population, yet fertility was such that if conditions remained unchanged the population would eventually decline. It was with this possibility in mind that the German Statistical Office made a number of estimates of the future population of the country, taking the official computation of the population on January 1st, 1927, as the starting-point.[4] In all these estimates it was assumed that mortality rates would remain at the level of the period 1924 to 1926. Having taken this for granted, three separate estimates were made. The first assumed that each successive year would show the same number of live births as in 1927—that is, about 1,160,000 in total. The second allowed for a 25 per cent. additional fall in fertility between 1927 and 1955, assuming that after the latter date fertility would remain constant. The third estimate assumed that fertility would continue at the 1927 level. The third case was only worked out roughly, since it appeared so improbable in fact, but the

populations estimated on the basis of the other two assumptions are given below. Possible emigration and immigration are not taken into account in either estimate.



Estimates of the Future Growth of the German Population[5]

A. Assuming that the annual number of live births remains equal to that in 1927.
B. Assuming a fall of 25 per cent. in the fertility of potentially fertile women by 1955, fertility then remaining constant.

	Estimate A	*Cpd. with 1927 (=100)*	*Estimate B*	*Cpd. with 1927 (=100)*
Beginning of:				
1927 . .	63·187 millions	100·0	63·187 millions	100·0
1930 . .	64·337 ,,	101·8	64·365 ,,	101·8
1940 . .	67·343 ,,	106·7	67·299 ,,	106·6
1950 . .	69·098 ,,	109·2	67·506 ,,	106·9
1960 . .	69·750 ,,	110·4	65·694 ,,	104·0
1970 . .	69·486 ,,	109·9	62·337 ,,	98·7
1980 . .	68·450 ,,	108·4	57·551 ,,	91·2
1990 . .	67·287 ,,	106·7	52·093 ,,	80·8
2000 . .	66·746 ,,	105·8	46·891 ,,	74·2

It can therefore be seen that even allowing for a constant annual supply of live births equal to that in 1927—a hypothesis which means that after 1930 the fertility of women aged 15 to 45 years would be increasing, and, moreover, that after 1932 their fertility would be rising steadily above the 1927 rate—the population would fall off eventually. The total numbers would begin to decline by about 1965, though they would not sink below the 1927 amount for a very long period. On the second hypothesis, which was much closer to reality, the rate of decline would be more rapid. Reaching their maximum by about 1945, the total numbers would then fall, and by the year 2000 would amount to only some 74 per cent. of those in 1927. It is significant that the actual course of population growth in Germany since 1929 has been below that anticipated by either estimate, though the divergence was quite small.

Estimated and Actual Growth of the German Population, 1927–1934

In millions

Year	*Estimate A*	*Estimate B*	*Actual growth*
1927	63·2	63·2	63·25
1928	63·5	63·5	63·60
1929	64·0	64·0	63·94
1930	64·4	64·4	64·28
1931	64·7	64·8	64·62
1932	65·0	65·2	64·897
1933	65·3	65·6	65·22
1934	65·6	66·0	65·58

Dr. Burgdörfer gave considerable publicity to these population estimates in his book, *Volk ohne Jugend*, which appeared in 1932, and made a careful analysis of the difficulties that would arise when numbers were falling.[6] But in spite of the interest in population questions which was being shown in Germany in the 'twenties, no steps were taken to combat what many people were beginning to regard as a real menace, the declining birth-rate.[7] Family allowances, which had been instituted in many industries during the immediate post-war period, were not aimed at encouraging births, and had in any case lost most of their importance by 1930. In

particular they were attacked by the trade unions on the ground that they were used to hide wage-cuts.[8] Public concern for population growth had not yet grown to the extent visible in France and Belgium. There was no specific anti-birth-control legislation, and no societies for encouraging large families had been founded. There was, in fact, more activity aimed at spreading the knowledge of contraception and legalizing abortion than at stimulating the birth-rate, though, for the most part, the first two movements were impelled much more by a desire to improve the condition of working-class women than by a belief in the Malthusian principle of population. But already the National Socialist party was, in attacking these attempts to repeal paragraph 218 of the Criminal Code (concerning abortion), adopting a positive population policy.[9] And when the National Socialists came into power they put this policy into practice.

In June 1933, Dr. Frick, Minister of the Interior, gave the opening address to the population and race-policy experts gathered together in Berlin, and emphasized the point that 'in the new Germany, the nation, the towns, and the rural communities must judge the whole field of administration from the point of view of population policy, and, where necessary, remould that administration'.[10] Since that date the German Government has initiated a large number of measures to stimulate marriage- and birth-rates in the country. The earliest of these, and the most important so far as immediate results are concerned, was the Act for the provision of marriage loans which was passed in July 1933, and came into force in August 1933.[11] Under this Act, 150 million marks per year are to be made available for loans to some 275,000 couples who wish to marry, but who cannot themselves afford to furnish a home and buy the necessary household equipment. The grant is obtained from revenue raised by means of the income-tax, and the loans, which at the maximum are 1,000 marks (for the period August 1st, 1933, to February 28th, 1934, the average loan was 620 marks),[12] are given in the form of coupons of varying denominations which may be exchanged at shops for certain kinds of household goods—furniture, linen, kitchen utensils, wireless sets, and so forth.

It should be remembered, however, that the Act for providing marriage loans was part of the general legislation aimed at reducing unemployment. The Act, therefore, had a twofold purpose—not only to encourage marriage, but also to withdraw women from commerce and industry and so to provide employment for men. It is, in fact, hoped by this means to diminish unemployment by 400,000 in the first year and by 200,000 in each succeeding year,[13] as well as to reduce the monetary requirements of the Unemployment Relief Fund by 200 million marks in the first year, and by an additional 100 million marks in each subsequent year. Herr Reinhardt, Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance, and the official to whose initiative the scheme is due, believes that the result will also be to stimulate the whole of German industry. Since the Act aims at replacing women in employment by men, loans are given only when the women to be married have been employed for at least nine months in the previous two years,[14] or, if they have been engaged in household tasks at home, only if they are replaced, when married, by domestic servants. In addition, there are, of course, domiciliary, racial, and medical requirements which the applicants must fulfil. In particular, they must not be of 'non-Aryan' extraction, and 'both of the applicants must be free from inheritable mental or physical defects, infectious diseases, or other illnesses threatening their life and appearing to prevent their marriage from being in the interest of the community'. But apart from the 'Aryan' and medical clauses, all these regulations imply that, although no upper income limit is stipulated, the loans are to be granted only to members of the working-class and lower middle-class. It is important to bear this fact in mind when analysing the increase in births attributed to the Act. The couples who borrow the money have to repay it at the rate of 1 per cent. per month—no interest is charged—and an inducement to have children early is given by the clause that a quarter of the initial loan is cancelled with the birth of each child. It is also to be noted that the loans are to be discontinued at the end of 1938, after which date repayments will be used to provide various child welfare services.

The other measures initiated cover a wide field, ranging

from such small aids as the transference of expectant mothers and mothers with young children to better-class railway carriages during the 'rush-hours', to important modifications in the inheritance and income-tax laws in favour of large families. Under the old property tax, for example, there was a maximum exemption limit of 20,000 R.M. If the inheritance exceeded this amount, the whole property was subject to the tax. Under the new laws of October 16th, 1935, much larger exemptions are allowed to members of the family, 10,000 R.M. tax-free inheritance being allowed for the head of the family, for his wife, and for each dependent child up to a maximum of three children. And even if the inheritance exceeds the tax-free limit, only the excess is actually taxed. The new income-tax law is a very complicated one, but, briefly, it gives considerable relief to middle-class and working-class families in respect of their dependent children. This relief takes the form of tax-free allowances, and they vary from 15 per cent. of the total income when there is one child, to 100 per cent. when there are six children, though it should be noted that in terms of actual money the maximum allowance for six children is 9,000 R.M. At the same time the new law raised the age-limit for dependent children from 21 to 25 years, provided, of course, that children of that age are still students at a recognized institution.[15]

Among the other methods of encouraging marriage and the bringing up of children is that of giving preference to the heads of large families when allocating places in the local and central government medical services, while labour exchanges distribute vacant jobs on the same basis.[16] Since April 1935 a family allowance system has been set up among the working-men's club doctors (Kassenärzte), so that those with a relatively large number of children receive an additional fifty marks per month for each child.[17] In addition, a number of towns have undertaken to 'sponsor' the subsequent children of already large families. In Berlin, for example, some 2,000 additional allowances are to be given each year, amounting to thirty marks per month during the first year of the child's life, and twenty marks per month from that point until the child has completed his

fourteenth year. These allowances, which are tax-free, are only to be given to the third and subsequent children, and the usual 'Aryan' and medical requirements have to be fulfilled. The 'sponsorship' does not consist only in these allowances, for the families and children honoured in this way also receive precedence when applying for jobs, flats, and houses—in fact, in any situation amenable to the influence of the city of Berlin.[18] At the same time, because of the anti-population effects of modern urbanism, attempts are being made to transfer working-class families to semi-rural communities, where houses and allotments are provided for them.[19] But most of these measures did not come into force until late in 1934 and can scarcely have had any effect upon the marriage- and birth-rates up to the present. The Act to which the greatest influence may be attributed is that for the provision of marriage loans.

Returning to the population movements themselves, the table below shows that the marriage-rate has risen almost continuously since the second quarter of 1933 and that the birth-rate has been rising since the first quarter of 1934.[20] By

	No. of marriages	*Marriage-rates per 1,000 total population*	*Index (same quarter of previous year=100)*	*No. of live births*	*Live birth-rates per 1,000 total population*	*Index (same quarter of previous year=100)*
1933						
1st qtr.	94,686	5·8	93·6	246,915	15·2	95
2nd ,,	157,906	9·7	116·9	243,425	14·9	96·8
3rd ,,	157,715	9·7	131·1	237,720	14·6	100
4th ,,	220,519	13·5	142·2	228,855	14·0	99·3
Average for year	630,826	9·7	122·8	956,915	14·7	97·3
1934						
1st qtr.	138,438	8·5	146·7	281,024	17·2	113·3
2nd ,,	196,129	12·0	123·8	295,819	18·1	121·5
3rd ,,	178,638	10·9	112·4	299,667	18·3	125·4
4th ,,	213,223	13·3	98·5	304,669	18·6	132·8
Average for year	731,431	11·1	114·5	1,181,179	18·0	122·4
Year 1932	509,591	7·9	..	978,161	15·1	..

the end of 1934 there was an increase of 343,075 marriages as compared with 1932, while during the same period the births increased by 181,772 (allowing for the fall of 21,246 births below the 1932 level in 1933). That is, the marriage-rate began to increase before the Act for providing marriage loans had actually come into force. The increase in births began considerably later, and the birth-rate for 1933 was, in fact, lower than that of the previous year.[21] It should be noted that the increase was spread over the whole of Germany, the towns, previously notorious for their low marriage- and birth-rates, also showing an upward movement, and that it is all the more remarkable in that it meant a still greater increase in fertility than is shown by the birth-rates themselves.[22]

The question is, what factors have been responsible for the change in the situation? Dr. Burgdörfer's analysis at the International Population Conference, held in Berlin in August 1935, was as follows:

'This change is no doubt partly due to the various kinds of State action to encourage population growth. In particular, the granting of marriage loans has stimulated the marriage- and birth-rates. Sixty per cent. of the increase in births comes from marriages which were concluded with the help of loans. But these external measures are not the sole reason for the change. The decisive factor is the new outlook brought about by the National Socialist revolution, the fundamental transformation of the political and moral (*geistigen*) atmosphere, the improvement in the economic situation, clearly shown in the fall of unemployment from over six millions to one and three-quarter millions; in short, the return of confidence on the part of the people in the political and economic government of the nation.'[23]

While it is impossible to subject all these statements to an exact scrutiny, some of them at least can be examined more closely.

We must immediately acknowledge that marriage loans have very probably played an important part in changing the position. For many members of the working-class and of the lower middle-class, a loan of 1,000 marks to be repaid in more than eight years is, if not a positive inducement, at least a factor helping to remove some of the barriers to an intended marriage. The effect is, therefore, to speed up

marriages and thus also first births. But there are other points to be considered in this connexion. In the first place we cannot say, as Dr. Burgdörfer has done, that the loans are responsible for 60 per cent. of the increase in births.

FALL IN THE NUMBER OF MARRIAGES DURING THE DEPRESSION AND RISE SINCE MID-1933 (GERMAN STATISTICAL OFFICE)
MORE (+) OR LESS (-) THAN WARRANTED BY THE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION



	[24] No. of marriages	Marriage rates per 1,000 total population	No. of live births	Live birth-rates per 1,000 total population
1928	587,175	9·2	1,182,815	18·6
1929	589,611	9·2	1,147,458	17·9
1930	562,648	8·8	1,127,450	17·5
1931	515,403	8·0	1,031,770	16·0
1932	509,597	7·9	978,161	15·1

True, the couples who received the loans produced 182,355 children between August 1933 and April 1935, but there is no way of estimating how many of these children would have been born if there had been no loans. And secondly, we cannot tell how many marriages were concluded only because of the provision of loans, although there are two

facts which throw some light on these questions. The first fact is that the years 1930 to 1932 saw a marked falling off in the marriage-rate, due partly, at any rate, to the economic depression.[25] Taking into account the age composition of the population and the marriage-rates in 'normal' years, there was, by the end of 1932, a deficit of some 330,000 marriages.[26] But many of these marriages had only been postponed, and Dr. Burgdörfer himself quotes the proverb, 'aufgeschoben ist nicht aufgehoben'—postponement does not mean putting off for ever. Even without the provision of loans there might, consequently, have been a considerable increase in the number of marriages in 1933 and 1934. There is, therefore, no justification for saying that the increase of 343,075 marriages in 1933 and 1934 was entirely or even mainly due to the law for providing marriage loans. The precise influence of the law cannot be estimated.

The second fact is this: Dr. Griesmeier's investigation in Württemberg shows that the increase in births which took place in 1934 and 1935 was common to all economic classes, and not confined to those whose members received marriage loans. The birth-rates by classes are given in the table below:[27]

Birth-rates in Württemberg in 1934 and first quarter of 1935

(No. of live births per 1,000 married men aged 20–50 years in the following classes.)

	Employed on own account	*Officials and general salaried class*	*Workers*
1934	145·6	118·1	134·0
1935 (1st quarter)	163·7	137·4	152·0

In so far as it is possible to compare the whole of 1934 with the first quarter of the next year, the rate of increase is greatest among the salaried class and not among the workers. Dr. Griesmeier maintains that in respect of employment and the age and sex composition of the population, Württemberg is typical of Germany as a whole, so that it is probable that similar rates of increase are to be found in other parts of the country.

Looking more closely at the general increase in births,

we find that the decrease in abortion has probably been a very important factor. The extent to which abortion has fallen off is indicated by the examples given in the tables below.

A. *Normal Confinements and Abortions among the Women Members of various Sickness Insurance Societies (Krankenkassen) in four German towns and two industries, 1926 to 1928*[28]

	Berlin			*Munich*			*Leipzig*		
	1926	*1927*	*1928*	*1926*	*1927*	*1928*	*1926*	*1927*	*1928*
Normal confinements	5,711	5,916	6,521	4,372	3,995	4,419	3,279	3,545	..
Abortions	5,740	6,289	5,747	1,500	1,583	1,804	..	1,575	1,793
Abortions per 100 normal confinements	101	106	88	34	40	41	..	44	..

	Dresden			*'Siemens Werke', Berlin*			*'Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft', Berlin*		
	1926	*1927*	*1928*	*1926*	*1927*	*1928*	*1926*	*1927*	*1928*
Normal confinements	3,090	3,074	3,584	529	438	704	304	226	347
Abortions	1,784	1,919	2,275	576	581	777	392	423	388
Abortions per 100 normal confinements	58	62	63	109	132	110	129	187	112

B. *Normal Births and Abortions among the Women Members of the Berlin Sickness Insurance Fund, 1929–35*

	1929	*1934*		*1935*	
		August	*December*	*February*	*April*
Normal births	5,900	1,464	1,560	1,729	1,873
Abortions	6,100	461	349	306	267
Abortions per 100 normal births	103	32	22	18	14

C. *Normal Births and Abortions among the Women Members of Sickness Insurance Funds in two cities and one industry, 1930 to 1934*

	Dresden					*Lübeck*					*'Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft', Berlin*				
	1930	*1931*	*1932*	*1933*	*1934*	*1930*	*1931*	*1932*	*1933*	*1934*	*1930*	*1931*	*1932*	*1933*	*1934*
Normal births	3,685	2,902	2,439	2,304	3,090	1,933	1,728	1,591	1,568	2,126	248	178	108	81	217
Abortions	2,244	1,694	1,668	1,329	1,179	899	878	1,036	749	714	240	161	95	85	89
Abortions per 100 normal births	61	58	68	58	38	47	51	65	48	34	97	90	88	105	41

Table A shows the position prior to 1929, as indicated by the statistics of a number of Sickness Insurance Funds, while Tables B and C show the marked drop in abortions in 1934 and 1935. Part of this fall must have been due to the granting of marriage loans. Between August 1933 and March 1934 there were part-cancellations of loans in respect of the birth of 43,101 children who had been conceived before marriage, and, referring to this, an article in *Wirtschaft und Statistik* acknowledges that 'a by no means inconsiderable proportion of these births might have been prevented by abortion if the provision of marriage loans had not enabled the parents to marry or hasten their marriage'. To this extent, therefore, the marriage loans have had a positive success, particularly as they are reinforced by an increased severity in the application of the law concerning abortion. The law against abortion has not, in itself, been made more severe since 1926; in fact, as part of the general eugenic legislation in Germany, it is now legally permissible to perform abortions on women who are likely to transmit inheritable diseases. But at the same time every effort is being made to prevent other kinds of abortions from being performed, while the 'purging' of the medical profession has probably created a class of doctors whose views on the subject are in line with those of the National Socialist leaders.[29]

Summarizing the material at our disposal, we can, therefore, say first, that there is no means of estimating the effect of a changed political system upon the willingness of German men and women to marry and have children, and secondly,

that a part of the increase in marriages and births might well have come about without any external stimulus. But we must also add that marriage loans have probably had an appreciable success, both by giving an inducement to marry and have the first child, and by reducing the tendency to obtain abortions. At present we cannot gauge the effect of the other measures with which the German Government is hoping to stimulate the birth-rate, though it is possible that a system in which so much legislation has been passed with the object of driving women out of industry and back into the home, will have some positive effect upon the size of the family. Looking at the number of births in 1934, we must also admit that in that particular year there was a very significant change in the position. According to Dr. Burgdörfer's method and the German life table for 1933,[30] the annual number of live births required to maintain the population stationary at 65·579 millions—its size in mid-1934—is 1·072 millions, while the actual number of births amounted to 1,181,179. The birth requirement was therefore satisfied.

But in weighing up this result we must remember the following facts: even if there were a constant annual supply of 1·072 million live births, the stationary population which would be attained would not, given 1933 mortality rates, contain as many females aged 15 to 45 years as were alive in 1934. The stationary population would only contain 13·44 million women in that age group instead of the 16·112 millions of 1934. To secure an adequate replacement of the potentially fertile women would need an annual supply of 1·285 million live births, and the total population would then stabilize itself at 78·7 millions. Secondly, if, with 1933 mortality rates, the population is to stabilize itself at 65·579 millions, the fertility of the females aged 15 to 45 years must, where the population has become stationary, be not less than 79·75 live births per thousand of those women. Now the fertility rate in 1934 was only 73·3 per thousand, and it was sufficient only because there were 16·112 million women in the particular age group. Since that group is now becoming smaller each year, their fertility will eventually have to rise in order to provide the requisite number of births. And

while such a rise is not by any means inconceivable, it is contrary to the experience of the last sixty years.

In brief, the rise in the German birth-rate, if maintained, is sufficient eventually to replace the present population by one no smaller in size, though containing a smaller proportion of potentially fertile women. But this rise may have been

A. *Marriages and Births in Germany as a whole*[31]

	First quarter of 1935		*First quarter of 1934*	
	Numbers	*Rate per 1,000 total population*	*Numbers*	*Rate per 1,000 total population*
Marriages	126,819	7·7	138,438	8·5
Live births	328,846	20·0	281,024	17·2
	Second quarter of 1935		*Second quarter of 1934*	
	Numbers	*Rate per 1,000 total population*	*Numbers*	*Rate per 1,000 total population*
Marriages	192,095	11·5	198,231	12·0
Live births	329,791	19·7	299,711	18·1

B. *Marriages and Births in the fifty-five largest cities of Germany*

	1935				*1934*			
	Marriages		*Births*		*Marriages*		*Births*	
	Numbers	*Rate per 1,000 total population*	*Numbers*	*Rate per 1,000 total population*	*Numbers*	*Rate per 1,000 total population*	*Numbers*	*Rate per 1,000 total population*
January	11,425	6·7	27,403	16·0	12,760	7·5	21,720	12·7
February	13,498	8·7	25,539	16·5	14,896	9·6	20,756	13·4
March	18,605	10·9	27,744	16·2	22,102	13·0	24,492	14·4
April	22,744	13·7	26,874	16·2	19,825	12·1	23,796	14·4
May	19,325	11·4	27,822	16·3	24,273	14·2	24,965	14·6
June	21,566	13·0	26,712	16·1	20,270	12·3	24,598	14·9
July	16,925	9·9	25,829	15·1	19,861	11·7	25,499	15·0
August	19,177	11·2	25,409	14·9	20,278	11·9	24,851	14·6
September	18,106	10·9	24,887	15·0	25,352	15·4	25,035	15·2
October	20,804	12·2	24,485	14·3	28,936	17·0	24,864	14·6
November	16,518	10·0	23,526	14·2	20,650	12·5	24,915	15·1
December	18,410	10·7	24,702	14·4	23,660	13·8	25,840	15·1

due largely to the special circumstances following the economic depression of 1930 to 1932, and if that is actually the case, there is little hope of continuing the 1934 level of births. And, in fact, there are already indications that the high rate of 1934 was only temporary. Complete figures for 1935 are not yet available, but both the tables above show that marriages fell off by the beginning of the year, while from the records of the major German cities it is evident that births began to drop in September. So rapid a regression does not augur well for the future of the German population.

III

ITALIAN ATTEMPTS TO ENCOURAGE POPULATION GROWTH

IT is obvious that the various countries which are making efforts to stimulate the growth of their populations are impelled largely by such motives as the fear of being overshadowed in numbers by other nations, and the desire to maintain a supply of active man-power for industrial and military purposes. But in Italy there is an additional factor—the anxiety to justify an imperialist policy. It is not an exaggeration to say that since the rise to power of Italian Fascism, population encouragement and expansionist aims have been deliberately woven together to form one of the main strands of governmental action. Signs of this were shown when, in January 1926, an official press communiqué estimated the Italian population for December 31st, 1925, at 42,115,606. This meant an increase of about three millions since 1921, the last census year, and the communiqué implied that Italy alone among western European nations had a rapidly growing population, and that this population was pressing upon the means of subsistence. Hence the need for colonial outlets. But this estimate was highly inaccurate, for the 1921 figures referred to the persons actually present in Italy at the time while those for 1925 also included Italians who were living abroad. In November 1926, the *Bolletino Mensile di Statistica* gave a corrected estimate, according to which the population on December 31st, 1925, was 40,548,666. Even this, however, was an exaggeration, for it meant an increase of 1,800,000 persons between 1921 and 1925, whereas an analysis of the official records of births, deaths, and net emigration showed an increase of only 1,100,000 in the period.[1] In particular, the generally accepted belief that the Italian population had already passed the French in numbers was not true.

But these facts were soon realized, and the realization gave rise to a marked change in Italian policy. Mussolini, who in 1913 had been one of the most ardent advocates of birth-control, expressed a new point of view in his speech on

Ascension Day, May 26th, 1927. He said: 'For five years we have continued to assert that the population of Italy was like a river overflowing its banks. That is not true. The Italian nation is not growing but diminishing in size. . . . The Italian nation still has an excess of births amounting to half a million per year. But this excess is no longer even as high as it was during the War.' And he continued: 'To count for something in the world, Italy must have a population of at least 60 millions when she reaches the threshold of the second half of this century. . . . It is a fact that the fate of nations is bound up with their demographic power. . . . Let us be frank with ourselves: what are 40 million Italians compared with 90 million Germans and 200 million Slavs? Let us look at our western neighbours: what are 40 million Italians compared with the 40 millions of France and the 90 millions in her colonies, or with the 46 millions of England and the 450 million inhabitants of her colonial possessions?' The new attitude was summed up in the statement: 'With a declining population a country does not create an empire, but becomes a colony.'[2]

Even before this date the Government had begun to make efforts to stimulate the growth of the Italian population, but the speech marked the beginning of an intensive campaign against the falling birth-rate. The measures adopted are of two main kinds—'repressive' laws aimed at discouraging celibacy and childlessness, and 'positive' laws intended to create a general environment favourable to the raising of large families. Of the first group, the best known example is the tax on bachelors, the object of which is not only to discriminate against bachelors but also to provide a regular governmental income for financing positive schemes. The law is then a rather peculiar one, for if the former object is achieved, the latter must necessarily fail. When the tax first came into existence, under the law of December 1926, it provided for a levy on all bachelors between the ages of 25 and 65, the actual amount payable differing with the age of the person.[3] Thus between the ages of 25 and 35, the tax was 35 lire per year, while it rose to 50 lire per year for men aged 35 to 50 years, and fell to 25 lire for bachelors over 60 years of age. At the same time the rate of income-

tax for bachelors was increased by 25 per cent. But two years' experience led to the conclusion that the tax was not high enough, and in September 1928 the rates were doubled, so that the tax yield, which had been 46·234 million lire in 1927 and 53·217 millions in 1928, rose to 106·440 millions in 1929, and 110·940 millions in 1930. At the same time, the income-tax payable by childless married couples and married couples with less than two children, was also raised. Discrimination was also practised in allocating places in the central and local government services. Up to 1929 it was customary to give preference to unmarried candidates, but under the law passed in the January of that year preference was to be granted in the other direction, and particularly to married men or women who had relatively large families. In recent years this practice has been extended to private enterprise, and applies not only to employment but also to the allocation of cheap houses and flats built by or with the help of the State or its various constituent bodies.

Since the whole programme was directed against anti-natalist tendencies, it was natural that it should also include laws against birth-control. They came under the general heading 'suppression of offences against maternity and infancy', and the first step was taken in 1926. By the new law any person taking part in birth-control propaganda might be punished with a fine of up to £200 and by solitary confinement for a year. Abortion was punished even more heavily, for any woman undergoing an operation for that purpose might receive as much as four years' imprisonment, while for the abortionist an even longer term of imprisonment was provided. In 1932 a new clause was added to the general law, making it illegal for drug stores to stock or even to list any contraceptive appliances. But, as in other countries, these laws are severe in theory rather than in practice. So far as contraception is concerned, condoms are listed as preventatives of disease and not as birth-control appliances, and are thus easily available.[4] Also, in the opinion of a number of Italians who were asked about the results of these laws, it is much more difficult to obtain abortions in Italy, but they are, in fact, still undertaken.[5]

Of the 'positive' measures the first important one was the law of June 1928 for decreasing the financial burdens of large families by means of tax exemptions and reductions. Three main modifications of the existing taxes were made. In the first place, a 100,000 lire of total income was exempted from liability to the progressively graduated income-tax and to the additional communal and family taxes. Secondly, for incomes of over 100,000 lire per year there were reductions in other directions so as to exempt the initial 100,000 lire from the tax on movable wealth, from the communal and provincial levies on industries, the various taxes going to the provincial councils of the economic corporations, and the taxes and super-taxes on land, buildings, and agricultural income. Finally, there was a complete exemption from communal taxes on licences, house-rents, and live-stock, contributions to labour corporations, and from the taxes levied for educational purposes. Note, however, that these reductions and exemptions only applied to 'large families', which were defined in the following way. For State employees, whatever their branch or grade of employment, or whether they were retired on pension, and for the employees of public bodies, the 'large family' was to consist of not less than seven children. For other workers and employees there had to be at least ten children to be provided for, or the parents must have had not less than twelve live-born children of whom they still have to support six. In the circumstances it is important not to exaggerate the value of these measures. The Central Statistical Institute estimated that there were, on June 30th, 1928, 1,532,206 families with seven or more children.[6] Since the reductions only apply to ordinary workers who have ten or more children, the families of those workers amount not to 1,532,206 but to 430,451, and, assuming that both parents are alive, represent a total population of not more than 5·6 millions. Add to this the families of State employees and the total figure does not amount to much more than 6 millions, while the total population of Italy at the end of 1928 was 40,392,000. That is, about 15 per cent. of the total population benefited from the measures.

The second big step was to provide a wide range of

services for the protection of mothers and children. Maternity insurance had been initiated in Italy as early as 1910, but the scope of the measures was very limited. But in 1925 a considerable extension was made in setting up the 'Opera Nazionale per la protezione della Maternità e dell'Infanza', which aimed, first, at protecting and helping suckling infants, children, and special classes of adolescents up to their eighteenth year of age, if necessary; secondly, at providing necessary services for needy or deserted mothers; and thirdly, at co-ordinating and further encouraging such work on the same lines as was already being undertaken. This kind of work has no direct bearing on population encouragement, but indirectly, by decreasing maternal and infantile mortality, and by raising the general level of health of mothers and children, it may have more appreciable results than direct aid. For this reason the provision of lying-in hospitals, pre- and post-natal clinics, and the extension of local public health and hygiene services, constitutes some of the most significant steps taken by the Fascist régime.[7] The various public, semi-State, and Fascist party bodies appear to have taken an active part in this work.[8]

The latest stage in the campaign is the attack on urbanism, combined with all the efforts to increase agricultural production and raise the prosperity of the country-side which come under the head of 'bonifica integrale'. The movement began with the latter phase, concentrating almost entirely on increasing the food supply. In 1925 there was the 'bataiglia del grano', the efforts to expand the corn harvest by the use of fertilizers and agricultural machinery, by holding agricultural exhibitions and competitions, and by an initial movement to break up the large estates and concentrate on intensive cultivation. The movement was helped by two factors. In the first place, the stream of Italian emigration was being reduced, partly owing to economic conditions abroad, and partly because of the new migration policy adopted by Italy. Secondly, while Italian industry had been very prosperous during the inflation period, the stabilization of the lira put an end to this, and by 1926 there was a considerable amount of unemployment.[9] At the same time the fall in the Italian birth-rate, which was becoming a

matter of some concern to the Government, was most noticeable in the big cities of the North Italian Plain. The result was the growth of an anti-urban policy designed for restocking the country-side and for diminishing the depressing influence of the towns upon the birth-rate. The intended ruralization plan was mentioned by Mussolini in his Ascension Day speech in 1927, and in the autumn of the same year a ministerial decree was issued forbidding the establishment of factories employing more than 100 workers in provincial towns of over 100,000 inhabitants. A year later the Minister of the Interior issued a circular explaining the objects of the scheme, which was to impede the flow of labour from the country to the towns and to initiate a movement in the reverse direction. At the same time the work of the 'bonifica integrale' was begun, aiming at the improvement of some 2 million hectares of land, largely in the south and in the islands, and involving the expenditure of not less than 7,000 million lire on water-supply, soil improvement and regeneration, road construction, technical education for agriculture, and the provision of special agricultural credit. Finally, the law which embodied this plan was signed by Victor Emmanuel on December 24th, 1928. It was meant, not to crush industrialization, but to restrict its urban manifestations and to transfer a considerable part of it to rural areas. The law was facultative, not obligatory, and gave the Prefects power to control and prevent the influx of fresh rural labour into the towns, and to repatriate those rural workers who had become unemployed after migration. On the other hand, there was no attempt to create a peasant class. Factory agriculture was envisaged, largely under the control of the existing landowners, though some element of attractiveness to the workers was given by introducing Share Farming in a number of areas,[10] particularly in the Roman Campagna. There are no figures showing the extent to which this law has been applied, but, according to an inquiry made by the Central Statistical Institute of Rome, 62 of the 92 Prefectures have actually enforced the law, while of the 92 Provincial economic corporations only 5 have made use of similar powers for labour control.[11] Much depends upon the particular agricultural community, and in some cases,

especially in the mountainous districts, the local administration has endeavoured to prevent further depopulation by building new houses, providing electric light and power and better transport facilities—in general, by making rural life more attractive. The National Fascist Institute of Social Insurance has also taken part in the scheme, and, according to their 1935 Report, has joined with the Commissariat for Internal Settlement to transfer, between 1929 and 1934, some 2,080,000 agricultural and industrial workers from the more densely settled areas to those where the population was relatively sparse.[12]

This brief account does not by any means cover the whole field of action. Much work is being done by public and semi-public bodies, by individual towns, and by rural areas. In the northern cities, in particular, where there is greater prosperity but a lower birth-rate, special privileges are given to large families, including marriage and birth premiums, prizes for the families with the largest number of children, reductions in fares, and better and cheaper house accommodation, while the movement is supported by intensive newspaper propaganda. Twin and other multiple births are given particular recognition, large families have their photographs exhibited, and the whole equipment of journalism is used to reinforce the possible effect of more material measures. It is evident that the Italians have been strongly influenced by the French examples of efforts to the same end, especially in the extension of health services, and the recent introduction of family allowances has carried this imitation still further. As in most countries where similar measures have been introduced, allowances were first given to central and local government employees. Under the Act of June 1929, and the various amendments which have followed, some 400,000 State employees of different kinds draw family allowances or cost of living bonuses graduated in proportion to the number of dependent children, and according to the rural or urban nature of the community in which the family lives.[13] Five years later the agreement of October 11th, 1934, between the Fascist Confederation of Industry and the Fascist Confederation of Industrial Workers, extended the allowance system to industrial (and now also

commercial) workers. Unlike the French scheme, however, this is not financed entirely by the employees, but draws its funds from equal contributions by the employing and employed classes. As with the bachelor tax, this new scheme is of a rather ambiguous kind. Its object was not primarily to improve the conditions of families with dependent children relatively to the unmarried and the married but childless. The impetus was given by the desire to reduce the hours of work to 40 per week, with corresponding general reductions in wages, and the allowances were introduced to prevent the full effect of wage-cuts from falling upon workers with families of at least two dependent children. The actual method of raising the necessary funds is unique. Every industrial worker contributes 1 per cent. of the wage received for work, amounting to not more than 40 hours per week, and an equal contribution is made by employers in respect of each worker. For hours in excess of 40, a 5 per cent. contribution has to be made by each worker, with a similar contribution on the part of the employer. In proportion, therefore, as the Italian 40-hour week campaign is successful, the value of the family allowances will be correspondingly reduced. As introduced, the scheme proposed to provide allowances to between 360,000 and 540,000 workers, in respect of 500,000 to 740,000 children, the rate of pay being fixed for the first year at 4 lire per week per child, and the annual contributions were anticipated at between 180 million and 200 million lire. But between January 14th and March 31st, 1935, the initial period of actual practice, the receipts amounted to only 15·588 million lire, and the payments to 13·581 million lire.[14]

Turning to the effect of this wide range of direct and indirect action upon the course of growth of the Italian population, it is essential to distinguish between the general position in Italy and that in other countries where comparable efforts are being made. In France, Belgium, and Germany, fertility had declined to such an extent since the third quarter of the nineteenth century that by the beginning of the post-war period these countries were no longer in a position to maintain their existing numbers. But in Italy, although fertility had also been declining since about 1880,

the rate of decline had been slower, and in 1921 the net reproduction rate was still well above unity—at 1·4.[15] Or to apply the Burgdörfer index, given the mortality rates of 1921, the Italian population could have maintained its existing numbers—37·974 millions—with a supply of 759,480 live births per year, and with 818,000 live births per year it would have arrived at a stationary population containing the same number of females aged 15 to 44 years as there were in 1921. The actual number of live births in 1921 was 1,163,213, so that there was an excess of about 53 per cent. for the former purpose and of 42 per cent. for the latter.[16] Given the fertility and mortality conditions of 1921, the Italian population would, therefore, have continued to grow, and the Government had no reason for concern in 1921 about Italy's ability to maintain her numbers. But the question was one of future trends and probabilities. The marriage- and birth-rates were falling, and in spite of the increased expectation of life, the positive excess of births over deaths was tending to become smaller. How long would it take for the net reproduction rate to fall below unity? Moreover, Mussolini was aiming at a future population of at least 60 millions, and to achieve and maintain this number, given the mortality conditions of 1921, would need a supply of 1,200,000 live births per year. The actual births had already fallen below this required figure. It was for such reasons that an intensive birth campaign was considered necessary. How far has it been successful?

In the first place, there seem to be no obvious signs of success in encouraging marriages. The table on p. 42 shows that the marriage-rate declined steadily between 1921 and 1932,[17] though there has been a rise since that date. A closer study of the figures shows that there may, however, have been temporary effects. The marriage-rate naturally fell rapidly after 1921, but the rate of decline had begun to slow up by 1925. In 1926 it was almost unchanged, a fact which may be attributed, in part at least, to the threat of the bachelor tax which was passed in December 1926 but did not come into force until January 1st, 1927. Marriages went up by 6,998 or 0·1 per 1,000 total population in 1927, probably influenced by the new tax, but by the following year the decline

had set in again, with a fall of 17,316 marriages compared with 1927. The tax was doubled by the law of December 1928 and there was an increase in marriage during the next two years, only to give place to a new and much more

Italy

	No. of marriages	*No. of marriages per 1,000 total population*
1921	438,535	11·0
1922	365,460	9·6
1923	334,306	8·7
1924	306,830	7·9
1925	295,769	7·6
1926	295,566	7·5
1927	302,564	7·6
1928	285,248	7·1
1929	287,800	7·1
1930	303,214	7·4
1931	276,035	6·7
1932	267,771	6·4
1933	289,915	6·9
1934	312,662	7·4

marked fall of 27,179 in 1931 and 8,264 in 1932. Whatever effect the various encouragements to marriage and discouragements to celibacy may have had, they have been, therefore, very temporary, the declining trend soon becoming evident again.

An analysis of the monthly figures of marriages shows an even smaller result. The influence of the 1926 Act seems to have been very short-lived, for, comparing the 1927 figures with those for the corresponding months of 1926, the increase in the number of marriages apparently lasted for only about eight months. The Act of December 1928 had an immediate effect, for marriages rose before it actually came into force. But once it had come into force marriages dropped again, and when a new rise did take place it was probably under the influence of economic conditions rather than in response to what was not, after all, a heavy financial penalty.

It must be admitted, however, that this analysis is a very crude one. To make an accurate comparison of marriages

and marriage-rates from year to year would involve the construction of marriage-probability tables. That is, taking some year as the base or normal year, the situation in succeeding years would have to be analysed in terms of the

Marriages in Italy, 1926 to 1929[18]

	1926	*1927*	*1928*	*1929*
January .	27,841	26,658	23,991	24,201
February .	33,171	37,894	33,410	24,708
March . .	14,433	18,583	14,583	12,366
April . .	36,853	33,249	32,921	35,796
May . .	19,858	20,340	17,426	18,115
June . .	18,979	19,526	18,205	20,123
July . .	16,605	17,045	14,468	15,661
August .	15,693	16,003	14,448	15,129
September .	23,563	22,929	22,753	23,328
October .	31,481	32,161	29,398	36,217
November .	29,174	28,733	29,082	37,115
December .	27,915	29,443	34,563	25,041
Total	295,566	302,564	285,248	287,800

number of marriages per thousand men and women at each year of age in the total population, related to the expectation of marriage at each year of age derived from the facts of the base year. Not many countries have statistics adequate for this purpose, though calculations on these lines have been made for some. Nevertheless, the broad facts of the Italian situation do not indicate any significant positive result of the attempts to encourage marriage. Leaving out the immediate post-war period because it was abnormal, and comparing the situation in the last ten years with that before the War, we see a marked worsening of the position up to 1933. The average marriage-rate for the period 1906 to 1910 was 7·9 per 1,000, while for 1926 to 1930 the rate was only 7·3, dropping still further to 6·7 and 6·4 in 1931 and 1932. Nor can the rise in 1933 and 1934 be attributed to Italian legislation. It is far more probably due to a slight but definite improvement of economic conditions, leading to the fulfilment of a pent-up desire to marry on the part of those persons whose marriages had been postponed by depression. Leaving aside Germany, where the introduction of marriage loans undoubtedly affected the situation, many other

European countries have had significant increases in their marriage-rates, even those western countries whose net reproduction rate is already below unity. The facts do not, therefore, give Italy much justification for believing in the success of the attempts to stimulate marriage.

Nor does the effect upon the birth-rate appear more noteworthy. Since 1922 there has scarcely been a break in the downward trend, the rate of decline being especially rapid in 1928 and 1929 when most of the Italian measures were

Italy[19]

	No. of live births	*No. of live births per 1,000 total population*
1921	1,163,213	29·2
1922	1,175,872	30·8
1923	1,155,177	30·0
1924	1,124,470	29·0
1925	1,109,761	28·4
1926	1,094,589	27·7
1927	1,093,772	27·5
1928	1,072,316	26·7
1929	1,037,700	25·6
1930	1,092,678	26·7
1931	1,026,197	24·9
1932	990,995	23·8
1933	995,979	23·7
1934	992,975	23·4

already in practice. The rise in 1930 may be partly explained by the relatively prosperous conditions in 1929, while in 1934, when most other countries were showing the effect of the increased marriages of 1933, there was a further decline in Italy, though there was an increase in the number of births in 1933. Of course, birth-rates give very little information, and often give it wrongly, but the inadequacy of Italian statistics makes it impossible to calculate really accurate fertility rates. Professor Mortara has computed legitimate fertility rates around the various census years, and between 1921–5 and 1930 they show a fall in every province of the kingdom except Sicily, and in the case of Sicily there is considerable doubt as to the accuracy of the figure for 1921–5.[20]

Italy. Legitimate Live Births per 1,000 Married Women aged 15 to 45 Years

	1921–5	1930
Liguria	160	131
Piemonte	164	136
Toscana	210	154
Venezia Giulia	198	171
Emilia	236	175
Venezia Tridentina	279	234
Lombardia	227	181
Umbria	256	203
Lazio	240	207
Marche	262	214
Venezia Euganea	303	237
Sicilia	(232)	244
Sardegna	297	293
Abruzzi	281	256
Campania	311	288
Calabria	301	266
Puglie	301	284
Lucania	308	289
Average for Italy	248	212

My own estimates of general fertility show a similar decline up to 1931. After 1931, however, there appears to be an upward movement not shown by the crude birth-rate, because the number of potentially fertile females has been

Italy. General Fertility Rates[21]

	No. of females aged 15–44 years	*No. of live births*	*No. of live births per 1,000 females aged 15–44 years*
1921 (Dec. 1st Census)	8,534,918	1,163,213	136·3
1931 (April 21st Census)	9,740,488	1,026,197	105·3
1932 (Mid-year estimate)	9,338,000	990,995	106·2
1933 (Mid-year estimate)	9,280,000	995,979	107·3

falling faster than the number of live births. But this upward movement is more apparent than real. The ordinary fertility rate is based on the total number of potentially fertile females, from the age of 15 upwards, while it is obvious, from the specific, single-year-of-age fertility rates of countries whose statistics make such a calculation possible,

that up to the age of 18 the births are insignificant, both in actual number and in proportion to those contributed by later age groups. What has happened in Italy is that, as the result of the War, the number of females of 15 to 17 years of age is abnormally low, and this merely reduces the divisor without appreciably affecting the number of births that would otherwise obtain. In reality it is highly probable that fertility has continued to decline since 1931, though it will not be possible to tell until this War-effect has passed through the early years and into the groups which are significantly fertile. It should also be noted that not all the births registered can be attributed to women resident in Italy. Under the influence of the new attitude towards migration, Italian consuls abroad urge Italian women living outside Italy to return home to give birth to their children. The object is to prevent the child receiving a foreign nationality and the inducements to the women are financial as well as propagandist. Some of the annual births for the last few years should therefore be excluded, though I have not been able to find any official estimate of the number concerned.[22]

Comparing the situation in 1933, after more than seven years of campaigning against the decline in marriages and births, with that in 1921, it is not easy to find any visible results. We must admit that the public services have been of great value, and, in particular, infantile mortality has dropped by about 24·8 per cent. in the period, as is shown in the table below.[23] But neither marriage nor fertility

Deaths of Infants under One Year of Age, per 1,000 Live Births

1921	131·2	1928	120·3
1922	127·9	1929	124·9
1923	128·7	1930	105·5
1924	126·9	1931	112·9
1925	119·8	1932	110·5
1926	126·6	1933	100·1
1927	120·3	1934	98·7

appears to have been affected appreciably. We can, of course, say that without this external encouragement the downward trend would have been still more marked, but the important point is that although the Italian population is still more than replacing itself, it is doing so at a lower rate than in 1921.

The net reproduction rate had fallen to about 1·218[24] by 1931 and has probably fallen still further since then. In 1933 there was only about a 29 per cent. surplus of live births for maintaining the population at its level of 42·214 millions —its size on December 31st, 1933—compared with a surplus of 53·1 per cent. in 1921, while for stabilizing the number of females aged 15 to 44 years, the surplus had fallen from 42 per cent. to 22 per cent.[25]

In view of this change for the worse, it is interesting to compare the actual course of population growth in the last fourteen years with the estimates made on the basis of the 1921 census.[26] Thirty different estimates of the future population were made, but only three were really important, and they are shown graphically on p. 49. Estimate A assumed that fertility and mortality would remain at their 1921 level, Estimate B that mortality would diminish until it fell to the level to be found in New Zealand at the time, while fertility would drop to about two-thirds of that in 1921, and Estimate C was a compromise between the other two estimates, assuming constant mortality with decreasing fertility. In all the cases an allowance for net emigration was made, estimated at 40,000 per year. Given these assumptions the course of the future population would be that shown in the table on p. 49.

Two points should be noticed. First, the estimates used an incorrect basis, since the 1921 census gave too high a figure for the population of Italy. Secondly, the actual course of population growth has been below all the estimates and is only just about to catch up with the lowest estimate. Even in 1931 there was a difference of some 400,000 between the lowest estimate and the actual population. Since the decline in fertility in the last fourteen years has been very marked, and as there seems to be no visible change in the trend, it is improbable that population in the future will grow at a more rapid rate than is indicated by the lowest estimate. In that case, the population at the beginning of 1950 would amount to only 46 millions instead of the 60 millions at which Mussolini is aiming. A glance at the graph also shows that, even if the facts were to correspond to the highest estimate, the population would still only amount to 53·5 millions by

1950. Or, looking at the question from another angle and assuming that deaths remained constant at their 1934 level —which means a continuously falling death-rate—to reach 60 millions by 1950 would require an annual supply of about 1·259 million live births. But in 1933 there were only 996,000, and in 1934 only 993,000. Judging from the experience of the last ten years, it seems unlikely that the necessary upward movement will take place.

Actual Course of Population Growth in Italy, 1921 to 1934, in millions[27]

(*Corrected figures for 1921*)

Population on December 31st of each year

1921	38·023	1928	40·392
1922	38·370	1929	40·706
1923	38·639	1930	41·069
1924	38·929	1931	41·439
1925	39·296	1932	41·809
1926	39·628	1933	42·214
1927	40·001	1934	42·625

Year	*Estimate A*	*Estimate B*	*Estimate C*
1921	38,944,317	38,944,317	38,944,317
1931	43,253,015	42,541,448	41,880,400
1941	48,891,765	46,192,360	44,440,686
1951	54,184,356	49,633,297	46,009,735
1961	60,589,011	53,197,365	47,337,286



IV

FAMILY ALLOWANCES

DIRECT measures and intensive campaigns such as are to be found in Germany and Italy at the present time are not the only ways of attacking the falling birth-rate. Other countries have for quite a long time been using such indirect means as family allowances. Briefly, a family allowance is a money grant quite separate from and additional to a man's wage or salary, and it is given to help him in raising a family. It therefore generally varies in amount with the number of children, and it is only given while the children are dependent—that is, until they begin to earn their own living. It is called an indirect measure because to increase the birth-rate is not its sole, and was certainly not its original, object. Consequently, the form it takes in practice may not be that best suitable for stimulating population growth. But family allowances may, nevertheless, have a considerable effect upon the number of births, and when we come to discuss the possible action which can be taken to avert a decline in population we shall have to give them careful consideration. That is why this chapter is concerned with an examination of the main family allowance systems, particularly in France and Belgium, where they are most firmly established.

In France both theory and practice are much older than is generally imagined. The year 1854 saw the formation of a Family Fund in the factory of Monsieur Hamel, with the object of preventing the standard of life of the family man from falling below that of the bachelor. And in 1862 the Ministry of Marine introduced a grant of 10 centimes a day for each child under 10 years of age to the lower grades in the French navy. But these were isolated incidents with little effect upon the country as a whole. A much stronger public opinion was necessary before the movement became at all extensive. To some extent this was helped by the Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII, 'De Rerum Novarum', which was issued in 1891, but since the struggle between Church and State was still at its height in France, it was scarcely

likely that the Pope's suggestions would be followed at the time. Later, however, it helped to reinforce the other currents of social feeling which were growing up in the country, and in the early years of the twentieth century various State departments, local authorities, and public utility companies granted family allowances to many, if not all, of their employees.

But the beginnings of the real movement took place during the War, and from the point of view of modern developments the first important scheme was that introduced by Monsieur E. Romanet in the firm of Joya et Cie, engineers, at Grenoble. The actual introduction was in 1916, when rising prices were making it increasingly difficult for the married man who had children to maintain his standard of life. At about the same time civil servants, since their salaries were fixed, were feeling the rise in prices no less severely, and in 1917 the State undertook to give to those whose annual salary was not more than 4,500 francs, an allowance of 100 francs per year for each child under 16 years of age.[1] The idea spread to other public authorities in the country, and by the end of the War the bulk of lower-grade central and local officials were entitled to family allowances.

The Romanet scheme spread to other engineering and metal firms in the Grenoble district, but as it did there was the danger that some employers might avoid the charge by refusing to take on married men with families. To meet this difficulty, Equalization Funds were established, the first actually being formed by 1918 in an entirely different district —at Lorient, in the Département of Morbihan—though apparently in similar circumstances. The idea underlying the fund was quite simple. Instead of giving allowances directly to his workers and therefore having to bear a heavier charge if the bulk of his workers were married men with children, the employer made a regular contribution to the Equalization Fund, which distributed the allowance itself. Since the employer's contribution varied directly with the total number of workers he employed, and not simply with the number of married workers, there was no incentive on his part to discriminate against married men. It is this Equalization Fund system which has been adopted in

practically all subsequent developments in France and Belgium.[2] Later growth saw the formation of two kinds of fund—the Industrial, embracing workers in the same industry, and the Regional, covering all kinds of workers employed in the same locality. The second type is the more satisfactory, for it prevents industries which employ a large proportion of juvenile or unmarried female labour from reaping a costs advantage over those containing a heavy percentage of married men. At the same time it is a more flexible method and permits an adjustment of allowance rates to meet differences in the cost of living in different regions. It is therefore natural that most funds to-day are operated on a regional basis.[3]

We must not forget that up to 1932 practically the whole system was a voluntary one, run on contributions obtained only from employers. That so extensive a development took place is, consequently, rather remarkable, and it is worth while looking at the main factors which helped in this growth. In the first place, there were the demands made by the workers themselves. For most of the period, prices were rising and conditions were becoming increasingly difficult for married men with children. The workers saw in family allowances a means of raising their standard of life, and demanded them, in spite of initial trade union antagonism. Secondly, the fact that prices were rising increased the employers' willingness to extend the system, since it meant little, if any, additional charge.[4] It would be untrue to say that rising prices were the only cause in persuading the employers, since in the period 1920 to 1922, when prices dropped sharply, there was a very marked increase in the number of workers covered by the allowance system. But in the main, the development of the system took place under a rising price level, and by the time prices began to fall again, in 1930 to 1932, the State intervened and made the institution compulsory. Among the other factors which may have influenced employers is one given by the Director of the Fund for the Stéphanoise Region. He believes that the granting of allowances has effectively withdrawn family men from the 'class-struggle'.[5] If this is true, the employers had very strong grounds for extending the system. There was

also, of course, the point that allowances probably tended to stabilize the labour-supply and reduce the rapidity of labour-turnover. So far as raising the birth-rate is concerned, it is difficult to say how important this motive was originally. Initially, the movement came about because of rising prices, and other factors were quite secondary. But once the movement had begun, public opinion was inclined to support it because it was thought that the birth-rate would be stimulated. A statement made by a committee appointed by one of the chief equalization funds shows that as early as 1919 some consideration was being given to the population aspect of allowances[6] while the war-time losses of man-power and the post-war labour shortage must have helped to increase this emphasis. By 1924 the Central Committee of the family allowance system decided to include a survey of the effects of allowances on the birth-rates,[7] and since that time the population motive has assumed a rapidly growing importance. In particular it should be noted that the allowances themselves are so graded that, up to a point, each subsequent child receives a larger grant. This obviously puts a premium on large families.

Confronted with a rapidly growing movement, the State could scarcely avoid taking an active interest in the system. Beginning in 1917, governmental action was gradually extended in scope to cover public utility companies, such as railways, and other public bodies. The laws of 1922 and 1923 also authorized Départements, Communes, and public bodies to insert a family allowance clause in the contracts they gave to private firms, so that any firm undertaking work for one of these bodies might be compelled to grant family allowances to their employees. This measure was generally adopted and in December 1928 it was made applicable to all public works contracts.[8] At the same time there was a considerable pressure for the generalization of the family allowance system—that is, for applying it to all occupations and throughout France. Since 1920, Monsieur Bokanowski and a number of his colleagues had been urging the Chamber to pass an Act for such a purpose. But though an investigation was made by the 'Commission d'Assurances et de Prévoyance Sociale', the Government was not anxious to enter a field in

which so much had already been done by voluntary action. Nevertheless, in 1929 three Bills were put before the Chamber—two by individuals and the third by the Government itself, under the leadership of Monsieur Poincaré. The three proposals were handed to committees of the Chamber—the 'Commission d'Assurance' and the 'Commission du Travail'—and they recommended an amended version of the governmental proposal. This in turn passed through the newly established Chamber committee—'Commission Supérieure des Allocations Familiales'—and then to the various committees of the Chamber concerned with the different sections. Finally, a complete scheme was placed before both Chambers and was passed by the Chambre des Députés in March 1931, and by the Senate in January 1932. The Act came into force on March 11th, 1932, though it could not be applied[9] until the appropriate administrative order had been published. This was in October 1933.

Briefly, the Act gave legal recognition to the system of family allowances already in existence, and extended it to cover all industries and occupations, though to prevent a sudden increase in the costs of industry the application of the law was made gradual. But ultimately all employers (except railway companies, mines, and public bodies which pay allowances directly to their employees) are to affiliate to equalization funds in their region or industry, and all employees, wage-earning and salaried, no matter how large the income they already receive, are to be given allowances for their dependent children.[10] The term 'dependent children' generally applies to those under 14 years of age, but the age limit may be extended to 16 years if the child is a student or an apprentice, or if he is physically or mentally ill and so unable to earn his own living.[11] The question of nationality does not arise, and so long as the employee is working in France he is entitled to an allowance for each dependent child living in the country. The allowances are also paid to the dependent children of an employee who is injured at, or contracts an illness from, his work, whether he be temporarily or permanently incapacitated or if he dies. There are no provisions for the payment of the allowances during unemployment, but the Act states 'the allowances

should vary with the number of days worked (i.e. per month), but the bodies which apply the law are naturally at liberty to give a full monthly allowance, without any deduction for days not worked, when the absence from work was not voluntary on the part of the attributary'.[12] In some cases the allowance is made during a period of three months' unemployment, while where there is 'short time' it may be continued indefinitely. This was the case in the Rouen Fund for the cotton and artificial silk industry, although in the second part of 1934 27 per cent. of the workers were on 'short time'.[13]

There are no definite regulations concerning the method or time of payment. The official handbook says that the father is legally entitled to receive the allowance but that, in practice, most funds send it to the mother by postal order. Payment to the mother is probably a more satisfactory method of ensuring that the allowance is actually spent on the children. The Act also defined the positions and membership of regional and industrial equalization funds, details of which are given in the notes to this chapter,[14] and provided official inspectors to ensure the efficient working of the funds. Finally, a permanent Family Allowance Committee was set up to advise the 'Ministre du Travail', after consultation with the departmental committees, on general questions of administration, minimum rates of pay, and on cases where allowances may be given directly by employers without affiliation to an equalization fund. This permanent committee consists of representatives of the Chamber and the Senate, of the funds, and of workers and employers.

As the law was intended to be applied gradually, it does not even now cover the whole employed population. At frequent intervals since 1933 new administrative orders have been published, applying the Act to further classes of workers, but by May 18th, 1934, it was only applicable to 595,663 undertakings employing 5,809,468 workers. In reality, however, only 75 per cent. of these workers were actually being covered and the bulk of the small employers had not yet fallen into line.[15] To these 4,150,000 employees, about 1,375,000,000 francs were being given annually in allowances. This does not include the cost of other services

provided by the funds, and no total figures are apparently available up to the present. Since May 1934 other categories of workers have been made subject to the law, but up to the present the whole of agriculture remains untouched. The official statements of the 'Ministère du Travail' indicates that agriculture is, however, within the scope of the Act, and that special regulations, drawn up in consultation with the 'Ministère d'Agriculture' and the local 'Chambres d'Agriculture', will gradually be applied. There are, of course, Agricultural Funds, or agricultural sections of other funds, left over from the pre-1932 régime. In 1934 there were thirty of these, distributing about 2 million francs per year to some 3,500 families.[16] In the main they are small and insignificant, but there are three of considerable size, those of Laon and Soissons in the Département of Aisne, and Montpellier in the Département of Hérault, in regions where agriculture is carried on in large farms run on factory lines. The existence of markedly divergent conditions, the individualist attitude of the farmers, and the difficulty of spreading propaganda amongst the scattered population, have prevented any great development from taking place up to the present. Even when the law is applied to agriculture there will be a considerable problem, since the bulk of the farming population consists of small proprietors who only casually engage hired labour.

In practice the State has not, apart from the generalized application of the Act, made any fundamental changes in the system which had grown up before 1932. On the contrary, its work has been largely to consolidate the position. The allowances, which are still obtained entirely by contributions from employers, are calculated, raised, and generally distributed by the equalization funds. As a whole they amount to about 2 per cent. of the total wages bill in industry, while the cost of administration amounts to about 0·1 per cent. of the wages bill. In agriculture the cost is higher—between 3 and 4 per cent.—because in the small number of funds which have been set up the proportion of married men with dependent children is relatively larger. Nor has the method of calculating the employers' contributions been changed. It is similar to the system of local rating in this country, in

that a rate is struck after calculating the total sum needed, and is based, in industry and commerce, upon the average number of employees, the number of days actually worked, or the total value of wages and salaries paid. In agriculture the basis is usually the area cultivated, having due regard to the different kinds of cultivation. This basis having been chosen, the total expenses of the fund are then estimated, administrative costs included, and the contribution of the individual employer calculated in relation to his wages bill, employees, or numbers of days of work. He may thus pay more or less than his workers actually receive in allowances.

The question of actual money allowance is rather confused. A number of changes have been made and the net effect is not quite certain. Nevertheless, the main features can be indicated and these give a fairly clear picture of the present situation. In the first place the Act provided for the computation of legal minimum rates of allowance for each Département. These rates have been established after consideration of the prosperity of the Département and the cost of living in it. But the various funds have complete liberty to pay higher rates or to provide additional services, and are, in fact, encouraged to do so. So that, while there is a minimum rate of allowance which is the lowest any fund in the particular Département is allowed to pay,[17] there are no upper limits. In actual fact, however, very few funds pay rates which are higher than the minima, and of the 201 industrial and commercial funds in operation in March 1935 only 15 were paying such rates. The present tendency is to use the surplus money, after the minimum allowances have been paid, to provide non-cash services, especially medical inspection and attendance. But this does not necessarily mean that there has, since 1932, been any reduction in the actual size of the allowances paid. Comparison between the actual rates given by the different funds in January 1933 (before the 1932 Act had begun to be applied) and in March 1935 shows that of the industrial and commercial funds[18] 32·7 per cent. now have higher rates, 32·8 per cent. have lower ones, while in 34·5 per cent. of the cases there has been no change. This does not, however, tell us whether the average amount received per dependent child has fallen,

since we do not know the number of children supported by each fund, and for this purpose we must fall back upon the sample of 54 funds used by Colonel Guillermin[19] for computing his population statistics. According to the figures provided by these funds, the annual average allowance per child has fallen from 422·5 francs in 1931 to 345·5 francs in 1932, and to 278·6 francs in 1933. Since in the same period the proportion of one and two child families has also fallen, compared with families having over two children, the actual drop in the average allowance paid is really greater than shown by the figures. So that, since the 1932 Act, family allowances have, in the main, been smaller. The 1934 figures have now been published, and they show an upward turn,[20] but it is not certain if the rise in 1934 has been sufficient to counterbalance the fall up to the end of 1933. Finally, we can compare the average rate given in January 1933 by the industrial funds with the legal minimum rates now in force. The former rate was:

	Rate per month in francs	*No. of children*	*Total allowance per month in francs*
1st child	25	1	25
2nd „	39	2	64
3rd „	54	3	118
4th „	72	4	190
5th „	74	5	264
6th „	121	6	385

Since there are many legal minimum rates—a different one for almost every Département—a number of examples are given below:

Legal Minimum Allowances in Industry, Commerce, and the Professions

	Rates per month in francs			*Total allowance per month in francs*			
	Lowest	*High*	*Highest*	*No. of children*	*Lowest*	*High*	*Highest*
1st child	15	20	25	1	15	20	25
2nd „	15	50	60	2	30	70	85
3rd „	15	50	115	3	45	120	200
4th „	20	80	120	4	65	200	320
5th „	20	80	120	5	85	280	440
6th „	20	80	120	6	105	360	560

The lowest legal rate is found in Corsica, while rates scarcely higher are given in four other Départements. The high rates shown in the table are those applying to the Départements of Seine, Seine et Marne, and Seine et Oise, and the highest to the Département of Aube. Since in only four Départements are the legal rates higher than the average rates given in January 1933, and since only 15 of the funds give allowances above the legal minima, there is scarcely any doubt but that the 1932 Act, taken into conjunction with the worsened economic conditions in France and the fall in the cost of living, has generally lowered the amount of money paid in respect of dependent children. The same is true of the Agricultural Funds, as is shown in the succeeding table:

Average Rates of Allowance in Agriculture

	Francs per month		*Total allowance in francs per month*		
			No. of children		
	1930	*1935*		*1930*	*1935*
1st child	11	10	1	11	10
2nd „	22	20	2	33	30
3rd „	29	25	3	62	55
4th „	33	30	4	95	85
5th „	39	35	5	134	120
6th „	40	40	6	174	160

But a more important question is the relation between the allowance and the basis wage or salary received by the worker. In 1932 it was estimated that the average family allowance gave a 15–20 per cent. increase in income to an unskilled worker with four dependent children, i.e. between 4 and 5 per cent. for each child. No general average has been computed for the most recent period, but in the Appendix there are a number of calculations based on the legal minimum rates for different Départements and the average monthly earnings of workers in industry, commerce, and agriculture. A selection of these is given in the next table.

It will be noticed that even when the rates have reached the peak in their average allowance per child—that is, when there are six children—the addition to basic income in respect of each child is under 11 per cent. at the highest, and is in most cases between 5 and 6 per cent. Since it is generally estimated in this country that the cost of rearing a child

RELATION BETWEEN FAMILY ALLOWANCE AND BASIC WAGE OR SALARY[21]

Percentage which Allowance Forms of Basic Wage or Salary

Départements	*Industry, Commerce, and the Professions*												*Agriculture*			
	Lowest percentages						*Highest percentages*									
Wage rates	*Corsica 1932*	*Av. per child*	*Calvados 1934*	*Av. per child*	*Yonne 1934*	*Av. per child*	*Vosges 1934*	*Av. per child*	*Ain 1934*	*Av. per child*	*Aube 1934*	*Av. per child*	*Hérault 1934*	*Av. per child*	*Aisne 1934*	*Av. per child*
No. of Children																
1	1·8	1·80	2·3	2·30	1·7	1·70	2·5	2·50	3·1	3·10	2·9	2·90	1·7	1·70	1·9	1·90
2	3·6	1·80	5·2	2·60	5·1	2·55	6·3	3·15	7·3	3·65	9·8	4·90	5·0	2·50	5·8	2·90
3	5·4	1·80	8·8	2·93	9·6	3·20	12·6	4·20	13·4	4·47	23·1	7·70	9·2	3·07	10·6	3·53
4	7·8	1·95	12·3	3·08	15·1	3·78	21·3	5·33	23·2	5·80	37·0	9·25	14·2	3·55	16·4	4·10
5	10·3	2·06	15·9	3·18	20·9	4·18	30·1	6·02	32·9	6·58	50·8	10·16	20·0	4·00	23·2	4·64
6	12·7	2·12	19·5	3·25	26·6	4·43	38·9	6·48	42·7	7·10	64·8	10·80	26·7	4·45	30·8	5·16
Average per child	1·9		2·9		3·3		4·6		5·1		7·7		3·2		3·7	

amounts to about 22 per cent. of the cost of maintaining a childless married couple, it will be seen that in no case do the allowances cover more than 50 per cent. of the cost of a child, and in most cases they only provide about 25 per cent.[22] In practice the percentages are probably higher than is indicated in the table. They have been calculated on the assumptions of an 8-hour day (or 48-hour week) and a 25-day month for workers. But, according to the Director of the 'Statistique Générale de la France', the 48-hour week is no longer general. Unemployment has led to 'short time', and the typical week in many branches of industry now consists of only 40 to 42 hours. The basic wage of the workers is thus smaller, and the relative addition made by family allowances is bigger. To sum up the position, we can say that the allowance makes it easier to raise children but gives no positive inducement in the sense of making the standard of life of parents higher than that of childless couples.

For many years the equalization funds have been spending a large part of their time and money on the provision of social services in addition to the family allowances themselves. About a third of the funds provide cash premiums on the birth of each child, the premiums varying between 50 and 5,000 francs. Breast-feeding payments are also given, though these are less frequent. The tendency is, however, not to extend this system of special cash payments by the funds themselves, and there has been a considerable decline since 1933. The main reason is that most of the Communes and Départements are already giving birth premiums and there is thus a good deal of overlapping. What is happening, on the other hand, is an extension of the various medical and health services given by the funds.[23] Mothers are attended by doctors, infants are cared for, and children are sent to convalescent homes and holiday camps. The funds believe—and there is good reason for their belief—that more can be done to improve health and diminish the risk of death by such action than by giving small sums of money on the birth of each child.

Turning to Belgium, we find that the development of family allowances was similar to, though to some extent

more rapid than, that in France. The beginnings were later, and it is surprising that in so Catholic a country the papal Encyclical did not have an earlier effect. Actually, the initial move came from the Civil Service about 1910,[24] but the War intervened and prevented any significant expansion from taking place. But even during the War there had been some discussion of the idea of allowances, and the post-war inflation gave it a new impetus. As in France the development took place during a period of rising prices,[25] and shortly after prices had begun to fall again, that is after 1929, the State took over the system. In the early post-war years, rapidly rising prices caused the workers to demand adjustments in the wages to meet the increased cost of living, and resistance on the part of the employers gave rise to many strikes. At the same time the labour shortage in France, and the existence of family allowances in the northern parts of that country, were attracting workers from Belgium. It was as an attempt to solve both these problems that the first equalization fund was established, based on the French model. This was at Verviers, in 1921, and it was a regional fund, although it did not originally include the textile industry. Initially, then, the movement was sponsored by employers for reasons which were almost entirely concerned with their own industrial aims.[26] But other motives soon began to play their part. The influence of the Christian trade unions directed public attention to the importance of allowances as instruments of social benefit, while the newly formed 'Ligue des Familles Nombreuses' was already emphasizing the danger of a falling birth-rate. As time passed and the movement grew in strength, the population aspect became increasingly important.[27]

Within four years after founding the Verviers fund, five more funds were set up, and by September 1929 there were forty-nine, covering 581,600 employees and paying allowances for 331,200 children. The need for a central co-ordinating body was soon apparent and the 'Comité d'Études des Allocations Familiales' was formed in December 1922, comparable in organization and scope to the French 'Comité Centrale' which had been set up in 1920. In addition to the funds there was also a considerable number of under-

takings paying allowances directly to their employees. This was particularly the case in the coal industry, and applied also to the State railways.

Such a spontaneous movement on the part of the employers was bound to influence the Government, and the latter showed their approval by participating in the system at an early date. In 1923 the Lille town council decided to include a 'Family Allowance clause' in the contracts given to private firms, and this measure was adopted by a considerable number of other local authorities,[28] until in 1928 general recognition was given to it by an Act 'requiring the insertion in the obligations of State undertakings of a clause respecting the grant of family allowances'.[29] This Act was more important than it appears at first sight, for it applied not only to public bodies and to all firms receiving State or local governmental contracts valued at 50,000 francs or over, but to the sub-contractors of the latter firms. And a legal minimum rate of payment was established, being 15 francs for one child, 35 francs for two children, 75 francs for three children, 155 francs for four children, and 235 francs for five children. In many cases the actual allowance was higher than the minimum rate, and the whole system of social and medical services, for which the funds were especially distinguished, was developed without any legal encouragement.

At the same time efforts were being made to generalize the whole system. Bills for this purpose had been presented in 1924 and 1926, and it was obvious after the 1928 Act that a complete legal basis was imperative. The Bill which eventually became the Act of August 4th, 1930, was proposed at the end of 1929 by Monsieur H. Heyman, Minister of Labour. His speech to the Senate is particularly interesting because it contained the following statement: 'Above all, the Bill aims at encouraging births and large families.'[30] Governmental policy was, then, especially concerned with the menace of declining population. A good deal of support was, of course, given to the Bill for other reasons. Many people who believed in family allowances wanted to remove the inequality created by the 1928 Act, which left over half the employed population out of the scheme. Others were afraid that unless the State took over the system, it

might gradually break up as it had done in so many other countries. And there was also a section which regarded compulsory allowances as the best reply to the demands made by the workers. The combination of these sections made the passage of the Bill an easy matter, and the family allowance system, though of later growth than in France, was made compulsory two years earlier.

The 1930 Act covered the whole field in considerable detail.[31] In the first place it applied to all workers, whatever their income, and foreigners were to be included if they were employed on the same footing as Belgians.[32] Similarly, allowances were payable in respect of all dependent children.[33] All employers in industry, commerce, agriculture, or other occupations were to belong to equalization funds, either joining existing ones or forming new funds with the approval of the Government.[34] Central and local government bodies were, however, allowed to pay allowances direct to their employees, and this permission was also given to a number of other public bodies, such as scientific institutions. The system was to be financed by employers' contributions plus a State grant of 30 million francs per year.[35] The Act, therefore, did more than merely give legal recognition to the existing voluntary institution. And the employers' contributions were calculated on a rather different basis. First, there was a payment of 65 centimes per man and 35 centimes per woman for each actual day's work done.[36] Secondly, each employer was responsible for a proportionate share of the administrative expenses of the fund; and thirdly, there was an additional payment, to be used for creating a reserve balance.[37] Nor was the actual administration the same as that set up by the 1932 Act in France. The individual funds were responsible for equalizing employers' expenses in their own locality, but there was in addition a Super-Equalization Fund. Since the amount raised by each fund varied only with the number of workers, and not with the actual expenditure to be undertaken, it was likely that some funds would show a deficit after paying the allowances which the State had decided were to be the legal minima. On the other hand, in areas or industries where the size of the family was small, or where a large proportion of

unmarried men and women was employed, there would be a surplus after paying the legal allowances. Half of this surplus was to be given to a National Fund, which would use it to make up the deficits in the other funds.[38] The Act laid down a minimum rate of allowance applying to the whole kingdom. This was:

	Francs per month	*No. of children*	*Total allowance in francs per month*
1st child	15	1	15
2nd ,,	20	2	35
3rd ,,	40	3	75
4th ,,	70	4	145
5th ,,	100	5	245
6th ,,	100	6	345

But the amount paid depended upon the number of days actually worked, no deduction being prescribed for absence through sickness or involuntary unemployment.[39] The funds were not, of course, prohibited from paying higher rates than the legal minimum, but they could do so only if they had a surplus.[40] Half that surplus, after the remainder had been given to the National Fund, might be used for the payment of higher allowances, or for providing accessory social and medical services. Finally, as in France, a permanent advisory Family Allowance Committee was set up, and the fact that it included two delegates from the 'Ligue des Familles Nombreuses' shows how important the population question was deemed to be.[41] So does the steep graduation of the allowance in favour of large families.

Since 1930 most of the funds have paid the minimum rate of allowances. Even those funds which in the voluntary period paid much higher rates have shown the same tendency, and this is rather contrary to the spirit of the 1930 Act.[42] So, too, is the practice of concentrating on accessory services to the detriment of the allowances themselves, a practice which has been by no means infrequent. One fund in particular, in 1933, spent 44,700 francs on allowances and 112,200 francs on other services.[43] Finally, in January 1935, the minimum rate itself was reduced by Royal Warrant, the stated reasons being the fall in the cost of living and the need to economize.[44] The rate is now:

	Francs per month	*No. of children*	*Total allowance in francs per month*
1st child	9	1	9
2nd „	12	2	21
3rd „	32	3	53
4th „	65	4	118
5th „	95	5	213
6th „	95	6	308

Taking a number of typical wage rates in Brussels we find the following relation between basic wages and allowances:[45]

Allowance as Percentage of Basic Wage in Brussels[46]

No. of children	*Lowest Groups of Wages*		*Medium Groups of Wages*		*Highest Groups of Wages*	
	Per-centage	*Average percentage per child*	*Per-centage*	*Average percentage per child*	*Per-centage*	*Average percentage per child*
1	1·3	1·30	0·8	0·80	0·5	0·50
2	3·0	1·50	2·0	1·00	1·2	0·60
3	7·6	2·53	4·9	1·63	2·9	0·97
4	16·9	4·23	10·9	2·73	6·6	1·65
5	30·5	6·10	19·7	3·94	11·8	2·36
6	44·0	7·33	28·5	4·75	17·1	2·85
Average percentage per child		3·8		2·5		1·5

It is obvious that throughout the system preference is given to the larger families. This is due partly to the desire to encourage large families, and partly to the fairly widespread belief that the average wage received by a Belgian worker is sufficient to support a family of two children.[47] If, however, the actual percentages are compared with those used in this country, they are seen to be far below the estimated cost of supporting children.[48]

The Royal Warrant which decreased the rates of allowance also reduced employers' contributions to 50 centimes per man and 25 centimes per woman per day. It is hoped by this measure to save 70 million francs on the total cost of family allowances. But Father Val. Fallon, an authority on family allowances, states that the economy will amount to only about 65 million francs, and will be spread among

over 100,000 employers. This will mean a reduction of 0·50 francs per 100 francs of the wages bill, and, assuming that wages and family allowances together form 60 per cent. of the cost of production, an employer will now be able to sell a 100 francs article for 99 francs 70 centimes.

We have examined the family allowance systems in France and Belgium and seen the kind of mechanism used. There still remains the question of how well the mechanism works. In France the Government wisely left the position largely unchanged by the 1932 Act, and the tradition of many years of voluntary allowances has made for smooth running. The idea is accepted by all political parties and the trade union antagonism in particular has largely died out. The feeling that allowances are a 'sop to the working classes' still persists, and the 'Confédération Générale du Travail' would like to see an increase in State control and the addition of State to employers' contributions. It also wants the workers' representatives to have a larger share in the administration of the system. But the most important original reason for labour antagonism—the wages problem—now exists no longer. It is highly probable that, in the early days of the movement, family allowances had a depressing effect upon wages. In some cases allowances were given at the expense of single men, while in others they made it possible to lower general wage rates. And even when wages did not actually fall, allowances sometimes prevented them from rising.[49] Recent years, however, have seen a change in the official attitude, and the Government have taken real steps to prevent allowances from being used to hide wage cuts. In December 1935 a supplement to the 1932 Act was passed, stipulating that 'the payment of family allowances could in no circumstances be a reason for reducing wages', while the French courts have awarded damages against an employer who disobeyed this law.[50] There is little further to add in comment on the French system. It is true that there are complaints that the application of the 1932 Act is not proceeding quickly enough and that the present method of inspection does not prevent numerous employers from evading their obligations. And Monsieur Fernand Rey, Director of the Haut Rhin Fund, finds that the employers recently brought into the

scheme pay little attention to the experience gained by the older funds, and that for many of these employers the object seems to be 'as late and as cheaply as possible'.[51] But these are defects which can be removed by a more stringent enforcement of the law. In the main the broad principles are sound, and within the scope of their relatively small allowances the funds perform a valuable service and add to it by their social and medical work.

In Belgium, however, there are more fundamental defects, in addition to those which are merely a question of the application of the 1930 Act. Within the latter category comes the criticism that of the 124,000 employers subject to the law, some 35,000 are still evading it,[52] while a considerable proportion of those who have actually affiliated are tardy in paying their contributions or do not pay them at all. The result is an annual deficit on the part of the Super-Equalization Fund, which has to be met by drawing on reserve balances. To solve this problem a Bill was introduced with the object of transferring more than 50 per cent. of the surpluses of individual funds to the National Fund, but this was defeated by a united bloc of Socialists and Liberals,[53] who maintained that the only real solution was to enforce the law with greater severity. But to bring in the laggard employers is by no means easy. They are generally the very small manufacturers and retailers and are difficult to trace and pin down. Moreover, they are only following an example set by the State itself, for the annual grant of 30 million francs promised by the 1930 Act has not, up to the present, been paid. Among the more fundamental issues is the question of super-equalization, which appears valuable in theory, but which in practice makes for a good deal of over-centralization and lack of flexibility. One of the great advantages of the French system is that the funds start with a basis adjusted to local conditions. The State itself provides a fair amount of variety in the minimum rates established for each Département, and these are calculated with a regard for differences in the cost of living. The Belgian system provides for one minimum rate only, applied indifferently to highly dissimilar regions, and this is obviously unsuitable. Monsieur Georges de Leneer distinguishes five kinds of

region,[54] each having a different cost of living, and there should correspondingly be at least five minimum rates of allowance. Nor need this interfere with the principle of equalizing the cost of family allowances in different regions and to different employers. Finally, since the beginning of this year two Royal Decrees have changed the system for the worse.[55] In the first place, the minimum rate of allowances has been reduced and, secondly, the funds have less money to spend on auxiliary services. Finally, just when 'short time' and unemployment are particularly widespread, the latest decree has markedly reduced the employers' obligation to pay allowances during periods of involuntary unemployment. In such circumstances it can hardly be said that the Belgian system is doing its work adequately.

So far we have been concerned with France and Belgium only. But many other countries have family allowance systems, although they are by no means as extensive and only in a few cases compulsory or statutory. Taking the statutory schemes first we find that they are most frequent among central and local government officials. In Europe, for example, practically every country gives allowances to its civil servants. Sometimes the allowance is given to all civil servants, as in Germany, but more frequently it is given only to those in the lower grades. On the other hand, there are instances where it is graded in accordance with the basic salary so that the higher grades receive a larger grant per child. In Hungary, for example, lower officials are paid 100 crowns per year for each child under 16 years of age, and higher officials receive 200 crowns per year for each child up to the age of 24 years, while in Latvia the actual amount of the allowance is so graded that it is always equal to 8 per cent. of the basic salary for each child. Civil servants and local government officials in some countries also receive a special allowance for their wives, paid either directly or by an adjustment of the cost of living bonus.

There are also three compulsory schemes applying to private enterprise in New South Wales (Australia), New Zealand, and Italy. The Australian scheme is the most important and has been in operation since 1927. Briefly,

the object is to help to provide a decent standard of life for married men with dependent children, and it is estimated that the 'living wage' for a man and wife and one dependent child is £3 8*s*. 6*d*. per week. For every additional child an extra 5*s*. per week cost is assumed. Whenever the family income falls below this level, a grant is given for each child under school-leaving age, the maximum grant being 5*s*. per week per child, and the rate being reduced if necessary so that it will not raise the family income above the prescribed limit. Then, if the maximum grant is being received, the allowance forms at least 8 per cent. of the basic income for each child. To finance the scheme the employers are taxed at the rate of 5*d*. for every pound of their wages bills, and the Treasury also makes a grant. There are no equalization funds, but the single tax on employers, based on the total wages bills, prevents any discrimination from taking place. The New Zealand scheme, which has been in force since 1926, gives much less assistance to families. In the first place, it is only received when the family income is below £3 17*s*. 6*d*. per week for a family of four persons, and secondly, the grant, which is 2*s*. per week for each child under 15 years of age, is only given to the third and subsequent children. The scheme is financed out of general State revenue and there are no special taxes on employers. The Italian State system of allowances has only just begun and little information about it is as yet available. But, as we have seen, the aim is twofold—to give allowances to families with children under 14 years of age, and to urge workers and employers to reduce their working hours to 40 a week. Contributions are obtained from both workers and employers, and since there is a specially high tax on hours worked in excess of the 40-hour limit, the increasing success of the 40-hour-week campaign will be followed by reductions in the funds available for the payment of allowances.

Voluntary family allowance schemes are in existence in many countries, but in the last ten years their importance has been steadily declining. In 1925 practically every large-scale industry in Europe could show examples, whereas nowadays only in the mining industry and in banking corporations are they of any real importance. One of the main reasons

for this decline is that in most countries they were a purely temporary measure. Whereas in France and Belgium the idea had been discussed in the nineteenth century, in most other countries allowances were not given until prices began to rise in the War and immediately post-war periods, and were really a kind of cost of living bonus. The result was that the systems did not take root, and when prices began to fall again most of the allowances were discontinued because employers were unwilling to bear the now heavier charge. This tendency was reinforced by the antagonism of trade unions. Very few equalization funds had been set up and the unequal charges borne by different employers caused some discrimination against married men. Only in State undertakings did the movement retain its strength. But as examples of the kind of schemes which remain, we may mention two in operation in this country. The London School of Economics gives its teaching staff the substantial allowance of £30 per year for each child up to 13 years of age, and £60 per year from 13 to 23 years provided the child is still at school or college. The Wesleyan Methodists also give allowances to their ministers, though they are much smaller. For each dependent child up to 18 years of age a minister receives £8 8*s.* per year, while for 6 years there is also an additional grant of £12 per year for educational purposes.*

At the beginning of the chapter we said that in France and Belgium family allowances were being used as indirect methods of raising the birth-rate. In the next chapter we shall attempt to gauge the success of allowances for this purpose.

* To complete the survey, details of the various schemes in existence in countries other than France and Belgium are given in the Appendix.

V

FAMILY ALLOWANCES AND THE BIRTH-RATE IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM

WHATEVER the original reasons for instituting family allowances may have been, it is evident that in recent years they have come to be regarded as possible means for keeping up the birth-rate.[1] Both in France and Belgium, as in the other countries we have surveyed, there is a considerable public fear that the population will soon begin to decline unless definite and effective steps are taken to stop this from happening.

In France this fear is by no means new. As early as the middle of the nineteenth century the declining birth-rate was regarded as a cause for anxiety in some circles.[2] In France such an organization as the 'Alliance Nationale pour l'Accroissement de la Population', which was founded in 1896 and officially recognized as a 'Société d'utilité publique' in 1913, was the result of this growing fear of population decline. Since the War its influence has increased because of the additional belief in the menace of the growing populations of Germany and Italy, and a glance at the list of directors shows how closely the Alliance is connected with official circles. The existence and activities of the 'Conseil Supérieur de la Natalité' and the French branch of the 'Ligue des Familles Nombreuses' give further indications of the importance attached to the population question at present.

The growth of a similar opinion in Belgium is comparatively recent, since it was only in the post-war period that the rate of increase of its population began markedly to slow down. But in that short space of time the change of attitude has been remarkable, though it is at least partly explained by the evident existence of a very strong Catholic section in the country. In fact, so rapid was this change that the first official pronouncement on the population aspect of family allowances was, as we have seen, made earlier in Belgium than in France. But M. Heyman's statement, made when he introduced the Allowances Bill in 1929, was only the cul-

mination of the development of a consciousness of the population question which had been taking place during the previous ten years. For in 1920 the 'Ligue des Familles Nombreuses' was founded, and by 1930 had obtained a membership of over a hundred thousand.[3] In 1923 an anti-birth-control law was passed, imposing penalties ranging from 8 days' to 5 months' imprisonment with fines varying from 26 to 500 francs, for persons selling pamphlets advocating abortion or birth-control, dispensing or selling drugs or other abortive agents, or exhibiting or distributing contraceptive devices.[4] This law was perhaps partly in imitation of a similar, though rather more severe, law passed in France in 1920. The French law provided penalties ranging from imprisonment for 6 months to 3 years and fines from 100 to 3,000 francs for any person giving public information—that is, by means of books, lectures, or public meetings—which might lead to the practice of abortion, or for any person selling instruments, books, or other materials having the same result. Any person giving or offering to give contraceptive information, or taking part in contraceptive or generally anti-natalist propaganda, might be punished with imprisonment for 1 to 6 months and a fine of 100 to 5,000 francs.[5] In practice, however, neither of these laws has been really effective. In the first place, they both laid a good deal of emphasis on birth-control propaganda, while making little attempt to interfere with the regular trade in books on, and appliances for, contraception. Moreover, as far as the Belgian law is concerned, Mlle Vulhopp has pointed out that not only is the actual selling of contraceptives allowed, but that even birth-control propaganda is only condemned in cases where the propagandist is actuated by motives of profit. Secondly, there are few prosecutions for propaganda, such action being employed in France, at least, largely as a political weapon, or against writers on birth-control whose influence on public opinion is thought to be too powerful.

On the whole, therefore, while the French and Belgian laws may have retarded the growth of a birth-control movement, they have had little effect on the adoption of contraceptive measures by the general public, except perhaps to

Estimates of the Future Population of France

(In millions)

	First estimate	*Second estimate*		*First estimate*	*Second estimate*
1929	40·746	40·746	1960	40·114	35·077
1935	40·966	40·230	1965	39·965	33·727
1940	40·926	39·320	1970	39·689	32·227
1945	40·654	38·277	1975	39·307	30·640
1950	40·404	37·282	1980	38·905	29·013
1955	40·232	36·255			

Birth Rates: France

	France in general, rate per 10,000 population aged 15 to 60 years	*Selected[9] equalization funds, rate per 1,000 employees (salariés)*
1926	29·8	40·7
1927	28·7	45·4
1928	28·9	44·9
1929	28·0	40·2
1930	28·6	46·5

increase the use of abortion as compared with other methods of preventing the birth of children. As a matter of fact, in both France and Belgium abortions seem to be more important than contraceptives in reducing the birth-rate. As long ago as 1911, Professor Lacassagne, of the University of Lyon,[6] suggested that there were more abortions than births in France, while M. Eugène Humbert estimates the present number of abortions at 800,000 per year, as compared with 700,000 live births.[7] For Belgium, Mlle Vulhopp believes there are about 150,000 to 200,000 abortions per year, as against 150,000 live births.

The whole question has recently been made much more important and sensational by means of the publicity given to the situation. In France in 1932 the 'Alliance Nationale pour l'Accroissement de la Population Française', with the help of M. Sauvy of the 'Statistique Générale', undertook a careful forecast of the future population of the country.[8] Two hypotheses were used, one optimistic and the other pessimistic. The first assumed that fertility would remain at the same level as that for France in 1929–30, and the second that future fertility would fall to the level found in the Département of the Seine in 1929–30. For both estimates the same mortality hypothesis was made—for infants under 1 year of age, a 50 per cent. fall in 30 years, with subsequent stability, for persons aged between 1 and 59 years, a fall of 20 per cent. in 30 years, and no change for persons aged 60 years and over—while immigration and emigration were not taken into account. The results of these estimates are given on p. 74. The former suggests a decline of about 2 millions by 1980, and the latter a decline of nearly 12 millions. In Belgium, Professor Baudhuin made an estimate in 1931.[10] Assuming the continuance of fertility and mortality at their existing levels, but making no allowance for immigration, the future population of Belgium would describe the course shown in the table on p. 77. These figures show a fall of almost 2½ millions by the year 2000. Mlle Vulhopp,[11] who made an estimate a year later than Professor Baudhuin, suggested an even greater fall. She calculated that, given the prevailing conditions of nuptiality and mortality in Belgium, 2·846 children per marriage were necessary to maintain the

population at its level of 8 millions. Since, in fact, marriages only produced about 2·06 children on the average, the population would fall, if conditions remained unchanged, to about 3·697 millions by the year 2030.

In view of these circumstances it is scarcely surprising that increasing emphasis is being placed upon the use of family allowances for stimulating the birth-rate. What is surprising, however, is the lack of scientific examination, in both France and Belgium, of the extent to which allowances are proving themselves successful for this purpose. One would, at least, have expected the compilation of detailed statistics for checking the effects, but no statistics of this kind exist. In Belgium it is not even possible to calculate fertility rates; in fact, anything more accurate than the crude birth-rates seems to be out of the question. In France there are, it is true, the annual figures compiled by Colonel Guillermin, official statistician to the 'Comité Central des Allocations Familiales', and these are given on p. 74.

These rates show an apparent positive difference in favour of the equalization funds, and, moreover, some tendency for that positive difference to increase during the period covered. But, in fact, the figures cannot be regarded as indicative of any real effect of family allowances upon the birth-rate. Until 1932 (actually the end of 1933) the system was a voluntary one, covering at its greatest development only about 4½ million workers out of a total employed population of over 21 millions. There was, in consequence, a considerable margin in which selection could take place, and it is quite possible that the system contained a larger proportion of families with dependent children than the rest of France, and, in addition, of families where the wife was younger and thus more likely to have further children. In fact, Mr. Vibart, in an article in the *Family Endowment Chronicle*, cites figures which show this tendency.[12] Colonel Guillermin does not mention this possibility of false weighting, which will remain present until the 1932 Act has been applied to every branch of trade, industry, and agriculture. Obviously, so long as the system is restricted in its application, there is some incentive to the heads of large families to

migrate to those areas and industries where they can obtain a bonus for the support of their dependent children. Moreover, quite apart from this possible bias, further correction is necessary because the adult population of France—aged 15 to 60 years—obviously contains certain elements in a much larger proportion than they are to be found within the

Estimate of the Future Population of Belgium

(In millions)

1930	
1940	8·110
1950	7·910
1960	7·680
1970	7·255
1980	6·725
1990	6·240
2000	5·760



equalization funds. Since the members of the funds form part of the employed population of the country, married women will only be represented if they, too, are employed in some paid occupations, while the student population aged 15 years and over will be entirely omitted. When an attempt was made to correct the equalization fund rates and make them comparable with rates based upon the whole French population, the method adopted was rather arbitrary.[13] However, Colonel Guillermin believes that, even bearing in

mind the need for correcting the rates, they show a margin of superiority sufficient to point to the conclusions which he draws.[14] This is an opinion which, given the available data, cannot be verified.

The above criticism applies still more to the Michelin experiment begun in 1916, the details of which are given in the Appendix. Briefly, the firm of Michelin published a pamphlet in which they attempted to show that their system of relatively high family allowances and special rebates had a significant effect upon the number of children born to their workers.[15] The figures given below show the birth-rate per 1,000 total population of the 'Michelin Families', and the comparable rate for the rest of the population of Clermont-Ferrand and its suburbs. The company itself states that 'this constant increase is the best proof that our method is effective;

	'Michelin Families'	*Rest of Clermont-Ferrand and its suburbs*
1924	25·1	14·6
1927	26·5	..
1928	29·8	11·9

it convinces us that we are on the right path'.[16] But no analysis of the age-composition of the employees is given, nor of the annual numbers of the employed population, nor, finally, of the age-composition of the rest of the population in Clermont-Ferrand. Without a knowledge of these facts it is impossible to assert that the allowances have had any real effect upon fertility. The figures quoted by the Michelin Company would only be a proof of their contention if the age-composition of their employees were the same as that of the remaining population in the town, and there is no reason for believing that such is the case. In fact, there is every reason to believe that the fecund age groups are represented in greater proportion in the population of the Michelin factories than in the population outside. A discussion with M. Huber, the Director of the 'Statistique Générale de la France', led to the same conclusion. M. Huber believed it highly probable that the Michelin factories drew all the younger adult population into their employment and left the

older sections outside.[17] There may, of course, be a positive effect on the birth-rate, but this can only be ascertained by a detailed examination of the ages of Michelin employees. Unfortunately, an offer to make such an investigation was refused by the Michelin Company.

The third test directly applicable to the family allowance system concerns a particular equalization fund—that of

Haut Rhin Equalization Fund

Number of Children of Different Ages per 100 Employees, and Ratios between Children of Different Ages

	Age 0–1 (a)	*Age 1–2 (b)*	*Age 12–13 (c)*	*Age 13–14 (d)*	*Ratio a/d*	*Ratio b/d*	*Ratio a/c*
1921	3·85	4·22	3·70	3·55	1·09	1·19	1·04
1922	3·98	4·08	3·50	3·42	1·16	1·19	1·14
1923	3·72	3·85	3·30	2·33	1·60	1·65	1·13
1924	3·76	4·13	3·56	2·60	1·45	1·59	1·06
1925	3·86	4·07	3·37	2·21	1·75	1·84	1·15
1926	3·87	4·29	3·56	2·24	1·73	1·91	1·09
1927	3·91	4·11	2·18	2·25	1·74	1·83	1·79
1928	4·22	4·45	2·02	1·48	2·85	2·20	2·09
1929	4·50	4·75	1·75	1·40	3·22	3·39	2·57
1930	4·63	4·66	1·93	1·17	3·95	3·98	2·42
1931	4·68	5·04	3·55	1·42	3·55	3·55	1·32
1932	4·35	4·94	5·52	2·18	1·95	2·26	0·79

(The full table is given in the Appendix)

the Haut Rhin Département. In October 1927 Professor R. A. Fisher analysed the relationship between the number of employees belonging to the fund and the number of children dependent upon them.[18] A table showing the main points in the analysis is given above. If the number of employees in the Haut Rhin Fund had remained constant, it would have been possible to tell immediately whether, within the fund, fertility had increased or not. A rise in the number of infants aged 0 to 1 year would have shown an increase in fertility. But, in fact, the increase in the rate per 100 employees is due, at least in some degree, to the influx of parents with dependent children. 'Indeed, it is a natural economic tendency which might be anticipated, that a generous system of allowances[19] will tend to encourage some

inward migration of large families and some outward migration of the childless. That this effect has in fact been of importance in increasing the proportion of dependants may be seen by following the same age-groups in different years.' In 1921 the children aged 0 to 1 year amounted to 3·85 per 100 employees. By 1932, when these children were 11 to 12 years of age, some of them should have died, and the number of children aged 11 to 12 years per 100 employees should have been less than 3·85. But, in fact, in 1932 the rate had risen to 5·68 per 100 employees, evidently showing a marked immigration of relatively large families.

Professor Fisher suggested that there was, however, one test, 'of an extremely precarious nature', which could be applied and which did 'seem to indicate a slight tendency to a real increase in fertility within the industry'.

> 'We might hope that any real increase in fertility, or indeed any tendency for the birth-rate to fall less rapidly, might be reflected in the proportion of the children of these two groups (1 to 2 years and 13 to 14 years) from 1921 to 1926. Any real increase in fertility should be shown by the younger children being relatively more numerous at the later date. . . . The general run of the figures does suggest a slight increase . . . if we take into account that the decreasing mortality of children under twelve ought to produce an opposite tendency, whereas the figures at least show no sign of a decreasing ratio, it seems as though a real check to the fall of fertility was definitely indicated.'

In fact the ratio (b/d in the table) shows an increase from 1·19 in 1921 to 1·91 in 1926. For the sake of completeness the table has been continued up to 1932, but the figures for the older age-groups are not comparable after 1927 for they show the influence of the abnormally low birth-rates of the War period. At the same time, the constant increase up to 1931 in the numbers of children aged 0 to 1 and 1 to 2 years per 100 employees, suggests that the allowances of the Haut Rhin Fund may have had some effect. But here again it is impossible to tell how great this effect is without a detailed analysis of the age-composition of the women concerned, and a comparison with the rest of the female population of the Département. Such figures are not as yet obtainable.

In the realm of infant welfare, however, the results of the family allowance system are much more evident. The infantile mortality rates given below show a much greater improvement in the two equalization funds than in the respective Départements or in the whole of France.[20] There is, then, an unmistakable tendency for an increasing proportion of children to live through the difficult first year of life, and the population must, therefore, be affected to some extent. But there are two points which must also be considered.

Infantile Mortality Rates[21]

Number of Infants under 1 Year of Age dying per 1,000 Live Births

Years	*France: official rate*	*Haut Rhin Département*	*Haut Rhin Fund*	*Nord Département*	*Valenciennes Fund*
1922	83·7	73·3	..	90·5	..
1923	96·4	75·8	..	94·6	..
1924	84·4	67·1	..	83·9	..
1925	89·9	68·8	53·2	88·2	..
1926	96·8	80·0	73·7	93·8	..
1927	82·1	66·2	53·3	85·3	73·7
1928	90·7	63·4	51·7	88·1	75·8
1929	94·8	71·8	57·7	101·5	78·4
1930	79·2	60·6	47·0	91·7	75·6
1931	75·0	61·5	43·5	73·7	45·2
1932	..	..	38·6	..	61·4

First of all, a large decrease in infantile death-rates has less effect than a much smaller increase in the birth-rate. In 1931 there were 733,909 live births and 55,385 deaths of infants between the ages of 0 and 1 year. If infantile mortality had been reduced to zero in 1931, that reduction would not have had as much effect upon the population as a 10 per cent. increase in the birth-rate. In the second place, it is by no means certain that family allowances are directly responsible for the fall in the infantile mortality rate. As we have seen, the French equalization funds make special efforts to provide medical services—pre- and post-natal attendance, children's clinics, and so forth—and the decline is more probably due to this aspect of the allowance system than to the monetary payments themselves. This view is given additional support by the experience of the Oise and Haut

Rhin Départements, where the establishment of infant welfare centres has resulted in a very considerable drop in the death-rate.[22]

Finally, we can examine the birth-rates in France and Belgium and ascertain if any results of family allowances are visible. The rates are given below. These rates do not really allow of comparison because of the differences in the age-composition of the population, and lack of the necessary dates has not made it possible to calculate accurate standardized rates. We can, however, examine each rate individually. The rate for the United Kingdom shows the greatest total decline in the period, amounting to over 28 per cent., but from 1927 onwards the rapidity of decline seems appreciably to have been checked. In fact, the extent to which the fall has slowed up is not very significantly less than in France, where it should have been helped by family allowances. The two sets of fertility rates for France are based upon two different estimates of the potentially fertile female population for the period 1921 to 1931. In Belgium, too, so far as we can tell from the crude birth-rate, there has apparently been an appreciable check of the decline since 1927, but how far this is due to allowances it is impossible to tell.

Birth and Fertility Rates[23]

	Belgium	*United Kingdom*	*France*		
Years	*Rate per 1,000 total population*	*Rate per 1,000 females aged 15–49 years*	*Rate per 1,000 total population*	*Rate per 1,000 females aged 15–49 years*	
				(*A*)	(*B*)
1921	21·8	78·7	20·7	75·8	75·8
1922	20·4	72·5	19·3	70·7	70·6
1923	20·4	70·3	19·1	70·5	70·4
1924	19·9	66·8	18·7	69·5	69·4
1925	19·8	64·9	19·0	70·8	70·6
1926	19·0	63·2	18·8	70·2	70·0
1927	18·3	59·2	18·2	68·1	67·7
1928	18·4	59·4	18·3	68·7	68·0
1929	18·1	57·7	17·7	66·1	66·1
1930	18·7	57·9	18·0	67·6	68·0
1931	18·2	56·4	17·5	66·5	67·4

Taking France by itself we can, owing to the excellent series of statistics published by the 'Statistique Générale',

make a rather closer analysis. We can, for example, obtain excellent figures for fertility, discounting changes in the age distribution of French women, by taking a standard population.[24] These rates are given below:

Standardized Fertility Rates in France

Number of Live Births per 10,000 Females aged 15–49 Years in a Standard Population

1926	735
1928	716
1929	678
1930	696
1931	679

The new table shows the same trends as the previous one, but it also makes clear the fact that the total drop in fertility between 1926 and 1931 is 7·6 per cent., instead of the apparent 4·49 per cent. deduced from the ordinary fertility rates for the same period. In fact, therefore, the decline in fertility is even greater than is at first apparent. The detailed official statistics for the years since 1931 have not yet been published, but the considerable fall in the number of births for 1932, 1933, and 1934, as shown in the table below, seems to afford a fairly strong basis for believing that the reputed stability of the period 1927 to 1931 has

Annual Numbers of Live Births in France, 1926–34[25]

1926	767,475	1931	733,909
1927	743,833	1932	722,246
1928	749,347	1933	682,680
1929	730,060	1934	677,365
1930	749,953		

now come to an end. And certainly, so far as ability to reproduce itself is concerned, France is now definitely worse off than in 1925. The net reproduction rate, the precise significance of which has already been explained, was 0·94 in 1925 and 1926. In 1927 it had fallen to 0·91 and in 1931 to 0·86, so that there has been a serious deterioration in the period.[26]

Surveying the results of this analysis we see first, that the official figures of the French 'Comité Central des Allocations Familiales' cannot be accepted without query, and that this

applies still more to the apparent results of the Michelin system, and secondly, that although the statistics for the Haut Rhin Fund appeared to show a positive effect up to 1927, the influence of the War then began to manifest itself in the older age groups and made it impossible to base conclusions upon a continuation of the series.

We note also that the family allowance system in France appears to have helped in reducing infantile mortality rates, but that this may have been due to the special medical services rather than to the actual payment of allowances. Finally, a closer examination of fertility in France leads us to believe that the period of stability ended in 1931, and that there has been a sharp fall since then. The results of personal inquiries also suggest that the anti-birth-control laws have not met with great success in either Belgium or France, and that the abortion rate in both countries is extremely high. The most, therefore, that can be said is that family allowances may have prevented a still sharper decline in fertility.

In spite of the very small amount of evidence there is quite a strong belief in France and Belgium in the efficacy of family allowances as a means of encouraging births. M. Bonvoisin of the 'Comité Centrale des Allocations Familiales', M. F. Boverat of the 'Alliance Nationale', and Le R. P. Val. Fallon, all hold this view, while M. Huber is willing to concede it as a possibility. The fund officials are generally of the same opinion as M. Bonvoisin, though a letter from one of them expresses a contrary view.[27] Since there is so considerable a belief in the efficacy of allowances, it is worth while considering them from a theoretical point of view and attempting to estimate to what extent family allowances are likely to be successful.

Supposing, for the moment, that monetary inducements can be used to increase fertility, how far do the present provisions meet the case? The answer is, that it would probably require a good deal more monetary aid to produce any appreciable result. If we assume that the average wage is sufficient to support a man and wife, we can estimate, if only roughly, the additional expense due to children. Taking the general figures for minimum requirements used in

England, we find that an extra 22 per cent. is necessary for an infant aged 2 to 3 years, 61 per cent. is necessary for an infant and 2 children, and 120 per cent. for an infant and 4 children.[28] But even the highest rates of allowance given in France and Belgium fall considerably below these standards. The lower grade civil servant (*petit fonctionnaire*), who receives the highest allowance in proportion to his salary, does not have much more than half the cost of raising three children. His basic salary is 9,000 francs per year, and the allowances granted are 600 francs per year for one child, 1,620 for two, and 3,180 francs for three children.[29] His actual position is given below:

No. of children	*Percentage increase in income due to allowances*	*Percentage increase recognized as necessary for compensation*
1 (infant) . . .	7·0	22·0
3 (infant and 2 children)	35·0	61·0

In other cases the discrepancy is even greater. The average worker in the Département of Bouches-du-Rhône receives a monthly wage of 925 francs. His allowances are 25 francs per month for one child, 50 for two, 100 for three, and 150 for four, with an extra 50 francs per month for each additional child. His position is shown in the following table:

No. of children	*Percentage increase in income due to allowances*	*Standard percentage increase required*
1 (infant) . . .	2·7	22·0
3 (infant and 2 children)	10·8	61·0
5 (infant and 4 children)	21·6	120·0

So that, in spite of family allowances, the raising of large families still means a very considerable drop in the standard of life, and we cannot, therefore, expect a really measurable effect on the birth-rate if we suppose that the cost of bringing up a family is an important factor in keeping its size low. The allowances lower some of the barriers to parenthood but do not provide adequate compensation for the increased expense.

Secondly, the allowances themselves, whatever their size,

need adjustment to differences in economic and other conditions. In Belgium, for example, only one kind of gradation is employed—a progressive scale which aims at a greater proportionate help to the larger families. But other kinds of differentiation may be necessary. For example, the cost of living is obviously not the same throughout the country, and a single rate envisages a false equality. We have already seen that, from the point of view of the cost of living, at least five types of region should be distinguished, and the rates of allowances should be graded in accordance with this regional division.

There still remains the question of whether family allowances, as at present conceived, are by themselves capable of encouraging large families. In 1919 one of the chief family allowance committees presented a report in which the following statement occurred:

> 'To give monetary assistance as a means of encouraging large families by the attraction of profit, is to labour under a delusion. Such an attitude has a false simplicity. . . . Give judiciously allocated help so that parents will be freed from the financial cares of bringing up children, or at least have those cares made less burdensome, and the ground will be prepared for attacking the real factors, which alone can alter our present mentality.'[30]

And that is really the whole problem—how to influence the real factors which have given rise to the present situation. It is a problem to which we shall have to give considerable attention, but even now it is clear, that to regard family allowances as the only measures necessary to raise the birth-rate is unduly to simplify the position.

VI

CONCLUSION

NOW that people are beginning to realize the danger of the present situation we may, within the next few years, see most of the governments of Europe attempting, in their turn, to stimulate the birth-rate. The question that arises is, what kind of action is likely to have such a result?

On the positive side, we cannot learn a great deal from the experiments which have been tried in other countries. In France, Belgium, and Italy the measures applied may, it is true, have prevented an even steeper decline from taking place. But they offer no dependable solution because any possible effects have, up to the present, been imperceptible. Nor can we learn much from German experience. There has been a sharp rise in the birth-rate in that country, but the circumstances in which it occurred were so abnormal that we cannot tell how far it was influenced by external action, and how far it was due merely to the postponement of marriages during the economic depression of 1930 to 1932. On the negative side, however, we can arrive at some important conclusions. In the first place we can see the faults in some of the schemes which have been instituted. If, for example, the economic factor is really influential in keeping down the size of the family, then the family allowances given in France and Belgium cannot by themselves be very effective. Since they rarely cover more than 25 per cent. of the cost of bringing up a child, they will only offer a real inducement to those people whose desire for children is relatively urgent. So far as we can tell from the size of the modern family, such people form a small proportion of the population. Nor, to take an Italian example, can we expect a significant change in the amount of marriage to result from a bachelor tax which, at its highest, is still far below the cost of a dog licence in Italy. In Germany, on the other hand, a loan of £50 may well encourage marriage among relatively poor people. But here again, although the cancellation of a quarter of the loan on the birth of a child may tend to discourage abortion to some extent, it is unlikely to effect any

profound change in people's desire to have children. Above all, we should remember that the systems adopted abroad have three peculiarities. First, the basic measure in the present population campaign in France and Belgium—the family allowance—was not originally introduced for the purpose of raising the birth-rate. It was undoubtedly designed to ease the burden of the married man who was bringing up a family, but it did not aim at offering any real inducement to raise children, and although the allowances have undergone a number of modifications in the last fifteen years, none of these modifications was for the specific purpose of stimulating births. Secondly, even where, as in Italy and Germany, there have been genuine and concerted attempts by the Governments to increase the rate of population growth, the means used have been *ad hoc*—aimed at particular problems rather than at basic causes. Finally, in none of the countries examined does the Government really understand why there is this continuous fall in the birth-rate, or exactly how that fall is making itself felt. It is with this last question that we must specially be concerned.

If we are to explain why the birth-rate has fallen, and continues to fall, it is useless to stop at the intermediate stage and accept the answer—'because of the increase in contraception and abortion'. Although that is a perfectly good explanation of how the present situation has come about, what we really need to know is, why people are restricting the size of their families. Apart from medical reasons, the frequency of which we do not know, it is evident that the small family pattern of to-day has been created largely from economic motives. There are other important influences—personal investigation shows that parents are, for example, affected by the fear of war in the near future—but the main factor is the cost of a large family. This does not, however, mean the simple money cost of bringing up children. What is involved is the whole complex of factors which combine to make it advantageous for people in almost all social classes to have small rather than large families. To take an example, people are not only influenced by the fact that house-rents are generally high, but also by the stereotype which speculative builders have been creating in the last fifteen years.

The whole trend of modern suburban house construction has been the setting-up of two- and three-bedroom houses. That is, private, and even public enterprise has intensified the small family movement, and helped to make conditions more difficult for the large family. Moreover, parents are now much more ambitious for their children than was the case even at the end of the nineteenth century. The prevailing aim is no longer for sons to carry on their fathers' occupations, but to begin where their fathers left off. The cost of bringing up children therefore includes many more items to-day—not only the mere expense of food, clothing, and housing, but the cost of 'waiting', that is, of the postponement of the earning period while the child is receiving some form of higher education, and parents have to consider, besides their income at the time, the prospects of employment in the future. Add to this the fact that large families generally form a barrier to social intercourse, particularly to-day when there are so many kinds of attractions outside the home, and it is evident that very heavy pressure is being brought to bear upon people and helping to decrease their willingness to have children.

These are just a few of the factors at work in the present situation, and our knowledge will need to be supplemented by much more information before we really know all the important forces which must be circumvented if the birth-rate is to rise again. We must know, for example, the precise influence of urban life upon the family. It is obvious that the town is less fertile than the country, and that, in fact, the town depends to a very large extent upon the country for increasing or even maintaining its population. But what we have to discover is, whether the circumstances which keep down fertility in the town are inherent in urban structure, or whether they are merely part of the particular urban civilization which has been developed up to the present. The latter may be the case, for since the Industrial Revolution, at least, there has been scarcely any serious attempt to make towns not only places in which to work, but also communities in which people can satisfactorily live and bring up families. Since our civilization is largely urban this is a problem of supreme urgency.

What, further, we need to know, is the way in which the falling birth-rate is making itself felt. A variety of investigations has shown us that there is a difference in the birth-rate between social and economic classes. Briefly, the wealthier members of society tend to have smaller families than the poorer members, though there is some reason to believe that the gap is closing up because the poorer members are also limiting the size of their families. But we have only a very indistinct picture of what is taking place within each class. Different kinds of people respond in different ways to the social stimuli which present themselves. Occupations may, for example, have an important influence upon people's willingness and ability to have children. Coal-miners, to give an actual instance, generally raise large families, while textile workers have relatively few children. The reason is, apparently, that in the textile districts married women are frequently engaged in the industry, while in the coalfields they have few opportunities of obtaining employment. Also, inside the occupations there may be important differences. We do not know whether all kinds of families are showing a similar tendency to decrease, or, on the other hand, whether the large families are only very slightly affected, so that the fall in the average number of children is due, instead, to a rapid increase in the number of childless marriages. If the latter is the case, a special kind of positive measure would probably be necessary, for a stimulus which would induce already large families to become slightly larger might not have any effect upon the willingness of childless married couples to raise children.

Our conclusion is, then, rather important even though it is not positive. What seems imperative is, first, a series of detailed studies of movements within the population of this country, and, secondly, a careful analysis of the factors which are urging people to keep down the size of their families. Until this is done, attempts to raise the birth-rate will be so much struggling in the dark with small chance of success. There are only two points on which we may be fairly positive at present. First, repressive measures are unlikely to be effective; what appears to be much more necessary is the creation of a general environment conducive to the bringing

up of relatively large families. Secondly, if there is to be any significant increase in the birth-rate, the major part must come from the working-class. Consequently, no action is likely to have a permanent influence unless it provides conditions in which the working-class is able to bring up children without thereby suffering from economic and social hardship.

NOTES

(*The references in parentheses are to the pages of the text.*)

CHAPTER I

1. The census figures are taken from the Registrar-General's Statistical Review for England and Wales. (*2*)

2. Up to 1871 the figures have been calculated from the annual returns of births and deaths published by the Registrar-General. From 1871 they are computed from the table given in the Preliminary Report of the 1931 Census of England and Wales. (*2*)

3. Much interesting information on emigration is to be found in A. Carrothers, *Emigration from the British Isles* (1929), especially chs. 12 and 13. In addition, the Preliminary Report of the 1931 Census of England and Wales gives the following table (p. xi):

Period	*Outward Balance of Migration* (in 1,000's)
1871–81	164
1881–91	601
1891–01	69
1901–11	501
1911–21	1,197*
1921–31	177

* 'Including the deaths of non-civilians of England and Wales—estimated at 577,000—which occurred abroad at various theatres of war.'

Statistics of emigration for recent years are to be found in Table S in Tables—Part II of the Registrar-General's Review of England and Wales for 1933, and in the 1932 Report of the Overseas Settlement Committee. (*3*)

4. It is doubtful how far there actually was an upward movement in the birth-rate in the first seventy-five years of the nineteenth century. Civil registration in England and Wales only began in July 1837, while birth registration was not made compulsory until 1875. In 1874, William Farr, the Registrar-General at the time, wrote: 'The deficiency (in births actually registered) thus rapidly declined; calculated on 1,000 births occurring, it was in the three decades, 65 in the first, 29 in the second, and 18 in the third.' (Thirty-fifth Annual Report of the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths, and Marriages in England for 1872). In 1878 he wrote: '. . . I am inclined to think the actual birth-rate of living children was 36 per 1,000 during the 39½ years of civil registration. At this rate, besides the 26,129,206 births registered, therefore 1,441,603 births remained unregistered, or about 5 in 100.' (Thirty-ninth Annual Report for 1876.) Dr. R. R. Kuczynski, from whose book, *The Measurement of Population Growth* (1935) (pp. 12–13), both these quotations are taken, believes that the earlier estimate is the more correct. If Farr was right, then the birth- and fertility-rates need altering and the uncorrected and corrected versions are given in the table on p. 93.

These corrected rates make it appear much more likely that the apparent rise in fertility was due to the decrease in the number of miscarriages and still-births, under the double influence of an increase in the standard of life and the more widespread provision of health services. (3)

	Birth-rate per 1,000		*(Females aged 15 to 45 years) General fertility rate per 1,000*		*(Married women aged 15 to 45 years) Legitimate fertility rate per 1,000*	
	uncorrected	*corrected*	*uncorrected*	*corrected*	*uncorrected*	*corrected*
1841	34·6	36·8	..	..	..	..
1851	33·9	34·9	147·8	152·0	253·0	260·3
1861	35·1	35·7	153·5	156·3	293·4	298·3
1871	35·5	35·5	158·7	158·7	302·7	302·7

(These fertility rates have all been calculated on census data)

5. R. R. Kuczynski, *Measurement of Population Growth*, pp. 2–3. (4)

6. R. R. Kuczynski, *Fertility and Reproduction* (1932), p. 4. (5)

7. Fertility rates are also subject to the same qualification, since within the age group of 15 to 45 years there can be important changes in age-composition. But, in fact, standardization does not help. As Dr. Kuczynski points out in *The Measurement of Population Growth*, chapter iv, standardization may be inadequate and give more dubious results than the crude rates. (5)

8. From Kuczynski, *Balance of Births and Deaths*, vol. i, p. 39. (7)

9. *The Shadow of the World's Future*, ch. 4 (1928). (8)

10. *The Probability of a Cessation of the Growth of the Population of England and Wales*, December 1895. (8)

11. 'On Population', *J.R.S.S.*, 1890. (9)

12. Published in 1928. The idea was first suggested by him in 1907. (10)

13. This age group has been generally adopted on the Continent. The figure given is the mid-year estimate of the Registrar-General. (10)

14. A certain amount of statistical adjustment was necessary for calculating the gross and net reproduction indices, and an explanation may be helpful. The year 1921 is the only one for which a distribution of births by the age of the mother is available, and even that is incomplete. In the fertility volume of the 1921 census the Registrar-General included an analysis, by the ages of the married women concerned, of the children whose age at their last birthday was 0 years.

The important column is (B) (see table, p. 94), giving the number of children born to married women in each age group. The Registrar-General gives 1,919 as being born to women of 50 years and over, including some to women aged 70–4, 75–9, 80–4, and 85–9 years of age. These last groups are, to say the least, highly improbable from the view-point of child-bearing. All children recorded as born to women of 50 years and over, as well as those born to women whose age was not stated, were therefore redistributed among women aged 15 to 49 years in the proportions given in those groups. The mid-year estimate of the

female population for 1921 was then taken, and the 1921 births allocated in the proportions derived from the figures given by the Registrar-General in the 1921 census. This same proportion, for lack of any other, has been used in calculating the gross and net reproduction indices for 1931. For more accurate figures we must await the enforcement of the new Birth Registration rules, and apparently these are only to be applied partially in 1936. Some

Age	(A) *Married women* (p. 74)	(B) *Numbers of children aged 0 years at last birthday* (p. 69)
Under 20	26,171	9,388
„ 20–4	406,023	125,746
„ 25–9	835,779	201,274
„ 30–4	974,782	176,247
„ 35–9	1,009,330	124,462
„ 40–4	963,627	55,526
„ 45–9	854,416	7,920
„ 50–4	674,427	972
„ 55–9	498,824	494
„ 60–4	341,862	259
„ 65–9	215,244	137
„ 70–4	111,158	54
„ 75–9	44,588	25
„ 80–4	12,561	8
Over 84 and not stated	506,259	27,206

difficulty also arose over the allocation of illegitimate births. The Registrar-General distributed them so that those born to mothers under 20 were more than twice as numerous as those born to mothers over 25. Since, in spite of the support of the Registrar-General, this allocation seems somewhat arbitrary, and since there is no reason to believe that the age-distribution of the mothers of illegitimate children is the same in England and Wales as in European countries with different birth- and fertility-rates, the method chosen—also arbitrary—was to allocate the illegitimate births in the same proportions as the legitimate. In calculating the net reproduction rate for 1931, the life table used was that constructed for 1933 by Dr. Kuczynski and given in *The Measurement of Population Growth*, pp. 179 and 181.

It should be noted in connexion with the potentially fertile women in England and Wales that there are two dates of particular importance. In 1911 the proportion of the total population constituted by women aged 15 to 45 years began to fall, while in 1931 the absolute numbers also reached their maximum. (*11*)

15. A generation is usually assumed to last 30 years. Connor, in 1926 (*J.R.S.S.*, 'Fertility of Marriage and Population Growth'), assumed it to be the average at marriage for men, plus the average length of time after marriage till the birth of the first child. For 1911 the length of a generation would thus be approximately 30·3 years. (*11*)

16. Dr. Kuczynski himself points out (*Measurement of Population Growth*, p. 228) that although the net reproduction index tells us how rapidly a population will decline once a stable age-composition has been reached, it gives no clue to the development which will take place before that point. 'This development can only be ascertained through a special computation based on fertility and mortality rates by age.' (*11*)

17. See A. L. Bowley, 'Population and Births' (*Economic Journal*, 1924) and G. C. Leybourne, 'The Future Population of Britain' (*Sociological Review*, April 1934). (*12*)

18. See Dr. Enid Charles, *The Effect of Present Trends in Fertility and Mortality upon the Future Population of England and Wales* (London and Cambridge Economic Service, Special Memorandum No. 40). Her assumptions are:

(*a*) First estimate: 'That fertility and mortality rates continue to be the same as in 1933. No specific fertility rates for England and Wales are available, only the total number of births being known. It was therefore assumed that the total births in 1933 were distributed among the women of different ages in the same proportion as they were distributed in Sweden, 1931.'

(*b*) Second estimate: 'As no accurate specific fertility rates were available, the quite arbitrary assumption was made that fertility rates for females under 20 would remain constant, that the fertility rate for females aged 20–4 would be decreased by 5 per cent. every five years, for females 25–39 by 15 per cent. every five years, and for females 40–9 by 25 per cent. every five years, the fall continuing until 1985 and rates thereafter remaining constant. . . . It was further assumed that mortality rates for persons under 1 year would fall by 20 per cent. every five years, for those between 1 and 70 by 10 per cent. every five years, the fall ceasing in 1965. Mortality rates for 70 and over were assumed to remain unchanged.'

(*c*) Third estimate: 'The specific fertility rates for England and Wales in 1931 were used throughout, obtained in the same way as those for 1933. . . . The same fall in mortality was assumed as for estimate (*b*), but in order to shorten the work, it was assumed to take place in fifteen years instead of in thirty years.' (*12*)

CHAPTER II

1. Kuczynski, *The Measurement of Population Growth*, p. 122. The figures are for live- and still-births. (*16*)

2. The birth- and death-rates are from Burgdörfer, *Aufbau und Bewegung*, p. 186, and the rate of natural increase has been computed from them. (*17*)

3. Dr. Burgdörfer's figures are from *Volk ohne Jugend*, p. 29 (the edition used for the purposes of quotation is the third, which appeared in 1935), and Dr. Kuczynski's are from *The Measurement of Population Growth*, p. 212. See also the German Life Table for 1924–6 in *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, Sonderheft No. 5, pp. 38–46, Burgdörfer, *Aufbau und Bewegung*, pp. 135–43, and Burgdörfer, *Der Geburtenrückgang und seine Bekämpfung*, pp. 26–45. After some discussion as to the precise significance of the Burgdörfer index

of total replacement, Dr. Kuczynski came to the conclusion that, although the annual number of births calculated by that means would eventually stabilize the population at the level of the particular year, there might be a temporary drop in numbers before the stabilization took place. (17)

4. *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, Band 401, II, 'Ausblick auf die zukünftige Bevölkerungsentwicklung,' pp. 641–83, also Burgdörfer, *Aufbau und Bewegung*, pp. 155 et seq. In the second estimate the distribution of the decline in fertility over the period 1927–55 was obtained by taking a curve of the type $\phi_t = ab^{-t^n}$ where a was the fertility in 1927, and calculating the values for a 25 per cent. decrease in fertility; the equation was

$$\phi_t = 139{\cdot}40 \times 1{\cdot}0446^{-t^{0{\cdot}61585}}. \qquad (19)$$

5. *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, Band 401, II, p. 663. The age-composition of the future population estimated on these two assumptions is rather interesting. (20)

Estimate A

Percentage age-composition of the population

	1927	*1940*	*1960*	*1980*	*2000*
0–15 years	24·96	22·76	21·72	22·14	22·70
15–65 „	69·09	69·41	68·14	63·98	65·67
65 and over	5·95	7·83	10·14	13·88	11·62
	100·00	100·00	100·00	100·00	100·00

Estimate B

Percentage age-composition of the population

	1927	*1940*	*1960*	*1980*	*2000*
0–15 years	24·96	22·71	17·87	16·55	16·25
15–65 „	69·09	69·45	71·37	66·94	67·05
65 and over	5·95	7·84	10·76	17·51	16·70
	100·00	100·00	100·00	100·00	100·00

6. *Volk ohne Jugend*, pp. 152–318. (21)

7. The interest that was being taken in these problems is shown, for example, by a number of articles on population published in the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*. The same period saw the publication of Dr. Burgdörfer's *Der Geburtenrückgang und seine Bekämpfung*, Harmsen's *Bevölkerungsprobleme Frankreichs*, and of the Deutscher Schutzbund's *Festgabe des Bevölkerungspolitischen Ausschusses*. (21)

8. See the chapter on 'Family Allowances in France and Belgium', p. 67.

9. See R. von Ungern-Sternberg, *Die Ursachen des Geburtenrückganges im europäischen Kulturkreis* (1932), pp. 231–6. (22)

10. *Schriftenreihe des Reichsausschusses für Volksgesundheitsdienst*, Heft I. (22)

11. See the *Erläuterung zum Gesetz über Förderung der Eheschliessungen vom 5. Juli, 1933, in der Fassung vom 21. Februar, 1935*, issued by the Reichsminister der Finanzen. (*22*)

12. It is assumed that the loans will be distributed in the following manner:

5,000 of	1,000	RM. =	5 million RM.
15,000 of	800	„ =	12
30,000 of	700		21
100,000 of	600		60
60,000 of	500		30
45,000 of	400		16
20,000 of	300		6

(*Erläuterung zum Gesetz*, p. 3.) (*22*)

13. (Abschnitt V of the *Gesetz zur Verminderung der Arbeitslösigkeit, vom 1. Juni, 1935.*) In a special memorandum kindly obtained for me by Herr G. Henle, Secretary of the German Embassy in London, the following statement is made: 'By withdrawing the married women from their employment, there will be room for 400,000 persons seeking work, and the increased prosperity of the industries affected by the loans will provide places for another 100,000, making a total of about 500,000 who would be replaced in employment. For this number of hitherto unemployed there would be a saving—at the rate of 500 RM. relief per year for each unemployed man—of 250 million RM. per year.' (*23*)

14. *Erläuterung zum Gesetz über Förderung der Eheschliessungen*, II, 7 and 8. (*23*)

15. See Herting, 'Der bevölkerungspolitische Gedanke in den neuen Steuergesetzen' (*Archiv für Bevölkerungswiss.*, Dec. 1934), the *Reichssteuerblatt* for October 18th, October 22nd, and November 7th, 1934, and for January 8th, 1935. Further accounts are given in Quante, 'Das Einkommensteuergesetz vom 16. Oktober 1934' (*Archiv*, Jan. 1935), *Vermögensteuergesetz vom 16. Oktober* and *Einkommensteuergesetz* (the two latter are published by the Reichsfinanzministerium). On the reductions in railway fares, see Harmsen, 'Die Fahrpreisermässigungen, &c.' (*Archiv*, Aug. 1934). (*24*)

16. See Peretti, 'Zusammenstellung der bevölkerungspolitischen Massnahmen in Deutschland' (*Archiv*, Aug., 1935). (*24*)

17. Peretti, op. cit. (*24*)

18. Klein, 'Ein Jahr Ehrenpatenschaften der Stadt Berlin', *Archiv*, March 1935. The request for sponsorship must be made in advance by the parents, and if accepted the sums mentioned will be paid in respect of a child born within two years from the date of acceptance of the application. Between April 1st, 1934, and June 30th, 1935, 2,181 requests were made but only 448 have as yet been granted. (*25*)

19. For example, the experimental settlement in the 'Begau' near Aachen. See Hoffmann, 'Großstadtbildung und Leistungsstand', and Bamberg, 'Die Arbeitsfrontsiedlungen im Wurmrevier', both in *Siedlung und Wirtschaft*, August 1935. (*25*)

20. The figures are from Burgdörfer, *Bevölkerungsentwicklung im Dritten Reich*, pp. 70–1, and the indices have been computed from them. (*25*)

21. Dr. Burgdörfer, in his article, 'Der Kampf um die Wiedergeburt des Volkes und seine Erfolgsaussichten' (*Archiv*, October 1934), explains the low birth-rate of 1933 as due mainly to the decrease of illegitimate births, which in turn was caused by the abnormally low number of girls aged nineteen years. Legitimate births had only dropped from 864,379 to 856,000. But this explanation must be discounted to some extent because between August 1933 and January 1934 there were 13,603 loan-repayment cancellations in respect of the birth of children from marriages which had not been concluded before August 1933. But for the marriage loans some of these births would have been illegitimate, while others would have been prevented by abortion. (*26*)

22. Fertility had increased even more markedly, as the number of women aged 15 to 45 years had fallen—had, in fact, been falling since 1930. (*26*)

	No. of women aged 15–45 years (millions)	*No. of live births per 1,000 women aged 15–45 years*	*No. of live births per 1,000 total population*
1930	16·741	67·3	17·5
1931	16·648	62·0	16·0
1932	16·455	59·3	15·1
1933	16·240	58·9	14·7
1934	16·112	73·3	18·0

The figures are from Burgdörfer, *Aufbau und Bewegung der Bevölkerung*, pp. 86 and 102. As regards the distribution of birth-rates by town and country, Dr. Burgdörfer gives the following figures (*Bevölkerungsentwicklung im Dritten Reich*, p. 37):

Number of Live Births per 1,000 Total Population

Urban settlements with the following populations	*1932*	*1933*	*1934*
Over 100,000 . . .	10·9	10·9	14·5
50,000–100,000 . . .	12·9	12·6	16·2
30,000–50,000 . . .	13·0	13·2	16·1
15,000–30,000 . . .	12·9	12·8	16·5
Under 15,000 . . .	18·0	17·3	20·4
Average for whole of Germany	15·1	14·7	18·0

23. Burgdörfer, *Bevölkerungsentwicklung im abendländischen Kulturkreis mit besonderer Berücksichtigung Deutschlands*. Note that as against Dr. Burgdörfer's contentions, German foreign trade has declined considerably and there is a marked shortage of certain kinds of foodstuffs, while the reduction in the unemployment figure is at least partly due to the transference of unemployed workers to labour camps. However, I must emphasize in advance that my analysis of German population movements is by no means a general

criticism of the statements made by Dr. Burgdörfer, or by the Government officials connected with the application of the various National-Socialist measures for encouraging population growth. On the contrary it is based largely on material which these officials have kindly allowed me to use. All the officials admit explicitly that the increase in marriages and births in 1933 and 1934 was due, in a large measure, to specially favourable circumstances. My criticism is concerned only with particular points of interpretation. (*26*)

24. In Volume 423 of *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs* (Die Bewegung der Bevölkerung im Jahre 1930) the following passage occurs (p. 31): 'It is true that the fall in the birth-rate in 1930 and 1931 was beyond all expectations, and it may therefore be assumed that, with the suppression of the causes of this extraordinary intensification of the rate of decline, that is, with the gradual improvement of the economic and political conditions of life of the German people, there may be, at least temporarily, a decrease in the shortage of births. A temporary rise in the level of births may even take place.' (*27*)

25. Burgdörfer, *Aufbau und Bewegung*, p. 86. (*28*)

26. See *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, November, II, 1934, 'Eheschliessungen, Geburten, und Sterbefälle'. According to the number of men and women in the marriageable age groups and the expectation of marriage calculated for the period 1910–11, there were 330,000 fewer marriages than should have taken place in the period 1930–2. But the second half of 1933 saw an increase of 50,000 marriages over the number which should have been expected (283,000), while the first half of 1934 saw a further increase of about 52,000. Thus the latter half of 1934 also saw an increase of over 100,000 marriages above the expected number. (*28*)

27. Griesmeier, *Die Geburtenhäufigkeit in Württemberg im Jahre 1934 und im 1. Vierteljahr 1935*. A synopsis of this was read at the Berlin Population Conference, and Dr. Griesmeier kindly gave me a copy of the full version afterwards. The number of live births in Württemberg was only about 41,000 in 1933, and rose to about 48,000 in 1934. For the first quarter of 1935 they amounted to about 14,590. The birth-rates are not, of course, an accurate index of the total fertility of the different social classes. Differences in the age at marriage and the period of effective fertility make the ordinary birth-rates a very crude gauge of differential reproduction. (*28*)

28. Table A is constructed from figures given by Dr. H. Riese in *Abortion and Suicide in Germany* (1931 Report of International Medical Group for the Investigation of Contraception), Table B is taken from Burgdörfer, *Bevölkerungsentwicklung*, &c., p. 82, and Table C is compiled from unpublished data kindly provided by Dr. Burgdörfer. The abortions are actually described as 'Fehlgeburten'—miscarriages—but they are apparently known to have been induced. In that case two kinds of abortion would be omitted—early miscarriages not requiring consequential medical treatment, and successful curettage. (*29*)

29. The punishment for women undergoing abortions was imprisonment for a period varying from 6 months to 5 years (Paragraph 218 of the Criminal Code). In 1926 a section was added to this Paragraph decreasing the punishment for self-induced abortions or for abortions freely procured at the request

of the pregnant woman. The law, which is now contained in Paragraph 253 of the Criminal Code, provides that in specially mitigating circumstances imprisonment may be forgone, but stipulates imprisonment for as long as 10 years for professional abortionists and for persons who sell instruments or materials for procuring abortions.

In June 1935 a section dealing with abortion was added to the *Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses*, stating:

(1) 'If a court has finally decided on the sterilization of a woman who is pregnant at the time when the operation is to be performed, the pregnancy can be interrupted with the consent of the pregnant woman unless the child is already capable of living or the interruption of the pregnancy would entail serious danger to the health or life of the mother.

(2) 'The child shall be considered not capable of living if the interruption takes place before the end of the sixth month of pregnancy.'

(Official translation of the Law for the Amendment of the Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring, enacted on June 26th, 1935).

Obesregierungsrat Dr. Linden, of the Reichsministerium des Innern, believes that anti-birth-control legislation will be passed in the near future. (*30*)

30. Dr. Burgdörfer (*Bevölkerungsentwicklung im Dritten Reich*, p. 68) suggests that 1·4 million live births per year are necessary to maintain the 1933 population. But he is referring to the replacement of the potentially fertile women alive at that time, and using the 1924–6 Life Table. The 1933 Life Table (Neue Beiträge zum deutschen Bevölkerungsproblem, *Sonderhefte zu Wirtschaft und Statistik*, No. 15, p. 60) gives the expectation of life at birth as 59·75 years for males and 62·63 years for females, as compared with 55·97 and 58·82 years respectively in 1924–6. In a stationary population with the mortality rates of 1933, women aged 15 to 45 years would constitute 20·5 per cent. of the total inhabitants. The replacement of 16·112 million women in that age group would therefore mean a total population of 78·7 millions, while the maintenance of a total population of 65·579 millions would only involve the replacement of 13·44 million women aged 15 to 45 years.

The true death-rate used in these calculations has been obtained by Dr. Burgdörfer's method, namely, derived from a simple average of the male and female expectations of life at birth. Since there are more male than female live births, the average should, however, be weighted by the male/female live-birth ratio. But the difference is not significant. The death-rate arrived at by a weighted average would be 16·36 per 1,000, as compared with the 16·34 per 1,000 arrived at by the simple average. (*31*)

31. The figures are from the 1935 and 1936 issues of *Wirtschaft und Statistik*. (*32*)

CHAPTER III

1. See Alois Fischer, 'Die Bevölkerungsentwicklung 1925–8' (*Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, 1928, Heft 4). (*33*)

2. S. Somogyi, 'La conception fasciste de la politique démographique' (*Economia*, March 1934), and H. Harmsen, 'Die Bevölkerungspolitik des

italienischen Faschismus' (in *Die deutsche Bevölkerungsfrage im europäischen Raum*, Berlin, 1929). (*34*)

3. Details of the bachelor tax are given in Harmsen, op. cit., C. Gini, 'The Italian Demographic Problem and the Fascist Policy on Population' (*Journal of Political Economy*, December 1930), and 'L'azione promossa dal Governo Nazionale a favore dell'incremento demografico e contro l'urbanesimo' (*Annali di Statistica*, serie vi, vol. xxxii). The latter is a rather thorough survey of the various measures adopted for encouraging population growth.

The law came into force in January 1927 and the 1928 amendment was applied in January 1929. Catholic priests and other members of religious orders, persons in hospital or otherwise seriously ill, and persons serving in the army or navy were exempted from this tax. According to the Act, it is not a penalty for celibacy, but simply a tax for revenue purposes ('per il solo fatto de loro stato'; see *L'Azione Promossa*, pp. 50–2). (*34*)

4. Information received from the International Birth-Control Information Centre. (*35*)

5. In 1928 there were 808 prosecutions for procured abortions, 1,155 in 1929, and 860 in 1930. The following table shows the number of procured abortions 'denounced': (*35*)

	Number of procured abortions	*Mid-wives*	*Number of persons 'denounced'*			
			Doctors	*Druggists*	*Persons*	*Total*
January 1929, to June 30th, 1929	500	159	35	3	942	1,139
July 1st, 1929, to June 30th, 1930	752	169	108	2	1,193	1,472
July 1st, 1930, to June 30th, 1931	611	105	18	..	1,021	1,144

(*L'Azione Promossa*, pp. 42–5). But these figures relate only to procured abortions and probably to only a small proportion of those actually undertaken. So far as total abortion rates are concerned, there is a marked lack of estimates as compared with Germany. I have been able to find only two estimates. The first comes from Professor Micheli, of the University of Rome gynaecological clinic, and are estimated at 16·5 per cent. of all conceptions for the beginning of 1928, as compared with only 4·85 per cent. twenty years previously (Harmsen, op. cit., p. 52). The second is from Dr. S. Alberti, based on the statistics of the Milan *Clinica pediatrica*, from March 1923 to March 1929, the results being given in the following table ('Indagini statistiche sulla abortività', *Economia*, April-May 1934):

Criminal Abortions per 100 Conceptions

(*a*) Wives of members of professions, clerical workers, and employees in industry and commerce . . . . . 0·32

(*b*) Wives of workers, artisans, and persons engaged in domestic service . . . . . 0·46

(*c*) Wives of peasants, and persons engaged in agriculture . . 0·00
(*d*) Unmarried women and wives not stating the occupation of their husbands . . . . . 1·04

These results do not appear to fit in with the estimates of Professor Micheli.

6. The Central Statistical Institute of Rome gives the following figures for 'large families' (*L'Azione Promossa*, pp. 4–5). (*36*)

'Large Families' on June 30th, 1928

No. of children	*No. of families*
7	447,231
8	376,582
9	277,942
10	193,300
11	113,068
12	63,607
13	31,643
14	15,261
15	7,293
16	3,312
17	1,547
18	787
19	308
20	182
21	87
22	29
23	13
24	7
25 and over	7
Total	1,532,206

Of this total, 39,666 are families of civil servants, local government employees, and others engaged in State services.

7. In 1929 the Opera Nazionale per la Protezione spent 72,188,746 lire on its work, 94,958,297 lire in 1930, and 90,458,001 lire in 1931 (*L'Azione Promossa*, pp. 100–1). This includes marriage and birth premiums. See also P. Haury, 'Une Politique de nuptialité en Italie' (*Revue de l'Alliance Nationale*, December 1933). (*37*)

8. For example, the National Fascist Party provided 1,197 holiday camps and convalescent homes for some 250,000 children. (*37*)

9. The number of wholly unemployed rose from 110,465 in 1925 to 113,902 in 1926, 278,484 in 1927, and 324, 422 in 1928. (Attilio Oblath, 'The Campaign against unemployment in Italy', *International Labour Review*, May 1930.) (*37*)

10. The following is a brief survey of the legislation concerning the 'bonifica integrale': (*38*)

September 30th, 1923. Act for providing adequate water supplies for agriculture.

May 18th, 1924. Act allowing State intervention in agriculture to apply to all cases where the methods of cultivation used were out of date.

February 7th, 1926. Act providing for the construction of villages.

May 20th, 1926. Act regulating irrigation works in Southern Italy and the islands.

June 7th, 1927. Act concerning the extension of cereal cultivation.

April 28th, 1928. Act setting up the National Association of Development and Irrigation Consortiums.

December 24th, 1928. (The 'Mussolini Plan'). Act classifying the various kinds of reclamation and improvement work, and deciding upon the amount of State subsidy to be given in respect of each kind. In general, no subsidy is to be given when the work yields private benefit only, but for certain kinds of undertakings, such as afforestation, land reclamation in mountainous areas, and the regulation and alteration of water courses, the subsidy may be as high as 100 per cent. of total cost. The execution of the actual work is entrusted to committees of the landowners concerned, and detailed plans have to be drawn up and approved beforehand.

Apart from the State subsidy, which is obtained from the general Budget, credit may be obtained from the various State-controlled financial institutions. The actual State expenditure is to be spread over a period of 44 years and will represent a total of some 3,800 million lire (the total cost being 7,300 million lire). For the period 1929–33 the total expenditure on general development schemes amounts to 832,767,000 lire, while the total cost of works authorized during the period is estimated at 3,506 million lire.

The following Acts relate to the provision of agricultural credit:

Legislative Decree of July 29th, 1927. Defined short term ('working') credit and long term ('improvement') credit. Working credit is to be provided by the local agricultural credit funds, whose work is conducted by bodies connected with the savings funds and large banks. Long term credit is to be provided by the National Land Improvement Credit Consortium, drawing its capital from State and other official and semi-official institutions, or by issuing debentures at 5 per cent. interest. The loans are not to be for more than 30 years.

Act of May 30th, 1932, set up the Agricultural Consortium Financing Institute which is to finance the work undertaken by agricultural consortiums.

See Harmsen, op. cit., M. Marcelletti, 'Aspects of Planned Economy in Italy' (*International Labour Review*, September 1934), and 'La bonifica integrale nel primo quinquennio di applicazione della legge Mussolini' (*Economia*, August 1935).

11. See *L'Azione Promossa*, chap. iv, p. 61. (*38*)

12. See *Report of the National Fascist Institute of Insurance* (Rome, 1935), pp. 22–3. (*39*)

13. Under the 1929 Act permanent State employees (excluding schoolmasters) who are married or widowed and have dependent children receive a family bonus ranging from 150 lire per month for those in the highest grades to 50 lire per month for those in the lowest. In addition to the bonus there are children's allowances at the rate of 30 lire per month for each dependent

child of the highest grade employees, and falling to 10 lire per month for the children of lowest grade employees. If the employee has more than three children the rates of allowance are doubled for children subsequent to the third.

The Royal Decree Law of November 20th, 1930, reduced all these grants by 12 per cent., and the Royal Decree Law of April 14th, 1934, made further reductions of 10, 25, 40, and 50 per cent. according to whether the employees lived in communes with at least 100,000 inhabitants, with over 50,000 but less than 100,000, with over 20,000 but less than 50,000, or with under 20,000 inhabitants. For those living in communes with 500,000 inhabitants or over no reduction was made.

Elementary school-teachers are given a cost of living bonus, the amount of which is determined by the number of dependent children and the population of the commune in which they live. The basic allowance is 16 lire per month for each child up to three children, and 32 lire per month for each subsequent child. (Information kindly provided by the British Commercial Secretary in Rome.) (*39*)

14. Note that these compulsory allowances were not introduced by law, though the legal status of trade associations in Italy gives the same result in effect. Workers in commerce have been included recently, but home-workers are still excluded. The actual allowance will depend upon the available funds. (See Claire Hoffner, 'The Compulsory Payment of Family Allowances in Belgium, France and Italy', *International Labour Review*, October 1935, and the 1935 *Report of the National Fascist Institute of Social Insurance*.) (*40*)

15. R. R. Kuczynski, *Balance of Births and Deaths*, vol ii, p. 59. (*41*)

16. The index is explained in Chapter II, pp. 17–19. For the 1921 calculation of the index for Italy the 1921 Life Table has been used (in Gini and Galvini, 'Tavole di mortalità della popolazione italiana', *Annali di Statistica*, serie vi, vol. viii, 1931), according to which the mean expectation of life at birth is 50·01 years, and the true death-rate there approximately 20 per 1,000. In the Life Table population, females aged 15–44 years would represent 20·6 per cent., given the ratio of male to female live births in 1920–3 (1,054/1,000). (*41*)

17. Figures from *Annuario Statistico italiano*, 1935, p. 21. (*41*)

18. Figures from the volumes of the *Movimento della popolazione* for 1926–9. (*43*)

19. *Annuario Statistico*, 1935, p. 21. (*44*)

20. G. Mortara, 'Nuovi Data sulla Natalità in Italia' (*Giornale degli Economisti*, August 1934). See also Livi, 'Andamento della natalità utile in Italia dal 1880 al 1933' (*Economia*, February 1935) and G. Mortara, 'La Capacità di Riproduzione della popolazione italiana' (*Giornale degli Economisti*, April 1935). (*44*)

21. These mid-year estimates were made by allowing for the deaths by 5-year age groups, the net balance of migration of women aged 15–44 years (from the *Annuario Statistico*), and the annual upward movement of the age groups of the population. The shortage of females in the 11–16 years group

in 1931 is most clearly shown in the population pyramid constructed from the data of the 1931 census (vol. iv, *Relazione Generale*, parte prima, p. 45). (*45*)

22. Gaetano Salvemini in 'Do Italian Women Obey Mussolini?' (*Birth Control Review*, March 1933), says that in recent years the consuls have been sending between 5,000 and 6,000 women per year to Italy.

The actual emigration policy, of which this feature is part, is rather interesting. In the post-war period, non-European emigration of Italians turned largely to South America, especially to Argentina. But Mussolini's aim was to prevent these emigrants or their children from acquiring a non-Italian nationality, and he brought up this request at the Inter-parliamentary Conference held in Rio de Janeiro in 1927. The Monroe doctrine was invoked, and the request refused, Mussolini retaliating with a sharp reduction in Italian emigration to South America. In France, however, the need for Italian labour was more urgent, and the Franco-Italian Convention of December 3rd, 1927, acceded to Mussolini's demands. (See Harmsen, op. cit., and also part 7 in *Bevölkerungsprobleme Frankreichs*, 1927.) (*46*)

23. The figures are from the *Annuario Statistico*, 1925, p. 21. (*46*)

The campaign against tuberculosis has also had considerable success, as is shown below. (The figures are from the 1935 *Report of the National Fascist Institute of Social Insurance*, pp. 13–15.)

Deaths from Tuberculosis per 1,000 Total Population

1924	1·56
1929	1·24
1930	1·12
1931	1·08
1932	0·96
1933	0·76

The funds for the campaign have been obtained largely from the contributions made by all dependent workers aged 15–65 years under the scheme for compulsory insurance against tuberculosis.

24. My own calculation based on the fertility distribution for 1931 given in *Movimento della Popolazione secondo gli atti dello stato civile nell'anno 1931* (published 1934), p. 58; the number and distribution of women aged 15–49 years (1931 *Census*, vol. iv, part ii, pp. 66–9); the ratio of male to female births (*Movimento della Popolazione*, p. 52); and the Italian Life Table for Females in 1931 (1931 *Census*, vol. iv, *Relazione Generale*, i, pp. 197–9). (*47*)

25. Calculated on the basis of the Italian Life Table for 1931, according to which females aged 15–44 years form 20·67 per cent. of the Life Table population, allowing for the male to female live birth ratio (1,049/1,000 in 1931). The mean expectation of life at birth is 54·88 years, and the true death-rate is 18·22 per 1,000. The number of live births required to maintain a population of 42,214 millions, given the mortality conditions of 1931, would be 769,000, while to maintain the number of females aged 15 to 44 years would need an annual supply of 817,000 live births. (*47*)

In applying the Burgdörfer index I have used the same method of deriving the true death-rate from the Life Table as Dr. Burgdörfer, namely, by a simple

average of the male and female mean expectations of life at birth. To be strictly accurate, the mean expectations should be weighted by the ratio of male to female live births, but in fact the difference resulting from the use of weighted averages is not significant, as is shown by the table below.

	True death-rate (uncorrected)	*True death-rate (corrected)*
Italian Life Table for 1921	19·98	20·00
Italian Life Table for 1931	18·22	18·23

26. From C. Gini and B. de Finetti, 'Calcoli sullo sviluppo futuro della popolazione italiana', *Annali di Statistica*, serie vi, vol. x (Rome, 1931). (*47*)

27. From *Annuario Statistico italiano*, 1935. (*48*)

CHAPTER IV

1. The upper limit was 3,600 francs for civil servants with not more than two children. See H. H. R. Vibart, *Family Allowances in Practice* (King, 1926), chap. iv, for an excellent survey of the development up to 1925. (*51*)

2. State schemes for civil servants do not use equalization funds. (*52*)

3. Regional funds ('Interprofessional' and 'Multiprofessional') form 58 per cent. of the total number (*Annuaire Permanent du Comité Central des Allocations Familiales*, 1935 edition). (*52*)

4. Also, where cost-of-living bonuses were given, 'there was no doubt a desire on the part of employers to economize; the (cost-of-living) allowances appeared to be increasing with extreme rapidity and employers naturally desired to limit their commitments and to give the big advances demanded only to those who they considered specially needed them' (Vibart, op. cit., ch. ii, p. 6). (*52*)

5. In a letter to the present writer he said: 'Au point de vue social, les versements des allocations ont empêché des Syndicats réformistes, à tendence de bouleversement, de pouvoir se servir à leurs fins propre de révolution, de l'ouvrier père de famille. La très grosse majorité de ceux-ci est resté en dehors de la lutte des classes.' (*52*)

6. The question was carefully considered in the 1919 Report of the Commission d'Étude du Règlement de la Caisse de la Région Parisienne. (*53*)

7. The first survey was included in the 1925 Annual Report of the 'Congrés National des Allocations Familiales', and was undertaken by Colonel Guillermin. (*53*)

8. *Annuaire Permanent*, pp. 444–6. (*53*)

9. The recent history of the movement in France is given in the *Manuel Pratique des Allocations Familiales*, pp. 1–4. (*54*)

10. 'Tout employeur occupant habituellement des ouvriers ou des employés de quelque âge et de quelque sexe, que ce soit dans une profession industrielle, commerciale, agricole ou liberale, est tenu par le loi' (Roger Rhein, *Les Allocations Familiales Obligatoires*, p. 48). Also, 'la loi ne distingue pas entre employés et ouvriers et n'impose ni limite maxima de salaire, ni possession de la nationalité française, ni travail "habituel" ' (op. cit., p. 76). (*54*)

11. The children for whom allowances are payable are defined as 'tout enfant ou descendant, légitime, reconnu ou adoptif, et . . . tout pupille, résidant en France, à la charge de l'ouvrier ou de l'employé' (Roger Rhein, op. cit.). (*54*)

12. *Manuel Pratique*, p. 14. (*55*)

13. The Director of the 'Caisse Patronale d'Allocations Familiales du Textile', in a letter to the present writer, said: 'La loi ne prévoit en effet le paiement des allocations que pour les jours de travail réellement effectués par l'ouvrier, et c'est que font les Caisses interprofessionelles qui sont les plus importantes en France (Caisse genre, Région du Haut-Rhin). Dans notre industrie cotonnière dans laquelle le 'short time' a atteint 27 per cent. pour le dernier semestre 1934, nous avons payé les allocations comme si les ouvriers avaient travaillé le mois entier. Comme le 'short time' depuis quatre ans est très important vous comprendrez que malgré les pertes qu'ils supportent, nos adhérents ont jusqu'ici accepté un supplément de charges pour aider les familles de leurs ouvriers.' (*55*)

14. A regional fund must contain at least 100 employers and a minimum number of employees, varying from 40,000 in the Seine Département to 25 per cent. of the total employed population (excluding farm workers, public officials, and domestic servants) in regions having less than 40,000 workers. An industrial fund must embrace at least 20 employers (or, if the total number is under 20, all the employers in the industry who are located in that region) and 50 per cent. of all the workers engaged in that industry in the region, with a minimum number of 3,000. (*55*)

15. Monsieur G. Bonvoisin, in an address at the 'XIV^{e} Congrès National des Allocations Familiales', said that of the 595,663 undertakings and 5,809,468 workers theoretically subject to the law, only about 100,000 undertakings, employing some 4,150,000 workers, were actually covered in May 1934. To this, he stated, should be added 1,100,000 public servants, bringing the total to 5,250,000 employees. At the same Congress Monsieur Fernand Rey, Director of the Haut-Rhin Regional Fund, made a statement which did not agree with that of Monsieur Bonvoisin. He said (p. 95 of the *Compte Rendu du Congrès*), 'Les statistiques que nous avons mentionnées indiquent que les établissements déjà assujettis occupent 6,492,000 salariés. Mais les effectifs des Caisses agréeés n'atteignent même pas la moitié de ce chiffre.' According to the *Annuaire Permanent* for 1935, the number of workers enrolled in the various funds in industry, commerce, and the professions amounts to 3,537,180. This figure would appear to agree with Monsieur Rey's statement rather than with that of Monsieur Bonvoisin. (*55*)

16. Information in a statement from Monsieur Bonvoisin, Director of the 'Comité Central des Allocations Familiales'. (*56*)

17. The minimum rates are given on p. xxv of the *Manuel Pratique des Allocations Familiales*. The following is a selection arranged in order of size: (57)

Département	*Allowance in francs per month for 1 to 6 children*					
	1 ch.	*2 ch.*	*3 ch.*	*4 ch.*	*5 ch.*	*6 ch.*
Corse	15	30	45	65	85	105
Cantal	15	30	70	110	150	190
Calvados	17·50	40	67·50	95	122·50	150
Manche	17·50	40	70	110	150	190
Yonne	15	45	85	135	185	235
Doubs	20	45	75	110	150	190
Ariège	20	50	90	130	170	210
Allier	20	50	90	140	200	260
Ardèche	20	50	100	150	200	250
Vosges	20	50	100	170	240	310
Haute-Marne	20	60	105	155	205	265
Territoire de Belfort	25	45	75	110	150	190
Bouches-du-Rhône	25	50	100	150	200	250
Bas-Rhin	25	60	105	150	200	250
Indre-et-Loire	25	55	105	160	220	290
Haut-Rhin	25	62·50	112·50	162·50	225	300
Seine	30	70	120	200	280	360

18. Comparison was possible only in 171 of the funds. In the others the sections had been changed too radically. (57)

19. *Compte Rendu du XIV^e Congrès National*, p. 57. The averages have been recalculated, as in Colonel Guillermin's own averages the decimal points have been misplaced. (58)

20. *Compte Rendu du XIV^e Congrès National*, p. 58.

Percentage Distribution of Families by Size (54 Funds)

Year	*Number of children*							
	Not more than 2	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*
1931	78·13	12·11	5·67	2·53	1·02	0·39	0·10	0·05
1932	77·67	12·18	5·73	2·65	1·17	0·47	0·11	0·02
1933	76·12	12·70	6·06	2·87	1·38	0·64	0·18	0·05

There is some uncertainty as to the position in 1934 owing to the two somewhat conflicting sets of results given by Colonel Guillermin (*Compte Rendu du XV^e Congrès National des Allocations Familiales*, May 1935, pp. 59–66), who explains that, owing to the confusion caused by the 1932 Act, 'il a donc paru nécessaire, dans ce rapport, de considérer d'abord les diverses caractéristiques de l'ensemble des Caisses ayant répondu au questionnaire pour l'année 1931 à 1934 et ensuite d'examiner la situation comparative d'un cer-

tain nombre de Caisses anciennes au cours des années 1932, 1933 et 1934'. According to the first inquiry, the average allowances per child for the years 1932, 1933, and 1934 were 399, 241, and 344 francs per year, so that in 1934 the average allowance was still below the 1932 level. The second inquiry, which covers 43 funds, gives rather different results, the average yearly allowance per child being 328 francs in 1932, 247 in 1933, and 334 in 1934, so that the average allowance was higher in 1934 than in 1932. But Colonel Guillermin's results do not seem to be in full agreement with the original figures from which they were drawn.

1st Inquiry

	Allowances paid	*No. of beneficiaries*	*Av. allowance per beneficiary*
	frs.		frs.
1932	271,502,009	655,972	414
1933	131,613,174	546,265	241
1934	489,595,073	1,422,107	344

2nd Inquiry

	Allowances paid	*No. of beneficiaries*	*Av. allowance per beneficiary*
	frs.		frs.
1932	66,068,983	201,373	328
1933	75,494,420	305,024	248
1934	132,904,375	409,376	325

21. The statistics of earnings were obtained from the *Bulletin Trimestriel de Statistique*, January-March 1935, and are for October 1934 unless otherwise stated. (*60*)

22. Estimates of the additional expenditure incurred on account of children are given in the next chapter, Note 28. (*61*)

23. In the Appendix there will be found a table of premiums given by the Communes and Départements and a summary of the money and other advantages given to large families in France ('Avantages accordés aux Familles Nombreuses'). (*61*)

24. This was introduced among Post Office employees by the Ministre des Postes et Télégraphes. It amounted to 36 francs per year for each child from the third, to be paid until the child was 14 years of age (Vibart, op. cit., p. 33). (*62*)

25. Prices rose steeply from 1921 to 1929 with an exception in 1924. The total rise in the period was 133 per cent. (*62*)

26. Monsieur Georges de Leneer says, 'L'intervention des chefs d'industrie dans l'octroi des allocations familiales n'a pas été motivée, surtout en Belgique, par des raisons étrangères aux fins industrielles. Il n'y a pas de raison pour qu'ils les assimilent aux aides de toute nature que peuvent être imaginées en

faveur des familles nombreuses'. (*Les Caisses de Compensation des Allocations Familiales en Belgique*, p. 23.) But in 1923 M. Paul Goldschmidt, in his report to the 'Comité d'Études', said that employers regarded allowances as a means of lowering the barrier between employer and employed. (*62*)

27. The French equalization funds apparently place more emphasis on the population aspect than the Belgian. The former publish an annual survey of the effects of allowances upon the births and infantile mortality, but the latter only give financial data in their report. (*62*)

28. Georges de Leneer, *Les Transformations du Régime des Allocations Familiales*, p. 5. (*63*)

29. *International Survey of Social Services* (League of Nations), p. 74. On September 28th, 1928, an *arrêté royal* extended the Act to all public bodies. (*63*)

30. Georges de Leneer, p. 12. (*63*)

31. 'Loi du 4 Août, 1930: Extraits du "Moniteur Belge"'. See also Heyman, *La Généralization des Allocations Familiales en Belgique* (1931). The law did not actually come into force until the beginning of 1932. (*64*)

32. The work must be regular. Casual labourers in the strict sense are not included. Nor are the allowances 'cumulative', i.e. if a man and his wife are both working they do not receive a double allowance for their children. No graduation of allowance rates according to the size of the basic income was prescribed, though in fact higher allowances were allotted to civil servants, magistrates, and similar officials. (*64*)

33. That is, children up to the age of 14, though it is extended to 18 years of age if the child is a student or an apprentice, or indefinitely if he is unable through illness to earn his own living. Grandchildren, adopted children, illegitimate children if acknowledged by their parents, and younger brothers and sisters came within the meaning of the term 'dependent children'. (*64*)

34. Equalization funds were to contain at least 7 affiliated employers and 1,500 workers. (These numbers might be reduced to 3 and 500 respectively in special cases.) There were special funds for certain defined occupations, such as dock work, inland navigation, shipping, hotels and restaurants, home workers, and commercial travellers. Employers not belonging to either of the above kinds were compelled to affiliate to the State Auxiliary Fund, which embraced a miscellany of trades. (*64*)

35. The State grant was 'earmarked' for helping to pay allowances to third and subsequent children, i.e. in the interests of larger families. (*64*)

36. This might be raised to 1·10 francs and 65 centimes respectively in the special funds. (*64*)

37. This payment was to be equal to 5 per cent. of the joint value of the other two contributions, and was to be continued until the reserve balance amounted to the value of two months' contributions. (*64*)

38. In the case of the Auxiliary Fund, the whole surplus has to be transferred. The National Fund (governed by a committee of fifteen, including nine representatives of the equalization funds and four workers' delegates) was also charged with the duty of paying special allowances, e.g. to workers

'living in', to adolescents in charge of younger brothers and sisters, and to workers injured by an industrial accident or illness, after their employment contract had expired. (65)

39. In practice, however, deductions were made for unemployment. The Director of the 'Caisse Professionelle Vervière' writes: 'D'autre part, nos ouvriers partageant le travail ont dû aussi partager les allocations, c'est-a-dire, qu'au lieu de 15 francs par mois, une famille d'un enfant n'arrive qu'à recevoir 5 ou 10 francs suivant le nombre de journées de travail.' (65)

40. Payment might be made to the mother or father, but particularly to the mother if there were any doubt as to the proper use of the money. It might be given monthly or quarterly, and usually through an equalization fund. In the special cases where it was paid by the employer the allowance was not to be given at the same time as the wage or salary. (65)

41. The Committee, which consisted of 17 members, also included five employers' and five workers' representatives. (65)

42. e.g., Even the Verviers Fund, which gave the largest allowance of 40, 100, 180, 270, 370, and 470 francs per month for 1 to 6 children, reduced this in 1933 to 18, 50, 100, 180, 280, and 380 francs per month. There is no 'Annuaire Permanent' for the Belgian funds, but 50 letters were sent to a sample of the funds (the total number is 79). Seventeen replies were received, referring to 19 funds, and only two funds were paying higher rates than the minimum. On the other hand, 9 funds were paying birth premiums, 8 provided *infirmières visiteuses*, and 2 gave breast-feeding payments and children's clothing. Higher rates of pay are given to public officials, civil servants receive 9, 23, 113, 243, 423, and 603 francs per month for 1 to 6 children, and magistrates are given 0, 0, 115, 345, 715, and 1,085 francs. (65)

43. Le R. P. Val. Fallon. *Les Allocations Familiales dans les Entreprises Privées*, p. 7 (1935). (65)

44. Le R. P. Val. Fallon, op. cit., pp. 1–2. It is very important to note, in addition, that, according to the author, the 30 million francs State subsidy has not, up to the present, been paid. This means that the Belgian system is, like the French, based on employers' contributions entirely, and has the added disadvantage of being extremely rigid. A new Royal Decree, issued on February 27th, 1935, excuses employers from the payment of allowances to workers who are involuntarily unemployed. The main clause is: 'Article 26 bis: En ce qui concerne les branches industrielles, commerciales et agricoles, qui se trouvent en état de crise, le droit aux allocations est suspendu du chef des jours de chômage, des dimanches et des autres jours de repos . . .' (From *Communication aux affiliés de la Caisse d'Allocations familiales Sambre-et-Meuse*, March 8th, 1935.) (65)

45. The wage rates are published by the Bourse Officielle du Travail de Bruxelles, and are for January 1935. No other rates were obtainable. (66)

46. The lowest group of wage-earners receives 700 francs per month, the medium 1,080 francs, and the highest 1,800 francs. (66)

47. e.g., M. A. Julin: 'Les recherches sur le coût de la vie, si nombreuses en Belgique, prouvent à suffisance qu'un ouvrier marié, père de deux ou trois

enfants, vit dans des conditions convenables à l'aide de son salaire' ('Enquête sur les charges sociales de l'Industrie'). (66)

48. To complete the description of the system the following facts may be mentioned. There are 79 primary funds (of which 38 are regional and 41 industrial), 7 special funds (industrial), an auxiliary fund (regional), and the National Fund, making a total of 88. At the end of 1933, 1,277,674 workers were covered, about 90 per cent. of the total employed population subject to the 1930 Act, and the total contributions made by employers amounted to 270,869,000 francs. (This excludes the allowances paid directly by State institution.) About 89 per cent. of the amount was contributed for men and 11 per cent. for women workers. 488,000 families received allowances, of which 54·7 per cent. consisted of only one child and 26·1 per cent. of two children. The total amount in allowances was approximately 253 million francs. (66)

49. Vibart, op. cit., ch. x, p. 159, quotes the following statement by M. Bonvoisin (made in 1921): 'We could cite examples where family allowances have made it possible to carry out without damage reductions in wages (which had become essential)', and also mentions that in December 1922 the Paris Regional Fund reported that allowances had never up till then been the cause of a fall in wages but had several times prevented a rise in them. (67)

50. *Family Endowment Chronicle*, April 1935, pp. 28–9. It also mentions that the French Chamber is considering the following resolution: 'The introduction of an obligatory system of Family Allowances can under no circumstances be a cause of or a pretext for lower wages. Any stipulation to the contrary is automatically null and void. (67)

51. 1934 *Congrès National des Allocations Familiales.* (68)

52. Other authorities have estimated the number of employers subject to the Act at 200,000. In that case, 110,000 are evading it (*Régime des Allocations Familiales et la Loi du 4 août, 1930*, p. 23). (68)

53. To some extent the object of the Bill has been achieved by the Decree of January 1935. See Note 44. (68)

54. The five regions, in ascending order of cost of living, are:

(1) rural districts,
(2) semi-industrial areas,
(3) towns with under 50,000 inhabitants,
(4) towns with over 50,000 inhabitants,
(5) the Brussels and Antwerp agglomerations. (69)

55. The 'Arrêtés Royaux' of January and February 1935. See Note 44. The Director of the 'Caisse Nationale de Compensation pour Allocations Familiales des Œuvres Ouvrières et Socialistes' writes: 'En effet, depuis le 1er Janvier, 1935, de profondes modifications ont été apportées a la structure de la loi sur les allocations familiales. Celles-ci nous ont obligés à diminuer, à notre grand regret, l'importance des advantages supplémentaires que nous avions introduits, grâce à la part du boni qui nous était laissée par la loi.' (69)

CHAPTER V

1. The population of France was 35·51 millions in 1850 and 39·623 millions in 1911, showing a growth of only 11·6 per cent. in the period. In Belgium, on the other hand, the growth was from 4·425 to 7·490 millions, showing an increase of 69·3 per cent. in the same period. (Figures obtained from the *Statistique du Mouvement de la Population* for France, and from the *Annuaire Statistique* for Belgium.) (*72*)

2. The following books published in France dealt with the question:

Rochard, J. *La Dépopulation de la France*, Paris, 1887.

Clément, H. *La Dépopulation en France*, 1910.

Bertillon, J. *La Dépopulation de la France*, Paris, 1911. (*72*)

Apart from the 'Alliance Nationale', founded by Dr. Bertillon himself, the following pro-population associations were in existence in France by the first decade of the twentieth century:

(*a*) Comité des revendications des pères de famille nombreuse (founded at Montpellier in 1906).

(*b*) L'Union des familles nombreuses de Levroux (Indre), founded 1898.

(*c*) La figure des pères et mères de famille nombreuse, founded by Captain Simon Maire in 1908.

(*d*) Famille Montpelliéraine, founded 1894.

(*e*) L'Union des familles de l'Eure, founded 1899.

(*f*) L'Union des familles d'Évreux.

(*g*) L'Union des pères de famille méritants (Isère), founded 1904.

(*h*) L'Alliance départementale de pères de famille nombreuse du Gard, founded 1907.

(*i*) L'Union de pères de famille de Châlons-sur-Marne, founded 1908.

(Bertillon, op. cit., pp. 247 et seq.)

3. The 'Ligue des Familles Nombreuses en Belgique' has, as a result of its efforts, obtained the following advantages for 'large families' (i.e. families with at least four dependent children). (1) Important rebates in various taxes, (2) considerable advantages in house accommodation, (3) reductions of 50 per cent. in railway fares, (4) subsidies for the education of children (see Mlle F. Vulhopp, 'The Situation in Belgium', *National Life*, May 1931). There are also similar, though more extensive, advantages for large families in France. See Appendix, p. 140, 'Avantages aux Familles Nombreuses'. (*73*)

4. F. Vulhopp, op. cit. (*73*)

5. See Alfred Fabre-Luce, 'La Loi de 1920' (*Pamphlet*, May 12th, 1933), and 'Texte de la Loi Française' (*Le Problème Sexuel*, November 1933). According to M. Luce the French law was passed in rather strange circumstances. The debate on the Bill was opened unexpectedly during a morning session which was supposed to have been taken up with an Amnesty Bill. There were protests at the irregularity of the procedure and M. Lhopiteau, the Minister of Justice, replied that discussion of such a question, even if it were necessary, might well be left until after the Bill had been passed. The voting was 521 in favour and only 55 against. (*73*)

6. See Harmsen, *Bevölkerungsprobleme Frankreichs* (Berlin, 1927), p. 47. (75)

7. Article in *La Grande Réforme*, February-March 1933. (75)

8. *Prévisions sur l'Avenir de la Population Française*, by M. Sauvy, read as a paper to the 'Société Statistique de Paris' in May 1932, and later also published by the 'Alliance Nationale' in their monthly review. (75)

9. Selected only in the sense that few of the funds supply the necessary information. In 1926–8 only 46 funds out of over 200 were used in compiling the rate. (74)

10. Professor Baudhuin, 'L'Avenir de la Population Belge' (*Bulletin d'Information de la Banque Nationale de Belgique*, June 10th, 1931). Since there were no recent life tables for Belgium, Professor Baudhuin used the French table for 1920–3 and, in order to allow for the most recent fall in mortality, adopted the female expectation of life at birth (56 years) as the general basis for a Belgian table. (75)

11. Mlle F. Vulhopp, 'La Population Belge de Demain' (in *Annales de la Société Scientifique de Bruxelles*, Series D, Jan.-March 1932). See also Le Rév. Père Val. Fallon, *La Population Belge et Son Avenir*. (75)

12. H. H. R. Vibart, 'The Birth-Rate in France and the Compensation Funds' in *The Family Endowment Chronicle*, August 1932. 'Coming now to the "attributaries"—(the father or mother to whom the allowance is paid over) —there are now fewer per fund than two years ago, but it is noteworthy that the decrease is not as great as that of the total employees and the ratio of attributaries to total employees has consistently increased from 26·9 per cent. in 1929 to 27·1 per cent. in 1930 and 29·3 per cent. in 1931. These figures seem to suggest that some preference has been given by employers to family men. In further support of this view Colonel Guillermin cites the figures for the Metallurgical Fund of Lyons, which show that during the last two years what may be called "attributary" personnel has decreased by 16·8 per cent. and other employees by 37·5 per cent. This may be an indication that the reduction of personnel owing to the crisis has been mainly at the expense of foreigners working in France.' (76)

13. In order to bring up the population of the funds to a level comparable with the rest of France (including children, women who are not at work, and old and retired men and women) Colonel Guillermin made certain additions. 'First, for persons outside working ages 25 per cent. is added, apparently more or less arbitrarily. Then for children, the average number per 1,000 employees is added; finally, to allow for the number of women of working age outside the factories, it is assumed that all women with only one child will be working in the mills, but none with more than one child' (Vibart, op. cit., p. 18). Since two of these additions are largely guesses, there is evidently a fair range of error to be taken into account when considering the higher birth-rates which the equalization funds are supposed to show. (78)

14. In a letter to the author. (78)

15. The figures were originally published in their pamphlet *Une Expérience de Natalité. Peut-on faire naître plus d'enfants en France?*, 1926, and a very interesting critique by Dequidt and Forestier appeared in *Le Mouvement*

Sanitaire in the same year ('Une Expérience de Natalité. L'Efficacité des Allocations Familiales sur la Natalité est-elle démontrée?'). See also the article by G. Ichok, 'La Dénatalité, ses Prophètes et ses Médecins' (*Le Problème Sexuel*, February 1935). (*78*)

16. *Prosperité*, January-March 1929 (Michelin publication). (*78*)

Further details are given in Harmsen, *Bevölkerungsprobleme Frankreichs*, pp. 98–9, in which the following table of birth-rates for the year 1924 appears:

Place	*Births per 1,000 total population*	
	Michelin families	*The rest of the population*
Clermont-Ferrand	21·20	14·86
Beaumont . .	21·50	8·10
Aubière . .	28·10	7·34
Riom . .	30·60	14·70
Pont du Château	32·10	12·94
Lempdes . .	40·46	12·30
Cournon . .	52·50	10·40

17. Even M. Ludovic Naudeau admits that this may be true in part. 'En un mot, il serait produit à Clermont comme une concentration de tout le potentiel de prolificité dont de nombreux cantons étaient susceptibles de sorte que les triomphants résultats constatés au chef-lieu seraient par contre la cause de la pénurie constatée en bien des communes rurales. Ce raisonnement renferme assurément une part de vérité.' But he goes on to say, 'Mais il reste à savoir s'il ne renferme pas plus d'erreur encore que de vérité. N'avons-nous pas constaté, en des études précédentes, que la prolificité et le malthusianisme paraissaient surtout soumis à l'influence des milieux? On a des enfants, écrivions-nous naguère, quand on voit tout le monde en avoir autour de soi. Mais, par contre, on se sent inclin à la restriction si l'esprit public, dans le milieu qu'on habite, paraît opposé à la natalité' (*La France se regarde*, p. 291, 1931). Since the urban environment is distinctly unfavourable to the raising of large families, and since, notoriously, urban families are generally smaller than rural, it would be much more likely to expect the urban example to diminish the fertility of the rural immigrants than for the process to work in the reverse direction. (*79*)

18. R. A. Fisher, *The Effects of Family Allowances on Population* ('Six Aspects of Family Allowances', conference at the London School of Economics in October 1927). The figures used constructing the post-1927 section of the table were kindly provided by M. Fernand Rey, Director of the Equalization Fund. (*79*)

19. The Haut Rhin allowances were higher than those of most other funds, and they still are. (*80*)

20. Out of the 30 funds to which particular requests were addressed, only two supplied figures for births and deaths. Refined rates are used, calculated on the average number of live births for the same year and the year before. (*81*)

21. Rates for Colonel Guillermin's selected equalization funds have not been given in the text as they show a number of inconsistencies. The infantile mortality rates were given in the Report of the 1927 Congress as 66·4 for 1924, 73·4 for 1925, and 62·1 for 1926. But in the 1928 Report the rates given were 51·0 for 1925, 62·7 for 1926, and 54·3 for 1927, while in the 1929 Report the rates were 60·0 for 1926, 65·5 for 1927, and 71·4 for 1928. The figures do not, therefore, appear to be comparable. (*81*)

22. On this point see particularly the speech by M. Garçon to the Comité National d'Études, delivered on May 19th, 1930. It formed part of the conference on 'La Lutte contre la Mortalité Infantile'. (*82*)

23. Computed from official sources (*Annuaire Statistique* for Belgium and *Statistique du Mouvement de la Population* for France). Of the French rates (*A*) has been computed to fit in with the official estimates of the population for 1926–31 and (*B*) to fit in both with the census of 1926 and the estimates made by M. Sauvy for 1929–31. The rate for England and Wales has been calculated from figures given in the annual numbers of the Registrar-General's *Statistical Review*, 1921–32. (*82*)

24. The 'population type' method is one recommended by M. Husson in his article 'Natalité et Accroissement de la Population' (*Bulletin de la Statistique Générale de France*, January-March 1931). It consists in applying to a standard population of females between the ages of 15 and 49 years the fertility rates derived from the actual population. It thus gives an index of the demographic potentiality of the actual population. The standard population is derived from an average of the actual populations of France, England and Wales, Germany, Sweden, and Italy about the year 1920. In this population women between the ages of 15 and 49 form the following proportions per 100,000 total inhabitants: (*83*)

. .	4,950	35–39 . .	3,350
20–24 . .	4,630	40–44 . .	3,000
25–29 . .	4,000	45–49 . .	2,700
30–34 . .	3,740		

Or, distributing the ages between 100,000 women aged 15 to 49 years, the proportions are:

15–19 . .	17,980	35–39 . .	
20–24 . .	16,800	40–44 . .	11,640
25–29 . .	15,530	45–49 . .	10,480
30–34 . .	14,550		

25. Figures from the *Annuaire Statistique* for 1935. (*83*)

26. The gross reproduction index was 1·17 in 1926 and 1·07 in 1931. Since the net indices have been calculated by using the 1922–3 life table, it is possible that they are actually higher than those given in the text. (*83*)

27. The Director of the Charleroi Fund for the Glass Industry writes: 'Nous ajouterons toutefois qu'après 4 années de pratique, il nous apparaît que les allocations familiales ne sont appréciées que par les familles nombreuses, et que d'une façon générale elles n'ont pas influencé le taux des naissances et des mortalités infantiles.' (*84*)

28. The percentages were obtained by averaging the standards of basic needs given in the 'Children's Minimum Campaign Committee Report' of July 1934. The dependent standards, reduced to percentages, are:

	A	*B*	*C*	*D*
1. New London Survey .	100	121·5	157·0	209·5
2. Merseyside Survey . .	100	122·6	161·7	229·3
3. Week-End Review Standard	100	122·0	162·7	218·9
4. B.M.A. Standard . .	100	122·4	163·4	222·0
5. Average	100	122·1	161·2	219·9

(Family 'A'—Man and wife; 'B'—Man and wife and infant (2–3); 'C'—Man and wife, infant (1–2 years), and 2 children (6–8 and 8–10 years); 'D'—Man and wife, infant (1–2 years) and 4 children (4–5, 6–8, 10–12, and 12–14 years).

It appeared more satisfactory to draw the comparisons in terms of typical families than to speak of 'percentage additions per child'. M. Boverat, of the Alliance Nationale, gives a very different scale of needs. He takes a man as 100, a wife as 50, and each child as 50. Thus a 3-child family has needs three times greater than a single man. This is an under-estimate as far as food requirements are concerned, but is a crude analysis of the total expenses of family life.

The actual percentages used in the text are not particularly generous, but they are higher than the money income received by a large proportion of working-class families in this country. (*85*)

29. F. Boverat, *Les Encouragements Matériels à la Natalité*, 1934, p. 8.

30. Report of the 'Commission d'Étude du Règlement de la Caisse de la Région Parisienne', 1919 (quoted in Bonvoisin and Maignan, *Allocations Familiales et Caisses de compensation*, Paris, 1930, p. 174). (*86*)

APPENDIX

FAMILY ALLOWANCE SCHEMES IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN FRANCE AND BELGIUM

ABBREVIATIONS

L. of N.: Information from the 'International Survey of Social Services' (International Labour Office, 1933).

B.C.S.: Information obtained from the replies to questionnaires sent to the British Commercial Secretaries in all European countries.

APPENDIX

FAMILY ALLOWANCES IN PUBLIC SERVICES OTHER THAN IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM

AUSTRALIA (Australian Year Book).

Commonwealth Public Services.

Family allowances have been in operation since 1920, financed by employees themselves, 5*s.* per week per child up to 14, but not to bring income above £500 p.a. So minimum percentages are:

	Income minus family allowance	*Family allowance*	*Percentage*
1 child	£487	£13	2·7
2 children	£474	£26	5·5
3 children	£461	£39	8·5
4 children	£448	£52	11·6

AUSTRIA (B.C.S.).

Civil Servants.

A. Out of a total number of 67,608 civil servants, 49,576 are in receipt of allowances. Of these:

(1)	19,673	receive household allowance only
(2)	17,003	„ „ „ plus allowance for 1 child.
(3)	8,645	plus allowance for 2 children.
(4)	2,801	plus allowance for 3 children.
(5)	932	plus allowance for 4 children.
(6)	522	plus allowance for 5 or more children.

B. Total annual expenditure = 7,845,310 schillings.

C. Allowances for children are not graded according to income but to the number of dependent children. The rate per year is:

1 child	60	schillings
2 children	180	„
3 „	420	„
4 „	720	„
5 „	840	„
6 „	1,140	„

plus 120 schillings per annum for each subsequent dependent child.

Married allowance ('household') is 60 schillings per annum. Illegitimate children are included. No deductions are made for absence through sickness, &c.

BULGARIA (B.C.S.).

Subsequent to a general rise in salaries in 1923, family allowances were withdrawn. But from April 1st, 1934, bachelors receive 10 per cent. less salary than married men in the same grade.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA (L. of N.).

Officials: Acts of June 24th, 1926 and March 5th, 1927. Officials and teachers with 1 dependent child receive family allowance of 1,800 Kc. per annum. Those with 'several' receive 3,000 Kc. per year.

Railways: Higher officials and salaried employees as above. Auxiliary workers receive 100 Kc. and 175 Kc. per month respectively (1,200 Kc. and 2,100 Kc. per year).

DENMARK (B.C.S.).

1. *Civil Servants.*

There is no family allowance, but the cost of living bonus is affected if the civil servant is married or a widower or divorced (if maintaining own household). A married man receives the full amount, while unmarried persons over 40 receive two-thirds, and under 40, one-third of the full allowance. The number of children is not taken into account.

2. *Copenhagen Municipality.*

Employees are divided into 3 groups: (i) married, (ii) unmarried and not less than 35 years of age, (iii) unmarried and under 35 years.

The basic salary is the same for all groups, but (*a*) cost of living and (*b*) family bonuses vary according to group and are in the proportion of 4, 2, and 1½ for the three groups.

Family bonuses amount to 7½ per cent. in highest salary grades and to 25 per cent. in lowest. These bonuses are given also to widowers, widows, divorced and separated persons, or to unmarried people who support children and maintain their own households. Children under 18 years are included, but the number of children is not taken into account.

11,800 employees are included in the scheme, and allowances amount to 6½ million Kroner (out of total salaries of 44½ million Kroner) per year.

There are no deductions for illness unless the illness is protracted and causes the salary itself to be reduced.

ESTONIA (B.C.S.).

Government and Municipal Employees.

To those employees earning under 150 Ekrs. per month (i.e. £8 2*s.*): so that the majority of employees come into the scheme.

Illegitimate children are included if the mother is a governmental or municipal employee.

No graduation by income, but allowances vary according to locality.

1. Tallinn: 8 Ekrs. per child per month.
2. Tartu: 6 Ekrs. „ „ „ „
3. Country districts: 4 Ekrs. „ „ „ „

Percentages: assuming Tallinn rates and maximum salary of 150 Ekrs. per month:

1 child	5·3 per cent.	3 children	16·0 per cent.
2 children	10·7 „ „	4 children	21·3 „ „

GERMANY (B.C.S.).

Civil Service, Army and Navy.

Par. 14 of the Reichsbesoldungsgesetz of December 16th, 1927:

Children's bonuses were granted to about 80,000 Reich officials and members of the army and navy. Total annual value 28,000,000 Rm.

Bonus graduated according to number of children, and is now:

1 child	10 Rm. per month	4 children	80 Rm. per month
2 children	30 Rm. „ „	5 children	110 Rm. „ „
3 children	55 Rm. „ „	6 children	140 Rm. „ „

Bonuses are the same for all income groups and there is no income limit. Illegitimate children are included if recognized by father and supported by him, or if they are entirely supported by female officials as their mothers. Bonuses are paid in cases of sickness. The same principles and amounts apply to officials of the Post Office, the German Railway Co., and officials of States and Municipalities.

Percentages

Lowest Salary Groups: 1,944 Rm. per year.

1 child	6·2 per cent.	4 children	49·4 per cent.
2 children	18·5 „ „	5 children	68·0 „ „
3 children	34·0 „ „	6 children	86·4 „ „

Medium Groups: 3,360 Rm. per year.

1 child	3·6 per cent.	4 children	28·6 per cent.
2 children	10·7 „ „	5 children	39·3 „ „
3 children	19·6 „ „	6 children	50·0 „ „

Highest Groups

	Civil Service	*Army and Navy*
	9,954 Rm. per year	18,960 Rm. per year
1 child	1·1 per cent.	0·6 per cent.
2 children	3·6	1·9 „
3 children	6·6	3·5 „
4 children	9·7	
5 children	13·3	
6 children	16·9	8·9

HUNGARY (B.C.S.).

Family allowances were introduced in 1912 for central and local government employees, in respect of legitimate, legitimized, and step-children under 24 years of age (under 16 years of age for subordinate officials). 200 crowns

per year per child are given to higher and 100 crowns per year to lower officials. According to a Decree issued in 1932, the following allowances are paid:

1. Active or pensioned civil servants or other Government officials:

6 pengoes per month for wife.
12 „ „ per child.

2. Unestablished permanent officials:

5·50 pengoes for wife.
10 „ per child.

3. Unestablished messengers, &c.

4·50 pengoes for wife.
9 „ per child.

N.B. The 1925 Act also allowed family allowances for members of a family other than children and wife, e.g. mother, father, brother, and sisters, if the latter were destitute, unable to earn their living, and entirely dependent on the civil servant concerned.

ITALY. See Chapter II, p. 39.

JUGOSLAVIA (B.C.S.).

Civil Service.

Each married civil servant receives a bonus of 5 dinars per day for his wife and 5 dinars per day for each child under 21. No difference is made in the grades of the service.

LATVIA (B.C.S.).

Central and Local Government Services.

Allowances are given for 46,000 children of civil servants and 15,000 children of local government officials: Their total annual value amounts to 8 million lats.

Allowances paid up to 16 years of age (or 18 if the children are still students). (Up to 1932 allowances were also extended to the wives of employees benefiting under family allowance schemes).

The allowance is paid in direct proportion to the number of children and is equal to 8 per cent. of basic salary in respect of each child, with a minimum of 9 lats and a maximum of 15 lats per child per month. (Up to 1932 the range was 15–24 lats.)

Illegitimate children are included if the mothers are central or local government employees, but their fathers do not receive any allowance.

NETHERLANDS (L. of N.).

1. *State officials*: Decrees of 1925 and 1929.

The allowance equals 3 per cent. of wage for each dependent child under 18 years of age, with a minimum of 60 florins and a maximum of 240 florins per year.

The State workers' minimum is 1·15 fls. per week.

2. *Provinces.*

S. Holland and Geldersland: 2½ per cent. per child.
Utrecht and Overijssel: 50 florins per year per child.
N. Brabant: 5 per cent. for officials and 1 fl. per week per child for workers.
Limburg: 4 per cent. for officials and 3 fls. per week for workers.
Generally given in respect of children up to 18 years of age, but sometimes only for third and subsequent children.

3. Most *communes* pay 2½–5 per cent. of the basic wage for each child under 16–18 years. This often amounts to 1 fl. per week, but first children are not generally included.

4. *Railways.*

2½ per cent. for children under 18 years (minimum 50 fls. per year and maximum 200 fls.). The first two children are excluded.

5. *Limburg mines* (largely State owned).

1921 Collective Agreement. 4 fls. per month per child under 14 years.

NORWAY (B.C.S.).

2,000 officials are in receipt of 'child allowances' amounting to 81,000 Kr. per year.

Illegitimate children are included if the recipients of the allowances are genuinely responsible for their keep. The system applies only to officials employed by the State or partly by the State and partly by a country authority. Allowances are generally paid quarterly.

1. The allowance is reckoned at 25 Kr. per year for each child under 18, subsequent to the third child.
2. The total allowance must not amount to more than 11 per cent. of the annual salary. Nor must it, together with the salary, amount to over 3,560 Kr. per year.
3. Allowances are only paid to officials in full-time posts.

SPAIN (B.C.S.).

The 1926 and 1927 Laws gave allowances to workmen having at least 8 children and earning under 6,000 pesetas per year, and to civil servants and members of the armed forces. (No income limit for the two latter classes.)

1. *Workmen's allowances:*

8	children	100	pesetas per year.	1·7 per cent. minimum
9	„	150	„	
10	„	200	„	
11	„	250	„	
12	„	300	„	5 per cent.
13	„	375	„	
14	„	500	„	
15	„	600	„	10 per cent.

Also free enrolment at any official educational centre.

2. *Civil Servants:*

(i) If 8–9 children, charged lowest rate of personal tax.

(ii) If 10 children, also given exemption from income tax and house-rent tax.

(iii) If more than 10 children, also receive the following bonus:

11	children	5	per cent.	of basic salary.
12	„	10	„	„
13	„	15	„	„

up to 50 per cent. for 20 children or more (only legitimate or legitimized children were acknowledged in granting allowances).

The 1927 Decree extended these allowances to orphans whose parents had received them. Discrimination in the system meant that the benefit to workmen was insignificant while civil servants already drawing high salaries received considerable bonuses and tax reductions. It was calculated that there were 120,000 families with over 8 children in Spain, but by the end of 1931 only 52,000 were receiving benefit.

At the end of 1931 the whole system was abolished by Largo Caballero, Socialist Minister of Labour, who said that 'a man who begot many children should be hanged rather than rewarded'. Maternity insurance has been introduced instead.

SWEDEN (B.C.S.).

Civil Servants only (not local government servants).

Inclusion in the cost of living bonus of a flat rate allowance of 4 Kroner per month for every child under 16 years of age.

SWITZERLAND (B.C.S.).

1. *Federal employees* (civil servants, government companies, P.T.T., and railways).

(*a*) No real family bonuses, but a 'residence bonus' (varying with cost of living in different localities) graded according as the employee is married or not.

	Single employees	*Married employees*
Zone	(1) 90 frs.	120 frs. per year.
„	(2) 180 „	240 „
„	(3) 270 „	360 „
„	(4) 360 „	480 „

1933. Total cost amounted to 9,613 m. frs.

(*b*) Child bonuses are given for children under 18, and amount to 120 frs. per year.

The system includes legitimate, adopted and step-children, and also illegitimate children if the paternity of the civil servant is established, or if the mother is a federal employee; grandchildren if parents cannot support them; and all other children, reared from the age of 6 months by the employee, and whose real parents cannot support them.

2. *Cantonal and Communal Employees.*

(i) Cantons: out of 25 cantons and demi-cantons, only 2 give family

allowances (Lucerne and Fribourg). Lucerne: 50 frs. p.a. per child under 18 years. Fribourg: 120 frs. per child from the third child.

(ii) Communes:

(*a*) Locle: an allowance of 120 frs. p.a. for each child under 18, with a maximum of 480 frs. p.a.

(*b*) Town of Lucerne:
If married . . . bonus 100 frs. per year.
If married and 1 child . . . 250 frs. per year.
If married and 2 children . . . 350 frs. per year.
3rd, 4th, and 5th children . . . 50 frs. for each:
(The maximum allowance is 500 frs. p.a.).

(*c*) Town of St. Gall: workers only: bonus of 5 frs. per month for each child under 17 years.

FAMILY ALLOWANCES IN PRIVATE UNDERTAKINGS, OTHER THAN IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM

STATUTORY SCHEMES

AUSTRALIA (Australian Year Book).

New South Wales.

1. Family Endowment Act, 1927: The maximum rate is 5*s.* for each child under school-leaving age and, where practicable, is paid to the mother. Residence qualification of two years' previous domicile in N.S.W. is required. Maximum rate may be reduced so that it will not raise family income above the prescribed limit. Up to December 1929 the limit equalled the amount of the current living wage plus £13 per year for each dependent child. (Illegitimate children are excluded except in special circumstances.) In May 1933 the living wage for man, wife, and 1 child was fixed by the Industrial Commission at £3 8*s.* 6*d.*

The scheme is financed by a tax on employers (of 5*d.* in the £ of wages bills, collected by means of stamps) and a grant from the public treasury. Since the allowances are 'payable only to the extent by which the total income of the claimant and his family falls short of the sum represented by the living wage plus children's allowances', the minimum percentages are those shown below:

No. of children	*Maximum total income including family allowance*	*Percentages*
	£ *s.* *d.*	
1	3 8 6	7·9
2	3 13 6	15·8
3	3 18 6	23·6
4	4 3 6	31·5

The allowances are paid during unemployment.

	No. of families receiving allowances	*Total benefits*	*Tax collected*
		£	£
1928	39,132	814,518	1,012,758
1929	42,000	1,553,986	52,598
1930	37,000	1,261,202	1,886,715
1931	38,948	1,196,484	558,555
1932	59,293	1,805,685	930,264

2. N.S.W. Banks: Special award June 1927: £29 p.a. per dependent child under 14 (or 16 if still at school), provided that allowance does not bring income over £750. (There has been some modification by collective agreement since 1927.)

So the minimum percentages are:

1 child: 4·0 per cent.
2 children: 8·4 „
3 children: 13·1 „
4 children: 18·3 „

ITALY. See Chapter III, pp. 39–40.

NEW ZEALAND (Family Endowment Society).

The 1926 Act grants 2*s.* per week to each legitimate child under 15 years of age, from third child onwards, to families with total income of less than £3 17*s.* 6*d.* per week. The family allowance is paid directly to mothers through the Post Office and must be used for the children's benefit.

The grants are paid out of general State revenue.

PRIVATE SCHEMES

CZECHOSLOVAKIA (L. of N.).

Provisions in collective agreements, mainly banks, mining, and agriculture.

1. '*Credit Establishments*'. Allowances are given in accordance with salary grade. For the first three dependent children up to 21 years of age: 1,500, 2,000, and 2,500 Kc. per year.

2. *Mining.*

(*a*) *Money allowances*: Morava-Ostrava Basin: workers with at least 3 dependent children receive family allowance per shift of 1·83 Kc. for 3 children, 1·95 for 4, 2·07 for 5, 2·19 for 6, and 2·31 for 7 or more up to 14 years (or 18 years if still students or incapacitated).

Kladno-Raknovik Basin: 1 Kc. per shift for each dependent child under 16 years living at home.

Plzen—Radice Basin: Family allowance to married workers and additions for dependent children. Rate increases as wage falls.

Lignite mines, N.W. Bohemia: 1·35 Kc. per shift for each child

under 14 years (under 16 if incapacitated). Also household allowance of 0·9 Kc. per shift.

(*b*) *Allowances in kind*: Free coal (or coal at a reduced price), housing facilities, &c.

1932: 372 mining establishments, employing 110,000 workers, paid family allowances of 42·5 m. Kc. (3·6 per cent. of wages bill) and 44 m. Kc. as family allowances in kind.

3. *Agriculture*. To permanent workers who lodge with employers and who receive part wages in kind. Cash wage fixed irrespective of needs, but receipts in kind are generally graduated. (Housing, wood, coal, cereals, &c.) In Bohemia, in addition, such benefits to married workers are 25 per cent. higher than to unmarried.

GERMANY (L. of N.). (Also see Chapter II, p. 24.)

1. *Salaried employees*, 1929: 25 per cent. of all married, widowed, and divorced employees received allowances for wives. Of these:

57·7	per cent.	received not more than	10	Rm. per month.
17·0	,,	,,	11-15	,,
12·8	,,	,,	16-20	,,
4·0	,,	,,	21-25	,,
3·3	,,	,,	26-30	,,
2·1	,,	,,	31-35	,,
3·1	,,	,,	over 35	,,

27·1 per cent. received family allowances for children. Of these:

37·2	per cent.	received not more than	10	Rm.	per month.
10·3	,,	,,	11-15	,,	,,
28·2	,,	,,	16-20	,,	,,
3·8	,,	,,	21-25	,,	,,
4·1	,,	,,	26-30	,,	,,
0·8	,,	,,	31-35	,,	,,
15·6	,,	,,	over 35	,,	,,

2. *Coal mining*. Allowances per working day, 1930:

	Allowances for wives	*Family allowances for children*
	Rm.	Rm.
Ruhr . .	0·16	0·16
Upper Silesia	0·10	0·11
Lower Silesia	0·09	0·09
Westphalia .	0·10	0·10
Saxony .	..	0·10

Also allowances in kind (mainly coal).

1927: Allowances (almost all family allowances) formed 2·7 per cent. of miners' earnings in Upper Silesia, 3·2 per cent. in the Ruhr, and 1·4 per cent. in Saxony.

GREAT BRITAIN.

1. *The School of Economics* (London). Given to all members of Federation of University Teachers. Grant of £30 p.a. per child up to 13 and £60 p.a. up to 23 (if child is still a student). Allowances are paid by School authorities.

Percentages (Salaries range from £275 to £1,250 p.a.)

£275 p.a.	*Under 13 years*	*Over 13 years*	£1,250	*Under 13 years*	*Over 13 years*
	%	%		%	%
1 child	10·9	21·8	1 child	2·4	4·8
2 children	21·8	43·6	2 children	4·8	9·6
3 children	32·7	65·4	3 children	7·2	14·4
4 children	43·6	87·3	4 children	9·6	19·2

2. *Wesleyan Methodists* (Rev. W. H. Hart).

The system began in 1819 and consists of a fund for the maintenance and education of ministers' children. The allowances are paid by the authorities and collected for each of the 46 districts of England, Wales, and Scotland. Individual assessments are made for each district.

The rates are £8 8*s*. for each child up to 18 years, plus an additional £12 per year for 6 years as an education grant (generally begins at 10–12 years). 1932: 1,976 allowances were given for dependent children.

The average salary for married ministers is £300 p.a.

Percentages: at £300 p.a.

	Children under 12 years	*Children over 12 years*
	%	%
1 child .	2·8	6·8
2 children .	5·6	13·6
3 children .	8·4	20·4
4 children .	11·2	27·2

HUNGARY (L. of N.).

1. *Mining*: Allowances are fairly general and are given for children under 14 years of age.

2. *Banking*: It is customary for married employees to draw higher salaries, often 10 per cent. above unmarried men, the difference being either in salary increment or housing allowance. In certain banks children's allowances are granted, too, varying with the grade of the father and the number of children.

NETHERLANDS (L. of N.).

Private Undertakings: Family allowances are met with occasionally. Some firms have funds to which employers contribute. Others have contributions from employees alone. In agriculture allowances are sometimes paid in kind. Amounts vary from 0·20 fl. to 1·5 fls. per week per child.

POLAND (L. of N.).

Family allowances are given either through collective agreement clauses or under rules issued by the management (in the case of State monopolies).

Allowances are given in coal and other mining (collective agreements of November 1929 for Upper Silesia, and June 1929 for Dombrowa and Cracow Fields), certain other industries, and various public utilities and banks. The allowances are paid at the employers' expense.

1. *Coal Mines.*

Upper Silesia: Allowances for all working days and holidays are included in collective agreement. (*a*) Household allowances to married workers and to divorcees and widows having their own household. (Also to unmarried people contributing to the support of their families.) The allowance is 0·18 zloty per day. (*b*) Children's allowances (up to 14 years of age)—0·28 zloty per day to legitimate, adopted, and illegitimate children (the latter only if the father is legally bound to support the child and if the mother is not receiving an allowance).

Dombrowa and Cracow Fields: Household allowances are given as bonus for regular attendance at work.

Dombrowa Field	*Cracow Field*
Unmarried workers: 6 per cent. of weekly earnings	5 per cent.
Married, widows, &c.:	
1 child 12 per cent.	10 per cent. (Increased bonus only
2 children 19 „	17 „ for worker's own children
4 or more 29 „	25 „ under 15 years of age.)

Loss of bonus if unjustified absence from work for more than 2 working days per month.

Also coal allowances (or cash in lieu of coal) graded according to whether the worker is married or not.

2. *Petroleum Industry.*

Married workers receive twice the lodging, heating, and lighting allowance granted to unmarried workers.

3. *Lead and zinc mines in Upper Silesia.*

Household allowance 0·17 zloty per day, and children's allowance granted (if under 14 years of age) of 0·28 zloty per day per child. Also coal allowance varied in accordance with size of the family.

4. *Potassium mines of Kalusz and Stebnik.*

Bonus for regular attendance, amounting to 15 per cent. of basic wage for unmarried worker, 20 per cent. for married worker with 1 child, 25 per cent. if 2 to 3 children, and 30 per cent. if over 3 children. Only paid for worker's own children and if under 15 years of age. There are also coal and rent allowances.

5. Various other industries, e.g. salt mines, cement works, metal industry, chemicals, paper manufacture, sugar refining, &c.

1930 statistics of specified industries (married workers only):

	Coal mines	*Iron foundries*	*Zinc foundries*
Number of workers employed in firms granting family allowances .	118,624	43,826	11,075
Number of workers receiving allowances .	84,408	..	..
Cost of money allowances	18,034,285 zloty	2,652,535 zloty	1,078,159 zloty
Value of coal allowances	15,691,139 „	4,722,988 „	1,392,432 „

United States (Family Endowment Society).

Two isolated examples:

1. Columbia Conserve Co. of Indianapolis: $1 per week per child up to a limit of 6 children.

2. Wells College: every married member of the staff receives an additional $1,000 per year for his wife and $250 per year for each child under 21. A similar system is contemplated at Bennington College.

FAMILY ALLOWANCES GIVEN BY MICHELIN & CO. IN THEIR FACTORIES AT CLERMONT-FERRAND AND NEIGHBOURHOOD

The system began in 1916 and by 1930 a very generous monthly allowance was being given. The rate was:

1 child . . .	100 francs per month
2 children . . .	200
3 „ . . .	405
4 „ . . .	540
5 „ . . .	675
6 „ . . .	810

When the 1932 Act came into force this rate, however, was lowered to the legal minimum for the Département. The higher rate is still given to certain workers in the factories, i.e. those married workers who were employed by the company before April 1933 and had at least one child before April 1934. The allowances are treated by the regional equalization fund as an exception and paid at the same time as the ordinary wages and salaries. Birth premiums are also paid, though the rates are not given, and there are suckling premiums which amount to 60 francs per month for six months.

The company also provides cheap housing accommodation for its employees. The 'Société Anonyme des Habitations à Bon Marché Michelin' has constructed three blocks of flats and 810 individual houses. The rent charged is as follows:

Flats:

3 rooms 870 francs p.a.; 4 rooms 1,092 francs p.a.; 5 rooms 1,296 francs p.a.

Houses: From 1,008 to 1,308 francs p.a. according to the number of rooms.

Both flats and houses have gardens attached.

Medical attendance is one of the most prominent features of the company's social services. A sanatorium has been built on the outskirts of the town; children are sent to convalescent homes or holiday camps; workers may be sent to special spas for various diseases, and, in addition, the company pays part of the cost for spectacles, crutches, special boots, &c. Within the factories themselves, female workers who are pregnant are given specially light duties, while attached to the factories are crèches for the workers' young children.

RELATION BETWEEN BASIC SALARY OR WAGE AND FAMILY ALLOWANCE IN DIFFERENT REGIONS OF FRANCE

Minimum Legal Rates of Allowance. Salaries and wages are from 'Bulletin Trimestriel de Statistique', January–March 1935, and are for October 1934 unless otherwise stated. Calculation for salary is 25 daily items equals a month, i.e. same as Caisses's calculation for monthly allowance. Minimum legal rates are from the 'Manuel Pratique des Allocations Familiales'.

INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE ONLY

Département	*Daily wage in francs*	*Monthly wage in francs*	*Legal minimum monthly rate of allowance in francs*	*Family allowance as percentage of wage with different numbers of dependent children*					
				1 child	*2 children*	*3 children*	*4 children*	*5 children*	*6 children*
Ain	32·80	820·00	25/60/110+80	3·05	7·3	13·4	23·2	32·9	42·7
Allier	30·15 (1933)	756·25	20/50/90+30+60	2·7	6·6	11·9	18·6	26·5	34·4
Ardèche	32·50	812·5	20/50/100+50	2·5	6·2	12·3	18·5	24·6	30·8
Ariège	31·65	791·25	20/50/90+40	2·5	6·3	11·4	16·5	21·5	26·6
Aube	34·60	865·00	25/85/200+120	2·9	9·8	23·1	37·0	50·8	64·8
Bouches-du-Rhône	37·00	925·00	25/50/100+50	2·7	5·4	10·8	16·2	21·6	27·0
Calvados	30·80	770·00	17·50/40/67·50+27·50	2·3	5·2	8·8	12·3	15·9	19·5
Cantal	30·70	767·50	15/30/70+40	2·0	3·9	9·1	14·3	19·5	24·8
Corse	33·15 (1932)	828·75	15/30/45+20	1·8	3·6	5·4	7·8	10·3	12·7
Doubs	32·00	800·00	20/45/75+35+40	2·5	5·6	9·4	13·8	18·8	23·8
Indre-et-Loire	32·70	817·50	25/55/105+55+60+70	3·1	6·7	12·8	19·6	26·9	35·5
Manche	30·00	750·00	17·50/40/70+40	2·3	5·3	9·3	14·7	20·0	25·3
Haute-Marne	31·65	791·25	20/60/105+50+50+60	2·5	7·6	13·3	19·6	25·9	33·6
Bas-Rhin	35·80	895·00	25/60/105+45+50	2·8	6·7	11·7	16·8	22·4	27·9
Haut-Rhin	32·00	800·00	25/62·50/112·50+50+62·50+75+75+100	3·1	7·8	14·1	20·3	28·1	37·5
Seine	50·72	1,268·00	30/70/120+80	2·4	5·5	9·5	15·8	22·1	28·4
Vosges	31·90	797·50	20/50/100+70	2·5	6·3	12·6	21·3	30·1	38·9
T. de Belfort	31·50	787·50	25/45/75+35+40	3·2	5·7	9·5	14·0	19·0	25·1
Yonne	35·35	883·75	15/45/85+50	1·7	5·1	9·6	15·1	20·9	26·6
AGRICULTURE									
Aisne (Laon & Soissons)	6,215 frs. per year	518 frs.	10/30/55/85/120/160/200	1·9	5·8	10·6	16·4	23·2	30·8
Hérault (Montpellier)	7,200 frs. per year	600	10/30/55/85/120/160/200	1·7	5·0	9·2	14·2	20·0	26·8

INFANTILE MORTALITY RATES

Number of Infants dying under 1 year of age per 1,000 live births

		France					
	Belgium	*Official rate*	*Haut Rhin Département*	*Haut Rhin Fund*	*Nord Département*	*Valenciennes Fund*	*England and Wales*
1921	115·5	..	70·7	..	97·2	..	77·8
1922	103·7	83·7	73·3	..	90·5	..	73·8
1923	93·7	96·4	75·8	..	94·6	..	68·4
1924	89·0	84·4	67·1	..	83·9	..	73·7
1925	94·0	89·9	68·8	53·2	88·2	..	74·0
1926	96·1	96·8	80·0	73·7	93·8	..	69·4
1927	90·6	82·1	66·2	53·3	85·3	73·7	67·7
1928	87·9	90·7	63·4	51·7	88·1	75·8	65·4
1929	103·5	94·8	71·8	57·7	101·5	78·4	73·4
1930	94·5	79·2	60·6	47·0	91·7	75·6	60·2
1931	81·7	75·0	61·5	43·5	73·7	45·2	65·5
1932	86·3	..	..	38·6	..	61·4	64·1
1933	..	..	..	..	..	..	61·9

BIRTH-RATES: BELGIUM, FRANCE, AND ENGLAND AND WALES

	Belgium	*France*			*England and Wales*	
			Births per 1,000 females aged 15–49 years			
	Births per 1,000 total population	*Births per 1,000 total population*	*(a) Computed to official estimates* +	*(b) Computed to M. Sauvy's estimates* ×	*Births per 1,000 total population*	*Births per 1,000 females aged 15–49 years*
1921	21·8	20·7	75·8	75·8	22·4	78·7
1922	20·4	19·3	70·7	70·6	20·4	72·5
1923	20·4	19·1	70·5	70·4	19·7	70·3
1924	19·9	18·7	69·5	69·4	18·8	66·8
1925	19·8	19·0	70·8	70·6	18·3	64·9
1926	19·0	18·8	70·2+	70·0	17·8	63·2
1927	18·3	18·2	68·1+	67·7	16·6	59·2
1928	18·4	18·3	68·7+	68·0	16·7	59·4
1929	18·1	17·7	66·1+	66·1×	16·3	57·7
1930	18·7	18·0	67·6+	68·0×	16·3	57·9
1931	18·2	17·5	66·5+	67·4×	15·8	56·4
1932	17·6	17·3	..	67·2×	15·3	54·9
1933	..	16·3	..	64·8×	14·4	52·1

FRANCE: DEPARTMENTAL BIRTH PREMIUMS (JANUARY 1ST, 1935)

Département	*First child giving right to premium*	*Premium in francs*
Ain	3rd	300 frs. to 3rd with 100 frs. increase for each subsequent child.
Aisne	3rd	150 frs. to 3rd with 50 frs. increase for each subsequent child.
Allier	..	None.
Basses-Alpes	4th	250 frs. to 4th, 300 to 5th, 400 to 6th and each subsequent child.
Hautes-Alpes	3rd	200 frs. to 3rd, 250 to 4th, 300 to 5th, and 400 to 6th and each subsequent child.
Alpes-Maritimes	3rd	300 frs. to 3rd with 100 frs. increase for each subsequent child.
Ardèche	3rd	300 frs. with increase of 50 frs. for each subsequent child.
Ardennes	4th	200 frs. to 4th, 250 to 5th, 300 to 6th, 350 to 7th, 400 to 8th, 500 to 9th and subsequent children.
Ariège	4th	100 frs. to 4th, with increase of 50 frs. for each subsequent child.
Aube	3rd	100 frs. to 3rd with increase of 100 frs. for each subsequent child.
Aude	3rd	200 frs. to 3rd with 100 frs. increase for each subsequent child up to 600 frs.
Aveyron	4th	200 frs. to 4th with 100 frs. increase for each subsequent child up to 1,000 frs.
Bouches-du-Rhône	3rd	300 frs. to 3rd with 100 frs. increase for each subsequent child.
Calvados	4th	300 frs. to 4th and to each succeeding child.
Cantal	3rd	150 frs. to 4th with 50 frs. increase for each subsequent child up to 600 frs.
Charente	4th	400 frs. to 4th, 600 to 5th, 800 to 6th, 1,000 to 7th and subsequent children.
Charente-Inférieure	4th	300 frs. to 4th and 50 frs. increase for each subsequent child.
Cher	..	Département gives some addition to Communal premiums.
Corrèze	4th	150 frs. to 4th and 300 frs. to 5th and subsequent children.
Corse	4th	100 frs. to 4th, 150 for each subsequent child.
Côte-d'Or	3rd	400 frs. to 3rd with 100 frs. increase for each subsequent child.
Côtes du Nord	4th	300 frs. to 4th and 5th, 400 frs. to subsequent children.
Creuse	3rd	300 frs. to 3rd, 500 frs. to 4th and subsequent children.
Dordogne	4th	150 frs. to 4th and for each subsequent child.
Doubs	..	None.
Drôme	4th	400 frs. to 4th with 100 frs. increase for each subsequent child up to 1,000 frs.
Eure	3rd	200 frs. to 3rd with 100 frs. increase per child up to 500 frs.
Eure-et-Loir	4th	300 frs. to 4th with 100 frs. increase per child.
Finistère	4th	300 frs. to 4th and each subsequent child.

FRANCE: DEPARTMENTAL BIRTH PREMIUMS (JANUARY 1ST, 1935) (*continued*)

Département	*First child giving right to premium*	*Premium in francs*
Gard	3rd	300 frs. to 3rd with 100 frs. increase per child to 1,000 frs.
Haute-Garonne	3rd	250 frs. to 3rd, 300 to 4th, with 100 frs. increase up to 6th and then 150 frs. increase up to 1,100 frs.
Gers	3rd	150 frs. to 3rd and each subsequent child.
Gironde	3rd	375 frs. to 3rd, 750 frs. to 4th and each subsequent child.
Hérault	3rd	300 frs. to 3rd, 100 frs. to 4th and subsequent children.
Ille-et-Vilaine	4th	300 frs. to 4th and each subsequent child.
Indre	3rd	100 frs. to 3rd, 150 to 4th, 225 to 5th, 275 to 6th and subsequent children.
Indre-et-Loire	4th	300 frs. to 4th, with 100 frs. increase per child.
Isère	3rd	300 frs. to 3rd and each subsequent child.
Jura	4th	300 frs. to 4th and subsequent children.
Landes	3rd	200 frs. to 3rd with 100 frs. increase per child to 800 frs.
Loir-et-Cher	..	None.
Loire	3rd	300 frs. to 3rd and subsequent children (with additional for wives of workers not paying income tax).
Haute-Loire	4th	200 frs. to 4th with 50 frs. increase per child.
Loire-Inférieure	4th	200 frs. to 4th with 50 frs. increase per child up to 1,000 frs.
Loiret	3rd	200 frs. to 3rd, 300 to subsequent children.
Lot	3rd	200 frs. to 3rd, 500 to subsequent children.
Lot-et-Garonne	4th	300 frs. to 4th with 100 frs. increase per child (for needy families only).
Lozère	4th	300 frs. to 4th and subsequent children.
Maine-et-Loire	4th	500 frs. to 4th with 100 frs. increase per child.
Manche	4th	300 frs. to 4th with 50 frs. increase to 450 frs.
Marne	4th	300 frs. to 4th and subsequent children.
Haute-Marne	3rd	150 frs. to 3rd with 50 frs. increase per child.
Mayenne	3rd	300 frs. to 3rd with 50 frs. increase per child.
Meurthe-et-Moselle	3rd	200 frs. to 3rd with 50 frs. increase per child to 400 frs.
Meuse	3rd	250 frs. to 3rd with 50 frs. increase per child.
Morbihan	4th	300 frs. to 4th and 5th, 350 frs. to 6th with 50 frs. increase per child to 500 frs.
Moselle	4th	300 frs. to 4th with 100 frs. increase per child.
Nièvre	..	None.
Nord	4th	300 frs. to 4th and 50–100 frs. increase per child to 1,000 frs. (100 frs. is for families not paying income tax).
Oise	3rd	200 frs. to 3rd with 100 frs. increase per child to 500 frs.
Orne	4th	400 frs. to 4th, 5th, and 6th, 500 frs. to 7th and 8th, 600 frs. to subsequent children.
Pas-de-Calais	..	None.
Puy-de-Dôme	..	None.
Basses-Pyrénées	4th	200 frs. to 4th with 50 frs. increase per child.
Hautes-Pyrénées	3rd	300 frs. to 3rd and subsequent children.
Pyrénées-Orientales	4th	300 frs. to 4th and subsequent children.
Bas-Rhin	4th	300 frs. to 4th with 100 frs. increase per child to 1,000 frs.

Département	*First child giving right to premium*	*Premium in francs*
Haut-Rhin . .	4th	300 frs. to 4th with 100 frs. increase per child to 8th, 9th 850 frs., 10th and after 1,000 frs.
Rhône . .	3rd	300 frs. to 3rd with 100 frs. increase per child.
Haute-Saône .	3rd	100 frs. to 3rd with 100 frs. increase per child to 1,000 frs.
Saône-et-Loire .	4th	300 frs. to 4th with 50 frs. increase per child.
Haute-Savoie .	3rd	300 frs. to 3rd with 100 frs. increase per child to 1,000 frs.
Seine . . .	3rd	650 frs. to 3rd, 850 to 4th, 1,050 to 5th, 1,250 frs. to 6th and subsequent children.
Seine-Inférieure .	3rd	200 frs. to 3rd and 4th, 300 to 5th and subsequent children.
Seine-et-Marne .	3rd	200 frs. to 3rd with 100 frs. increase per child to 500 frs.
Seine-et-Oise .	..	None.
Deux-Sèvres .	3rd	250 frs. to 3rd, 350 to 4th, 450 to 5th, 550 to 6th, 700 to 7th, 850 to 8th, and 1,000 frs. to 9th and subsequent children.
Somme . .	4th	400 frs. to 4th and 5th, 500 frs. to 6th and subsequent children.
Tarn . . .	4th	500 frs. to 4th with 100 frs. increase per child to 800 frs.
Tarn-et-Garonne .	4th	200 frs. to 4th, 250 frs. to 5th and subsequent children.
Territoire de Belfort . .	3rd	300 frs. to 3rd with 100 frs. increase per child.
Var . . .	4th	200 frs. to 4th and subsequent children.
Vaucluse . .	3rd	200 frs. to 3rd with 100 frs. increase per child to 1,000 frs.
Vendée . .	4th	100 frs. to 4th, with 50 frs. increase per child for subsequent children.
Vienne . .	4th	200 frs. to 4th with 50 frs. increase per child to 400 frs.
Haute-Vienne .	..	None.
Vosges . .	4th	300 frs. to 4th with 50 frs. increase per child.
Yonne . .	4th	300 frs. to 4th with 100 frs. increase per child.

SPECIAL ADVANTAGES FOR LARGE FAMILIES GIVEN IN FRANCE

1. *National Allowances* (*Annual*).

For families not paying income tax: for children under 13 years or 16 if students, apprentices, or incurables, from 3rd onwards, if legitimate or legitimized.

Given to father if alive: 84 frs. for 3rd, 300 frs. for 4th, 480 frs. for 5th and subsequent children.

If father dead, interned, disappeared, or run away, 300 frs. for 2nd, 480 frs. for subsequent children.

If mother dead, &c., 300 frs. for 3rd and 480 frs. for subsequent children.

If orphans, or abandoned, 300 frs. for 1st, 480 frs. for subsequent children.

'Ne se cumule ni avec l'allocation d'assistance aux familles nombreuses, ni avec les indemnités pour charges de famille versées par l'État, les Départements, les Communes où les service publics à leurs fonctionnaires.'

2. *Assistance to Large Families.*

The 1913 Law now includes foreigners in France—Italians, Poles, Belgians, and Luxemburgers—as reciprocal treaties have been concluded with these countries. If means insufficient, these families may receive annual allowances of 270 to 300 frs. according to the particular Commune. Children under 13 years, &c., and if mother and father alive, there must be at least 3 children to qualify the family for an allowance. (Application to foreigners only since passage of Act for National Encouragement recently.)

3. *Allowances for Confinement.*

Every Frenchwoman not personally registered for Social Insurance (husband may be), if showing lack of sufficient means can obtain for 8 weeks (4 weeks before and 4 weeks after confinement) a daily allowance of 2·50 frs. to 7·50 frs.

If she receives this, she is also entitled to a premium for suckling of 45 frs. per month for 6 months, and 15 frs. per month for the succeeding 6 months. These premiums are due right from birth of first child. The woman is also entitled to stay away from work for 12 weeks.

4. *Birth Premiums.*

The State gives subsidies to each Département willing to grant birth premiums.

They are given to each French family (or families where the mother is French) whatever the size of their income.

By January 1st, 1933, 66 Départements adopted this for all their Communes, 13 for those Communes helping to pay the premiums, 5 only with special reservations, and 6 others not at all. (See Tables of Birth Premiums, pp. 137–9.)

5. *Social Insurance Premiums.*

Families with total incomes (excluding family allowances) of not over 15,000 francs (18,000 frs. in towns of over 200,000 population and

increase of 2,000 frs. for 1st child, 4,000 for 2nd, and raised to 25,000 if there are 3 or more children) are compulsorily registered for Social Insurance.

Social Insurance entitles them to the following monetary assistance:

(*a*) Maternity allowance—for 12 weeks (6 before and 6 after confinement) —50 per cent. of daily allowance for illness plus medical costs.

(*b*) Suckling allowance—for maximum period of 9 months, allowance of 150 frs. per month for first 4 months, 100 for 5th and 6th, and 50 frs. per month for remainder. If unable to suckle, mother may receive gifts of milk up to total value of not more than two-thirds the total suckling allowance for 9 months (i.e. not over two-thirds of 950 frs.).

(*c*) Allowances during illness of insured wife or children under 16 years from 6th day of illness for maximum period of 6 months.

(*d*) Invalidity.

(*e*) Old Age.

(*f*) Death: Capital payment equal to 20 per cent. of insured person's average annual income and not less than 1,000 frs.
Orphans' pensions in addition.

(*g*) Dependent children (own or not):
Sickness pay: increase of 1 fr. per child per day .
Invalidity pay: increase of 100 frs. per child per year.
Death: increase of 100 frs. per child in payment.
Wives of insured persons, aged at least 35 years, can also specially insure themselves in addition and are then entitled to extra benefits.

6. '*Professional' Family Allowances* (Gen. F. A. Law 1932).

7. *Unemployment Benefit.*

Daily rate (maximum): 1 child 13 frs., 2 children 16 frs., 3 children 19 frs., &c., up to 5 children and over 25 frs. (must not exceed value of half usual salary), increased by the amount of family allowances customary in the occupation or region.

8. *Rebates in Taxes.*

(Dependent children defined for this purpose as:
(i) Own children under 21 years or, if incapable, indefinitely;
(ii) On the same conditions, children treated as own.)

'*Impôts Cédulaires*'.

(i) On salaries: if income not over 20,000 frs., rebates of 20 per cent. for each of first 2 children, and 60 per cent. for each subsequent child.
20–40,000 frs., 15 per cent. for first 2 children, 45 per cent. for subsequent children.
Over 40,000 frs., 10 per cent. for first 2 children, 30 per cent. for subsequent children.
Total reduction not to exceed 800 frs. per dependent child.
(Family allowances not taxable.)

(ii) On profits (industry, commerce, and professions): 10 per cent. reduction for each of first 2 children, 30 per cent. for subsequent children. Total not to exceed 800 frs. per child.

(iii) Income Tax:
  (*a*) Basis is 10,000 frs. for unmarried man. This raised by 5,000 frs. if married, or if a widower with dependent children; if taxpayer has children, by 5,000 frs. for each of first two, 8,000 for 3rd, 9,000 for 4th, and 10,000 for subsequent children.
  (*b*) Increase of tax for childless or unmarried men over 30 years of age.
(iv) Succession duties: other things being equal, lower for each additional child left by deceased.
(v) The property of working-class 'large families' cannot be attached for debt.
(vi) Pensions to children of workers killed by accidents at work.
(vii) 'Bourses, trousseaux et degrèvements dans les établissements nationaux de bienfaisance.'

9. *Education.*

Reduced school charges: (secondary schools) depending on number of children enrolled at the time in secondary schools.

For 2 children rebate of 12½ per cent.; 3 children 15 per cent.; 4 children 20 per cent.; 5 and over 25 per cent.

10. *Special Advantages reserved for 'Fonctionnaires' (Government Employees).*

(i) Indemnities in respect of dependent children: 660 frs. per year for 1st, 960 for 2nd, 1,560 for 3rd, 1,920 for 4th and subsequent. (Up to 16 years, or 21 years if students.)
(ii) Increase in pensions for those who have had at least 3 children living up to 16 years of age: 10 per cent. for 3, 5 per cent. addition for each subsequent child (not to exceed 70 per cent. of last year's salary). (i) and (ii) cannot be held together, though (i) can be received for young children while (ii) for those over 16 years.
Orphans up to 21 get pension of 10 per cent. of pension their father would have received.
Married men with 3 or more children may stay in office after retiring age.
Free education up to secondary school standard for children.

11. *Rebates on Fares.*

(i) Railway ticket reductions: if 3 or more children under 18 years old; 30 per cent. for 3 children, 40 per cent. for 4, 50 per cent. for 5, 60 per cent. for 6, 70 per cent. for 7 or more.
(ii) Also reduction of 30 per cent. during life of parents, the number of whose living children (at any time since August 10th, 1923), plus those *morts pour la France*, is not less than 5.
Same for parents who have already been obtaining 50 per cent. reduction.

12. *Reductions in local taxes, octroi, &c.*

Exemption from domestic servant tax.
Rebate in 'contribution mobilière' in Paris.
Medal of the 'Famille Française'.

13. *Housing.*

(i) Subsidies: To private individuals to help them build houses for themselves and their families. 5,000 frs. for family with 3 children under 18 years of age, increased by 2,500 frs. for each subsequent child, the total not exceeding 15,000 frs.
Also to Communes, &c., building houses for families with at least 3 children under 16 years of age.

(ii) Building: 1932 Law authorizing 'Sociétés de crédit immobiliers' to lend money to Co-operative 'cheap houses' Societies whose shareholders all have over 3 children, to build or buy collective houses to be let two-thirds to large families.
Communes and Départements authorized to build cheap houses if at least two-thirds of rental comes from families with over 3 children.
Money borrowed for such purpose does not pay over 2 per cent. interest.

(iii) Preference to be given to large families (especially with 6 or more children) in allocation of cheap houses, small-holdings, &c.

(iv) Also fiscal exemptions, &c.

14. (*a*) *Fondation Cognacq-Jay.*

(i) 90 annual awards of 25,000 frs. to large poor families having at least 9 children *nés au même lit* living or *morts pour la France*, mother and father French born and not over 45 years old on January 1st of the year.

(ii) 100 annual awards of 10,000 frs. to French families with at least 5 legitimate children, parents not being over 35 years old on January 1st of the particular year.

(iii) 103 awards of 10,000 frs. to families with at least 5 children. Maximum age of father 35 years.

(*b*) *Other Awards.*

(i) Fondation Baussé. Annual prize of 5,000 frs. for a 'large family'.

(ii) Fondation Carnot. 101 annual gifts of 600 frs. to working-class widows with dependent children.

(iii) Fondation Daigremont. Annual gifts of 600 frs. each to widows with dependent children.

(iv) Fondations Davilliers and Schuhmacher de Guéry. Annual gifts to poor widows with dependent children.

(v) Fondation Deloy. Annual award of 2,000 frs. for a family of at least 8 children, the parents and grandparents to be or have been French subjects.

(vi) Fondation Fournier-Sarlovèze. Award of at least 2,000 frs. to widows of French officers killed in action, preference being given to widows with dependent children.

(vii) Fondation Général Huguet. Annual distribution of the interest on 300,000 frs. among large families.

(viii) Fondation Glière. Annual division of 5,000 frs. between two French Catholic rural families having at least 5 children, one family chosen from the Département of Mayenne, the other from the Département of Maine-et-Loire.

(ix) Fondation H.H.H. Annual award of 5,000 frs. to a French Catholic rural family.

(x) Fondation Ernest Lamy. Two annual awards of 10,000 frs. and one of 5,000 frs. for French Catholic rural families.

(xi) Lefort Bequest. 20,000 frs. for families with at least 5 children living in Paris.

(xii) Fondation Paul Levylier. Two annual awards of 500 frs. for French families with at least 4 children.

(xiii) Malouet Award. Annual award of 3,000 frs. for a secondary school teacher having at least 4 children.

(xiv) Fondation Metzger. Five life annuities of 800 frs. given each year to parents having at least 5 children.

(xv) Lieutenant Mignard Award. Annual award of 500 frs. to a wounded soldier or war-widow having at least 4 living children.

(xvi) Fondation Saulnier. Annual division of 25,000 frs. among 5 rural French families having at least 5 living and healthy children (2 shares reserved for the Cantons of Châteauneuf and Jarnac in Charente).

(xvii) Roy-Vaucouroux Award. Annual award of 6,000 frs. to a French Catholic family having at least 4 children.

(xviii) Spiers Award. Ten awards of 10,000 frs. to the fathers of families of at least 6 living children, reserved for families in the Île de France, Normandy, or Brittany.

(xix) Valpinson Award. Two annual awards of 3,000 frs. for families of 8 living children. (The parents must not be drunkards or sufferers from tuberculosis.)

(xx) Barès Award. Income of 15,000 frs. to be given in 2 annual awards to French inventors having at least 3 children.

ACTUAL NUMBER OF DEPENDENT CHILDREN BY AGE GROUPS AND NUMBER PER 100 EMPLOYEES. MULHOUSE (HAUT-RHIN)

Year	Number of employees and wage earners	Age of children (in years)														Total no. of children
		0–1	1–2	2–3	3–4	4–5	5–6	6–7	7–8	8–9	9–10	10–11	11–12	12–13	13–14	
1921	54,866	2,115 3·85	2,315 4·22	1,514 2·76	898 1·64	761 1·39	985 1·80	1,141 2·08	1,821 3·32	1,842 3·36	1,841 3·36	1,783 3·25	1,944 3·54	2,029 3·70	1,949 3·55	22,938 41·8
1922	56,735	2,256 3·98	2,312 4·08	2,443 4·31	1,565 2·76	966 1·70	819 1·44	1,039 1·83	1,198 2·11	1,858 3·27	1,917 3·38	1,878 3·31	1,871 3·30	1,983 3·50	1,940 3·42	24,045 42·4
1923	58,450	2,176 3·72	2,249 3·85	2,407 4·12	2,522 4·31	1,645 2·81	998 1·71	890 1·52	1,084 1·85	1,237 2·12	1,971 3·37	1,997 3·42	1,998 3·42	1,931 3·30	1,364 2·33	24,469 41·9
1924	63,034	2,372 3·76	2,603 4·13	2,561 4·06	2,741 4·35	2,843 4·51	1,870 2·97	1,138 1·81	1,031 1·64	1,202 1·91	1,355 2·15	2,167 3·44	2,163 3·43	2,242 3·56	1,638 2·60	27,926 44·3
1925	64,325	2,485 3·86	2,620 4·07	2,786 4·33	2,651 4·12	2,804 4·36	2,852 4·43	1,913 2·97	1,138 1·77	1,059 1·65	1,236 1·92	1,388 2·16	2,187 3·40	2,165 3·37	1,423 2·21	28,707 44·7
1926	64,725	2,505 3·87	2,777 4·29	2,838 4·38	2,957 4·57	2,808 4·34	3,025 4·67	3,038 4·69	2,043 3·16	1,238 1·91	1,119 1·73	1,305 2·02	1,471 2·27	2,301 3·56	1,450 2·24	30,875 47·7
1927	65,152	2,543 3·91	2,680 4·11	2,857 4·40	2,780 4·27	2,908 4·47	2,787 4·29	3,640 5·60	2,947 4·53	2,017 3·10	1,222 1·88	1,207 1·86	1,313 2·02	1,422 2·18	1,465 2·25	31,875 48·9
1928	70,298	2,966 4·22	3,127 4·45	3,176 4·54	3,378 4·80	3,191 4·54	3,304 4·70	3,166 4·50	3,299 4·70	3,324 4·72	2,230 3·18	1,338 1·90	1,240 1·76	1,418 2·02	1,042 1·48	36,199 51·5
1929	69,885	3,008 4·50	3,270 4·75	3,241 4·71	3,258 4·73	3,291 4·78	3,223 4·67	3,328 4·84	3,206 4·65	3,314 4·81	3,289 4·78	2,201 3·2	1,335 1·94	1,205 1·75	966 1·40	38,135 54·5
1930	67,631	3,129 4·63	3,156 4·66	3,235 4·78	3,294 4·86	3,242 4·79	3,291 4·86	3,230 4·77	3,349 4·95	3,187 4·72	3,323 4·91	3,289 4·86	2,230 3·3	1,306 1·93	794 1·17	40,055 60·0
1931	58,214	2,718 4·68	2,930 5·04	2,900 4·98	2,944 5·06	3,022 5·19	2,991 5·14	3,066 5·27	2,994 5·15	3,078 5·29	2,978 5·12	3,099 5·32	3,065 5·27	2,066 3·55	825 1·42	38,676 66·4
1932	52,260	2,270 4·35	2,581 4·94	2,704 5·18	2,704 5·18	2,754 5·26	2,818 5·40	2,810 5·38	2,861 5·48	2,844 5·44	2,904 5·56	2,777 5·32	2,965 5·68	2,885 5·52	1,137 2·18	37,014 70·8

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